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“Withdrawing policy accommodation is not for today, tomorrow or even the day after
tomorrow. The economy will require support for quite some time. Moreover, there is
a natural concern that even talking about withdrawal could reduce the effectiveness of
the policies in place by sapping confidence. But at some point, as soon as conditions
allow, disengagement will be called for. Starting the debate now can get markets,
and economic agents generally, ready.”
Claudio Borio
Head of the BIS Monetary and Economic Department




The present manuscript offers but a mere glimpse of my doctoral research that took
place at Toulouse University between 2016 and 2020. Undoubtedly, this was an
exhilarating experience extending far beyond the limits of this document, which
appears to me still perfectible. However, I do experience a certain contentment
regarding the product of the following pages, which I consider as a starting point
of a hopefully long research series in economics. At the end of this journey, it
is pleasant to look back at the progress and to thank those who, in many ways,
contributed to its completion.
First and foremost, I would like to thank my supervisors Alexandre Minda
and Olivier Brossard for their invaluable advice on and contributions to my work.
Alexandre was the first to trust me when I came up in 2015 with a then quite vague
research project on cooperative banking. Ultimately, cooperative banks find them-
selves confined to the last chapter of a thesis dedicated to the risk-taking channel
of monetary policy, and I would like to express my gratitude to him for his support
despite several agenda changes, which I sometimes imposed ineptly. In addition, I
would like to thank Olivier for his methodological advice and his numerous sugges-
tions for improving my working papers despite an extremely busy schedule as the
head of Sciences Po Toulouse. I am profoundly indebted to both of them as they
selflessly helped me become closer to the person I want to be professionally.
My warmest thanks also go to the national association Mouvement Sol, and
especially to Andrea Caro Gomez, who strongly supported this research project
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within the National Association of Research and Technology. Without you Andrea,
I would not be where I am today. I want to thank the French Ministry of Higher
Education and Research and its Industrial Agreement on Training through the
Research Program for the financial support (CIFRE convention) that allowed me
to carry out my research in excellent material conditions.
I greatly benefited from the lively research environment offered by the LEREPS
research unit, where I had many stimulating conversations with scholars and my
fellow PhD researchers. I would like to thank especially Stefano Ugolini for his
comments and suggestions, each more constructive than the last, as well as François-
Seck Fall for his methodological assistance. I want to express all my appreciation to
Jean-Pierre Del Corso and the lab executive committee for backing me up as a board
member and for their continued trust from one academic year to the next. Moreover,
my representative mandate at TESC doctoral school was a genuine opportunity to
gain a better understanding of the crucial issues around which the French public
research is structured nowadays.
Héloïse, you made our office a cocoon where we shared thousands of working
hours with varying degrees of stress, the levels of which were related exponentially
to the frequency of our mouse clicks. Geoffroy, our common love for music, beer,
offbeat humor, and all those moments spent outside the lab with you and Simon
were a real source of pressure relief. I also congratulate Delio, with whom I started
my PhD in 2016, and who will defend his doctoral thesis 6 days after me. Many
thanks, once again, to Anne-Marie and Joël for their background support as behind-
the-scenes players without whom the daily lab life would not be what it is. Zafa,
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Cathy, Isabelle, Hélène, and Arnauld, I wish you all the best in the remainder of
your respective theses. I hope the time separating you from the defense will pass
as pleasantly as possible.
A few people were truly essential in making this endeavor possible and even
pleasurable. I am extremely grateful to my parents, who provided me with every-
thing I needed since my early childhood to stand on my own feet and reach my
full potential. You both always found the right words in my times of doubt and
questioning. I send a massive thank-you to my little sister who, without knowing
it, inspires me as much as she claims I inspire her. Last but not the least, I would
like to thank my partner in life, Anastasia, for her being, her endless curls, and her







The thesis contributes to the recurrent debates in the macroeconomics of banking
regarding the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission. As the unifying
theme of the present essays, I tackle this issue from three different angles with a
special focus on the euro area banking industry. I rely on available data–at both the
bank-level and the country-level–and different identification strategies to deliver up-
to-date empirical evidence contributing to a deeper understanding of the monetary
policy impacts on credit risk.
In the first chapter of the thesis, I investigate how the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy interacts with the degree of leverage in banks’ balance sheets af-
ter the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (GFC). Using dynamic panel techniques, I
first find significant statistical evidence that credit risk is negatively associated with
variations in interest rates, while competition in national banking industries tends
to enhance this effect. I also suggest that this negative relationship is most pro-
nounced for banks with relatively high levels of leverage, which is consistent with a
“search for yield” effect. These results for the euro area are strikingly different from
the U.S. banking industry, confirming that time, geographical circumstances, and
local banking market conditions are key in understanding the impact of monetary
policy on credit risk. Moreover, the results point to the importance of considering
alternative channels of risk taking in addition to traditional portfolio rebalancing
channels in theoretical studies.
The second chapter investigates the joint impact of bank capital and funding
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liquidity on the monetary policy’s risk-taking channel. Using data on the euro area
from 1999 to 2018 and triple interactions between monetary policy, bank equity,
and funding liquidity, I shed light on a “crowding-out of deposits” effect prior to the
GFC, which supports the need for simultaneous capital and funding liquidity ratios
to mitigate the monetary transmission to bank credit risk. Interestingly, the analysis
also highlights a missing crowding-out of deposits effect among low-efficiency banks
in the aftermath of the GFC. Consequently, a trade-off arises between financial
stability and increased funding liquidity, requiring a special treatment for inefficient
banks operating in a low interest rate environment. These results challenge the
implementation of uniform funding liquidity requirements across the euro area as
by the Basel III framework suggests.
The third and last chapter extends the analysis to the special case of coopera-
tive banks and relationship lending in the euro area. These financial intermediaries
tell a different story between countries and therefore imply different responses to
a common monetary policy. Accordingly, I find no evidence of the presence of a
risk-taking channel of monetary policy for consolidated (i.e., less committed to rela-
tionship lending) cooperative banks, whereas the results indicate extensive evidence
of a risk-taking channel in the euro area for non-cooperative banks (see also the pre-
vious chapters of the thesis). Therefore, consolidated cooperative banks seem not
to raise their credit risk significantly when monetary policy is eased. Further, I
highlight that the profitability of cooperative banks preserving their relationship
lending model is more severely hit by a low interest rate environment compared
to cooperative banks opting for consolidation. This finding raises issues on the
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mid-term durability of relationship lending as interest rates have been low for an
extended period in the European banking industry. I ultimately find that both non-
cooperative banks and relationship-based cooperative banks are concerned about
the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission, which results in an increase
in their credit risk under accommodating monetary conditions. Nevertheless, I sug-
gest that such similarities do not exist for the same reasons, as relationship lending
is associated with a fundamentally different lending process than transactions-based
lending technologies, which devote significantly lower proportions of their assets to




La thèse s’inscrit dans les débats florissants en macroéconomie bancaire dédiés au
canal de prise de risque par transmission de la politique monétaire. Ainsi, nous
abordons cette problématique sous trois angles différents au sein du secteur bancaire
de la zone euro. Sur base de nombreuses données micro et macroéconomiques,
nous utilisons toute une palette de stratégies d’évaluation pour fournir plusieurs
preuves empiriques qui contribuent à une meilleure compréhension de l’impact de
la politique monétaire sur le risque de crédit.
Dans le premier chapitre, nous étudions comment le canal de prise de risque
de la politique monétaire interagit avec le niveau d’endettement des établissements
bancaires après la crise financière mondiale de 2008. En utilisant des techniques de
panel dynamiques, nous montrons que le risque de crédit est négativement associé
aux variations de taux d’intérêt, bien que le degré de concurrence dans les indus-
tries bancaires nationales tende à renforcer cet effet. Nous suggérons également
que cette relation négative est plus prononcée pour les banques ayant des niveaux
d’endettement relativement plus élevés, ce qui correspond à un effet “de quête de
rendement”. Ces résultats pour la zone euro sont très différents de ceux observés
dans le secteur bancaire américain, ce qui confirme que le temps, les circonstances
géographiques ainsi que les conditions des marchés bancaires locaux doivent être
pris en compte dans la compréhension de l’impact de la politique monétaire sur le
risque de crédit. De plus, ce point souligne toute l’importance pour la littérature
théorique d’envisager des canaux alternatifs de prise de risque, en plus des canaux
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traditionnels de rééquilibrage de portefeuille.
Le deuxième chapitre examine quant à lui l’impact conjoint du capital bancaire
et de la liquidité de financement sur le canal de prise de risque de la politique moné-
taire. En utilisant des données sur la zone euro de 1999 à 2018 et des interactions
triples entre politique monétaire, fonds propres bancaires et liquidité de finance-
ment, nous mettons en lumière un effet “d’éviction des dépôts” avant la crise de
2008, justifiant la nécessité de mettre en place des ratios de capital et de liquidité
de financement simultanés afin d’atténuer le mécanisme de transmission monétaire
au risque de crédit. L’analyse met également en évidence l’absence d’un tel ef-
fet “d’éviction des dépôts” pour les banques peu efficaces après 2008. Ainsi, cela
place les banques inefficaces opérant dans un environnement à taux bas face à un
dilemme entre stabilité financière et liquidité de financement. En définitive, ces
résultats nous invitent à questionner l’uniformisation des exigences de liquidité de
financement au sein de la zone euro, comme le suggèrent les accords de Bâle III.
Le troisième et dernier chapitre étend l’analyse au cas particulier des banques
coopératives et du prêt relationnel dans la zone euro. Avec des spécificités locales,
régionales et nationales, ces organismes de crédit peuvent réagir de façon très dif-
férente à une même politique monétaire commune. Ainsi, nous ne trouvons pas
de preuves empiriques quant à la présence d’un canal de prise de risque pour les
banques coopératives dites consolidées (c’est-à-dire peu engagées dans le prêt re-
lationnel), alors que ce canal a largement été mis en évidence pour les banques
non-coopératives de la zone euro (voir également les chapitres précédents de la
thèse). Par conséquent, les banques coopératives consolidées semblent ne pas aug-
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menter leur risque de crédit face à un assouplissement de la politique monétaire.
En outre, la rentabilité des banques coopératives qui préservent leur modèle de
prêt relationnel est plus durement touchée par un environnement à taux bas que
les banques coopératives ayant opté pour la consolidation de leurs activités. Cela
soulève des interrogations quant à la viabilité du prêt relationnel lorsque les taux se
maintiennent à des niveaux historiquement bas. Enfin, nous montrons que les ban-
ques non-coopératives et les banques coopératives relationnelles sont toutes deux
touchées par le canal de prise de risque de la politique monétaire, ce qui se traduit
donc par une augmentation de leur risque de crédit. Néanmoins, nous suggérons
que de telles similitudes ne surviennent pas pour les mêmes raisons. En effet, le
prêt relationnel est associé à un processus radicalement différent de celui des prêts
dits transactionnels ; ces derniers consacrant des proportions beaucoup plus faibles
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Most advanced economies, including the euro area, experienced a declining trend in
market interest rates over the past few decades against a background of a declining
equilibrium real interest rate, also referred to as the natural interest rate. In the
aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (GFC), the European Central Bank
(ECB) furthered its lender-of-last-resort function and intensified its market-making
activities to stabilize the euro area economy. Thus, unconventional monetary policy
measures addressing low inflation issues pushed interest rates to ultra-low levels,
suppressed bond spreads, inflated asset prices, and distorted market signals in a
way comparable to the application of financial repression tools after the 1930s (van
Riet, 2019). Figure 1.1 shows the magnitude of the problem between 1999 and 2018
regarding the ECB’s key interest rates and EONIA.
More than ten years after the most acute phase of the GFC, growth remains
sluggish and inflation below target in the euro area. In addition, the COVID-19
pandemic recently prompted renewed lender-of-last-resort interventions and asset
30
Figure 1.1: ECB key interest rates & EONIA (1999-2018)
Notes. Percent per annum from January 1, 1999 to December 31, 2018 (source: ECB).
purchases to ease financial constraints (Pfister and Sahuc, 2020). To help the euro
area absorb the shock, a pandemic emergency purchase program was implemented
by the ECB with an injection of 1,350 billion Euro aimed at reducing borrowing costs
and boosting loan growth in the banking industry. Therefore, the way unconven-
tional monetary policy frameworks impact bank behavior has been and will remain
for some time on the agenda of euro area policymakers and scholars concerned with
preserving financial stability. Drumetz et al. (2015) distinguish two important steps
in the standard description of the monetary transmission to the economy. First,
the ECB sets an interest rate that determines the short-term money market rates
through arbitrage between operations with the central bank or in the interbank
market. Second, the observed and anticipated short-term interest rates are deemed
to feed through to the financial system and the economy. The present thesis aims
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to contribute to the current empirical debates related to this second step, with a
focus on bank credit risk.
Setting policy rates at unprecedentedly low levels and adopting looser mone-
tary policy overall results in flat yield curves. Eventually, “low-for-long” interest
rates (Claessens et al., 2018) might be detrimental to the economy as they encour-
age “search for yield” strategies (with potential increases in non-performing loans),
erode bank profitability (as low rates are typically associated with lower net interest
margins), and reduce bank equity considerably (hence lowering the weight on loan
supply).
A related issue is whether a prolonged period of low interest rates produces
overconfidence in economic agents, with side effects on their risk tolerance. This
mechanism is referred to in the literature as the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy transmission (Fève et al., 2018; Borio and Zhu, 2012), and posits that the
longer the yield curve remains flat, the higher the risk associated with low interest
rates in the banking industry. In addition, an excessively long accommodative
policy may encourage the build-up of leverage and fuel asset price bubbles.
From a theoretical perspective, it is noteworthy that the effects of monetary
policy on bank risk taking are multifaceted. On the demand side, one might expect
that looser monetary policy reduces the financial burden on borrowers, and therefore
lowers the probability of overall default risk (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). On the
supply side, Smith (2002) suggests that the lower interest rates, the higher bank
cash reserves (because such reserves depend mainly on bank opportunity cost), and
the safer bank balance sheets.
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Another strand of the literature provides evidence on the existence of a risk-
taking channel of monetary policy that potentially hampers bank risk perception
when they operate in a (persistently) low interest rate environment (Borio and
Zhu, 2012). For instance, banks might loosen their credit terms (Dell’Ariccia et al.,
2012) and lend to riskier borrowers. Bank profitability is also a matter of concern
to several academics warning that lower profitability might eventually cause banks
to take reckless investment decisions if they are willing to compensate for the losses
incurred (Rajan, 2006). On the liability side, low interest rates also might be
a source of cheaper funding costs for banks and therefore act as an incentive to
increase their levels of leverage (Gertler and Karadi, 2011).
From an empirical perspective, the risk-taking channel of monetary policy is also
extensively documented. Based on a threshold model, Djatche (2019) prove both
the upsides and downsides of monetary policy in U.S. bank risk, where the latter
vary with the deviation of interest rates from the Taylor rule-based rates. Chen
et al. (2017) also suggests that in most emerging economies, lax monetary policy
significantly increases bank risk. Additionally, most studies in advanced economies
usually focus on the near-zero or negative interest rate setting (see, among oth-
ers, Heider et al. (2019); Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014); Jiménez et al. (2014); Delis
and Kouretas (2011); Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) or else Gaggl and Valderrama
(2010)). Moreover, Brana et al. (2019) find that low interest rates and increasing
central bank liquidity have a harmful effect on bank risk taking; this relation is non-
linear as the effects of lasting unconventional monetary policies are stronger below
a certain threshold.
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The starting point of the empirical analysis consists of assessing how the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy takes the floor in the euro area, the latter display-
ing a great deal of heterogeneity in bank-specific characteristics, business models,
and macroeconomic conditions. Interestingly, investigating this path might have
important implications for policymakers to adjust banking supervision and regula-
tion. From this pivotal issue, this thesis covers three lines of research and conducts
empirical investigations in the following chapters.
In Chapter 2, I first analyze the amplitude of the risk-taking channel of mone-
tary policy in 16 euro-area countries over the period 2009-2017. The final sample
consists of 3,898 banks and 27,072 observations. I first evidence the presence of
a “portfolio reallocation” effect whereby, in a low interest rate environment, banks
are influenced to shift their investments away from safe assets towards assets with
higher expected returns (Albertazzi et al., 2018). I also suggest that competition in
the banking industry interacts with this portfolio reallocation channel: the higher
the competition, the greater the extent that monetary policy changes are passed on
to bank credit risk. As high competition lowers the opportunity for banks to enjoy
high market power, herding behaviors are likely to arise, intensifying the negative
impact of monetary policy on risk taking.
I also make the case that bank leverage influences the relation between credit risk
and interest rates through a search for yield effect: highly levered euro area banks
are prone to higher risk taking when monetary policy is eased. This finding stands
in stark contrast to the U.S. banking industry, where the negative link between
risk taking and interest rates is steeper for highly capitalized banks (Dell’Ariccia
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et al., 2017). This might be due to the presence of a “skin-in-the-game” effect (De
Nicolò et al., 2010) in the European banking industry: the more a bank has to
lose in case of failure (i.e., having high levels of capitalization), the less severe the
moral hazard problem. Similarly, a bank with a high franchise value has much to
lose and little incentive to take excessive risk, whereas a zombie bank is prone to
greater risk taking to gamble for resurrection. An important implication of this
result is that a macroprudential tool such as the leverage ratio is actually effective
in influencing the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (Angelini et al., 2014)
and in modifying credit risk.
Further, I identify nonlinearities in the search for yield effect depending on the
level of bank capitalization. Search for yield strategies intensify as bank capital
is depleted and limited liability is more likely to be binding. Such an outcome
suggests that banks complying with the Basel III capital requirements are better
prepared to face the side effects of low-for-long interest rates. Eventually, Chapter
2 highlights the importance of considering bank heterogeneity and geographical
circumstances (including within the euro area) to gauge the relative significance of
monetary policy’s risk-taking channel.
In turn, Chapter 3 is devoted to the joint impact of bank capital and funding
liquidity on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. I believe that analyzing
monetary policy’s risk-taking channel from this perspective is key, as banks, in ad-
dition to being subject to a low interest rate environment, are required to comply
with simultaneous capital and funding liquidity standards within the Basel III reg-
ulatory framework. Accordingly, the coordination of capital and funding liquidity
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ratios with monetary policy is a crucial issue.
Using an extensive dataset of 58,280 bank-year observations on the euro area
between 1999 and 2018, I provide empirical evidence that before the GFC, banks
concerned with a crowding-out of deposits effect (Gorton and Winton, 2017) (i.e.,
having low levels of deposits when equity capital is high) are more sensitive to the
risk-taking channel of monetary policy. However, in the aftermath of the GFC, only
efficient banks continue to display such an effect. Under low interest rates, inefficient
banks become more sensitive to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy if they
must comply with capital and funding liquidity standards simultaneously. In this
scenario, concomitant capital ratios and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) might
be counterproductive in taming risk-taking behaviors.
These findings argue for special treatment for banks unable to recover in terms
of efficiency after the GFC, as it might be harmful for them to require funding
liquidity standards along with the existing capital ratios. The growing share of
inefficient banks in most euro-area countries between 2011 and 2018 also suggests
that inefficiency is a major concern when regulators strengthen capital and funding
liquidity standards simultaneously in a low interest rate environment.
Risk persistence due to strong regulation (Delis and Kouretas, 2011) might ex-
plain this scenario. In particular, capital requirements and liquidity guarantees
might broaden moral hazard, leading to inefficient and risky investments or port-
folio rebalancing toward trading activities over a considerable period. Whereas
prolonged low interest rates erode banks’ income and franchise value, only the fi-
nancial institutions able to fix moral hazard eventually mitigate the risk-taking
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channel of monetary policy. In line with Distinguin et al. (2013), my results also
question the implementation of uniform funding liquidity requirements when less
efficient banks seem to manage their credit risk differently under an accommodative
monetary policy.
Finally, Chapter 4 analyzes the effects of monetary easing on bank credit risk
and profitability in 10 euro-area countries between 2010 and 2019 (with a sample
of 30,467 observations). I investigate how such effects depend on bank ownership
structures and, for cooperative banks, how they interact with relationship lending
practices. Building on previous studies indicating that credit risk and profitability
are jointly determined, I consider a simultaneous equations system to examine how
relationship lending by cooperative banks influences their performance in a low
interest rate environment.
I find no evidence of the presence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy
for consolidated (i.e., less involved in relationship lending) cooperative banks and
extensive evidence for this channel in the euro area for non-cooperative banks (see
also the previous chapters of the present thesis). Second, the profitability of cooper-
ative banks preserving their relationship lending model is more severely hit by a low
interest rate environment compared to cooperative banks opting for consolidation.
This raises issues on the mid-term durability of relationship lending, as interest
rates having been low for an extended period in the European banking industry.
Further, both non-cooperative banks and relationship-based cooperative banks are
concerned about the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission, but not
for the same reasons. As relationship lending is associated with a fundamentally
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different lending process than transactions-based lending technologies, these lat-
ter banks devote significantly lower proportions of their assets to lending to small
businesses and high-risk firms (Berger and Udell, 2002).
Therefore, under low-for-long interest rates, non-cooperative banks accord higher
priority to maintaining their profitability at the expense of higher credit risk (Kuc
and Teply, 2019), whereas relationship-based cooperative banks increase their capi-
tal buffers (on average, the capitalization of relationship-based cooperative banks is
significantly higher than the capitalization of consolidated cooperative banks) to en-
sure access to credit, including for risky local businesses. As a close bank-customer
relationship produces informational rents to the cooperative banks involved, they
exercise some degree of market power and are better prepared to finance riskier
borrowers and projects. While one might be concerned about the durability of rela-
tionship lending when interest rates are close to the zero lower bound, this insight
points to the crucial impact of the bank-customer relationship on the development
of regional and local economies.
Accordingly, the greater the relationship lending strategy of a cooperative bank,
the greater its willingness to undertake credit risk, which is particularly valuable
to high-risk firms and small businesses. Such borrowers are often being informa-
tionally opaque and have far fewer alternatives to access external finance than large
companies. The conclusions raised in this last chapter suggest that further research
on the impact of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy on relationship-based
cooperative banks may yield new insights into alternative transmission mechanisms,
which would differ from the traditional channels already identified in the previous
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literature on commercial (i.e., non-cooperative) banking.
Ultimately, this thesis is in direct line with the relatively recent and abundant lit-
erature that aims to refine the understanding of the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy transmission while accounting for the inherent diversity of bank-level charac-
teristics, business models, and macroeconomic conditions in the European banking
industry. Hopefully, the substantive issues addressed throughout the manuscript
are avenues to explore to improve the regulatory framework that governs banking
activities in the euro area.





channel & leverage in bank-based
financial systems
2.1 Introduction
The 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC) has drastically impacted risk assessment
standards in banking regulation. As a result, a growing consensus has emerged
among policymakers on the need to better understand the role of credit institutions
in linking financial markets to the real economy. Besides a lively debate about the
extent to which monetary policy should include financial stability considerations
(Woodford, 2012), an important line of research also suggests that a monetary policy
of “low–for–long” interest rates in the aftermath of the GFC has fueled an asset
price boom, leading banks to increase leverage and engage in excessive risk–taking
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behaviors (Adrian and Shin, 2010).
While Borio and Zhu (2012) introduced the concept of “risk-taking channel of
monetary policy transmission” to show that interest rates affect the quality — and
not just the quantity — of bank credit, literature offers ambiguous predictions on
how the relationship between interest rates and risk–taking interacts with bank
leverage.
On the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, traditional portfolio allocation models
predict that increased interest rates reduce risk–taking through a reallocation from
riskier securities towards safe assets. In this case, monetary policy tightening raises
the hurdle rate for investment, leading agents to cut low return and/or high risk
projects with an uncertain impact on the investment pool risk.
Still on the asset side, a “search for yield” effect might also arise amongst finan-
cial intermediaries experiencing negative maturity mismatches. This results in a
larger share of risky assets when monetary policy easing compresses their margins.
Therefore, a negative relationship between interest rate and risk–taking is predicted
in this case. As returns on short–term assets are undermined compared to those
on long–term liabilities, the “search for yield” effect might be more pronounced for
highly levered banks.
In turn, on the liability side of balance sheets, a “risk–shifting” effect appears
when higher interest rates that banks pay on deposits worsen the agency problem
associated with limited liability and result in greater bank risk. A positive relation-
ship between interest rate and risk–taking is predicted here. Moreover, as highly
levered banks are more prone to agency issues, they are expected to be more sensi-
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tive to monetary policy changes, and to further exacerbate the agency problem when
interest rates are higher and intermediation margins are compressed. Dell’Ariccia
et al. (2014) also show that the effect of interest rates changes on risk–taking de-
pends on the extent to which banks pass such monetary shift onto lending rates,
and how they optimally adjust their capital structure.
Accordingly, the net effect of monetary policy changes on bank risk–taking and
its interaction with leverage still raise important empirical questions. While a more
negative impact for slightly–levered banks would be consistent with the classical
“risk–shifting” effect, a more negative impact for highly–levered financial interme-
diaries would be consistent with a “search for yield” channel of monetary policy.
Therefore, literature on bank leverage and monetary policy requires to consider
alternative channels of risk-taking in addition to traditional portfolio rebalancing
channels.
Consistent with the “risk–shifting” channel, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) provide
evidence that the negative effect of interest rates on risk–taking in the U.S. industry
is less pronounced for poorly capitalized banks (i.e. with higher levels of leverage).
Conversely, Jiménez et al. (2014) yield insights on a “search for yield” channel for
the Spanish banking industry where highly levered banks react most to changes in
interest rates, taking less risk when monetary policy is tightened and more risk when
it is eased. While the link between interest rates, leverage, and bank credit risk is
likely to depend on geographic circumstances, there is still a lack of studies to date
analyzing the post–GFC euro area as a whole to determine whether it is concerned
either by a “risk–shifting” channel — similarly to the U.S. banking industry —
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or, conversely, by a “search for yield” channel. However, the euro area is one of
the biggest bank–based financial systems worldwide, contrary to the U.S. where
the industry is rather market–based (Bats and Houben, 2020). It is also of great
interest as it displays a large diversity in domestic banking systems with different
levels of competition led by a common monetary policy. This empirical paper is an
attempt to fill in this gap.
In the present analysis, we study the link between interest rates at different
maturities, bank leverage and bank credit risk using yearly data based on a panel
of 3,898 euro area banks over the period 2009–2017. We find that bank credit risk —
gauged ex–ante by the loan loss provision ratio and ex–post by the non–performing
loans ratio — is negatively associated with monetary policy. Confirming Ioannidou
et al. (2015) insights, our results also suggest that a high level of competition in
nationwide banking industries is an important vehicle for transmitting the negative
impact of interest rates on bank credit risk. Further, consistent with the “search for
yield” channel (Rajan, 2006), we also show that this negative relationship is more
pronounced for highly levered banks operating in the post–GFC euro area.
One may be concerned that our results are confounded by an endogenous rela-
tionship between monetary policy and bank risk–taking. To address these concerns,
we conduct robustness checks on the impact of macroeconomic conditions, correla-
tion with the euro area business cycle, periods of financial distress, and large banks.
Our findings survive each of these tests, which alleviates endogeneity concerns and
confirms that the results we get are unlikely to be explained by monetary policy
reacting to bank credit risk.
Chapter 2 Bruno De Menna
2.1. Introduction 45
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, we empirically con-
firm the presence in the euro area of a risk–taking channel of monetary policy in the
aftermath of the GFC. As a result, a low interest rate environment undoubtedly im-
pacts risk–taking and requires interest rates to be complemented with other financial
stability tools. Second, this paper is the first to our knowledge to present empir-
ical evidence of a “search for yield” channel of monetary policy in the post–GFC
euro area taken as a whole. Accordingly, we find that the inverse causal relation
between interest rates and credit risk is increasing in bank leverage. This outcome
provides a link to the theoretical literature on bank “search for yield” which posits
that risk–taking is a function of leverage. While confirming Jiménez et al. (2014)
insights (though restricted to the Spanish banking industry), this also points out an
essential difference with the U.S. banking system where the negative link between
risk–taking and interest rates is steeper for highly capitalized banks (Dell’Ariccia
et al., 2017). As a result, time, geographical circumstances, and local banking mar-
ket conditions are key elements for regulators and policymakers in understanding
the impact of monetary policy on bank credit risk.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Background literature is
presented in Section 2.2 where we discuss the risk-taking channel of monetary policy
transmission and its interdependencies with bank leverage. Next, Section 2.3 lays
out the dataset and Section 2.4 the empirical methodology. Ultimately, Section 2.5
describes the findings and robustness checks, and Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Related literature
Early findings on the influence of a changing interest rate environment on banks’ risk
perception are provided by Hancock (1985), who analyze the interaction between
bank profitability and monetary policy stance. Later, Asea and Blomberg (1998)
demonstrate that banks change their lending standards — from tightness to laxity
— systematically over the cycle. They suggest that loans extended on easier terms
during expansions return to haunt banks as problem loans during contractions.
This causes credit market imperfections to have a stronger impact on aggregate
fluctuations during boom times, when the seeds of a future recession are sown.
More recently, a growing body of research has investigated the relationship be-
tween “low for long” interest rates and higher levels of bank risk. This link is
introduced as the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission by Borio and
Zhu (2012). Preliminary empirical evidence supports the idea that interest rates
remaining low over an extended period trigger risk-taking in banking industries.
However, in-depth analysis reveal more complex mechanisms involved in linking
financial stability and monetary policy (De Nicolò et al., 2010). At least in the
short-term, two opposite channels are operating.
The first channel implies a negative relationship between interest rates and bank
risk-taking. This channel is explained by two main effects — the portfolio reallo-
cation effect and the “search for yield” effect — working through the asset side of
banks’ balance sheets. The portfolio reallocation effect operates on the basis of
valuations, incomes, and cash flows (Delis et al., 2017). Lower interest rates on
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safe assets boost banks’ capital and collateral values, resulting in a reallocation in
banks’ portfolios towards riskier securities. As the hurdle rate for investment de-
creases, banks are inclined to undertake projects with either low return or high risk
(Chodorow-Reich, 2014). This leads to reduction of banks’ risk perception (Adrian
and Shin, 2014), so risk-neutral banks (i.e., banks that do not internalize the losses
they impose on depositors and bondholders) increase their demand for risky assets
until equilibrium returns, whereas risk-averse banks reallocate their portfolios in
a similar way under most utility functions1. This results in increasing riskiness
of banks’ portfolios (Fishburn and Porter, 1976) and worsening of the equilibrium
risk of failure. Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) notes that the magnitude of the portfolio
reallocation effect depends on the market structure of the banking industry: it is
minimal in the case of monopoly and maximal in the case of perfect competition.
In turn, the “search for yield” effect arises from pressures that monetary eas-
ing exerts on banks’ profitability (Rajan, 2006). Declining interest rates indeed
compress banks’ margins and impair the yield on short-term assets compared to
long-term liabilities. Some investment managers may have fixed rate obligations
that force them to take on more risk when rates fall. A low interest rate environ-
ment also intensifies competition in the banking sector and negatively impacts the
ability of banks to generate profits (Maudos and De Guevara, 2004). Eventually, it
constrains banks to search for higher yields (typically derived from riskier positions)
to save their credibility with investors (Buch et al., 2014).
1However, banks with decreasing absolute risk aversion tend to decrease their holding of risky
assets instead.
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The second channel implies a positive relationship between interest rates and
bank risk-taking. It operates through the liability side of banks’ balance sheets
and is referred to in the literature as the “risk–shifting” effect (De Nicolò et al.,
2010). The starting point is a maturity mismatch occurring in banks’ balance
sheets. As banks typically transform short-term loanable funds (e.g., deposits) into
long-term loans, a cut in interest rates will improve intermediation spreads and
banks’ franchise value. As the demand function for loans is negatively sloped, a
decline in deposit rates is only partially passed through to lending rates, causing
expected net returns to rise. Such an increase in profit acts as an incentive to
limit bank risk-taking to reap those gains. Therefore, riskier assets become less
attractive. Eventually, this results in “shifting” value from shareholders to creditors
and depositors2.
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) provide a substantive contribution to the theoretical
insights on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy and its interdependencies with
leverage. This link is key in determining which of the two above-described channels
will dominate. Under asymmetric information and limited liability, levered banks
are willing to take more risk than is socially optimal (Keeley, 1990), as they generally
opt for higher payoffs associated with riskier assets rather than safe investments
generating a higher net present value. Highly levered banks consistently induce
larger losses for depositors in the case of failure. Although banks’ liabilities are
2An additional effect is sometimes described in the literature as the “Greenspan put” effect to
account for agents’ expectations of monetary policy stance (Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Diamond and
Rajan, 2012). In short, if there are strong expectations of interest rates cuts in cases of future
systemic threats in the banking industry, banks will tend to assume greater risk. Rather than an
effective drop in interest rates, it is the implicit promise of lower rates that justifies this effect.
This typically leads to a collective moral hazard issue.
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priced correctly at the equilibrium, excess risk-taking occurs because investors are
not able to observe banks’ monitoring efforts. This moral hazard issue is one of
the main rationales for prudential banking regulation to reduce leverage (De Nicolò
et al., 2010).
These insights provide theoretical foundations for the relationship between the
risk-taking channel of monetary policy and bank leverage during extended periods of
low interest rates. On the one hand, the “risk–shifting” effect is a function of leverage
and is driven primarily by limited liability. It is expected to be the strongest for
highly levered banks, which, typically, are more exposed to agency problems. For
instance, the “risk–shifting” effect may be stronger just ahead of a crisis, as leverage
is high and competition limits the pass-through of interest rates to loan rates (in
traditional “risk–shifting” models, highly levered banks tend to be more sensitive to
interest rate changes). On the other hand, the “search for yield” effect points in the
opposite direction but also tends to be most pronounced for highly levered banks,
as they switch to riskier assets in higher proportions (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2017). This
may be due to a higher degree of competition and a lower ability for such banks to
adjust their capital structure.
Recent empirical research on the U.S. industry demonstrates the presence of
a risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission. For instance, Abbate and
Thaler (2019) show that a low interest rate environment impairs banks’ lending
standards. Adrian and Shin (2014), in turn, suggest that such an environment
leads to increased leverage and asset risks, as noted by Angeloni et al. (2015). For
the euro area, the low interest rates’ environment turns out to be a multi-faceted
Bruno De Menna Chapter 2
50 2.3. Data
issue influencing lending standards (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011), risk preferences,
and profiles (Altunbas et al., 2014), in addition to interest rate margins (Claessens
et al., 2018). This paper is part of the growing literature providing evidence of
a risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the euro area. However,
the way in which interest rates influence bank risk-taking and how this relationship
interacts with bank leverage still remain under-documented for bank-based and
highly heterogeneous financial systems such as the euro area after the GFC. In
what follows, we provide an empirical analysis that attempts to address this gap.
2.3 Data
This paper uses panel data from the euro area (excluding Estonia, Malta, and
Slovakia due to incomplete data) to examine the interaction of monetary policy with
leverage in bank risk-taking. We collect bank balance sheets and income statement
data from Fitch Connect at an annual frequency over the period 2009–2017. The
sample includes four categories of banks: retail and consumer banks, universal
commercial banks, wholesale commercial banks, and private banks. Data on bank
financials provide exclusively unconsolidated accounts, making the assumption that
each subsidiary manages its own assets. This implies that foreign owned banks
are classified abroad and not in their home country. Before running regressions, we
apply an outlier rule to drop lines corresponding to missing data and extreme values.
The final sample consists of 27,072 bank-year observations broken down into 3,898
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banks from 16 countries3. Since 2008, banks have continued to scale back their
physical presence across Europe, as the importance of widespread bank branch
networks has reduced. According to the European Banking Federation (2017), the
number of banks from the countries we examine reached a total of 4,682 entities in
2017, so our sample covers more than 83% of the banking systems surveyed.
Analyzing the impact of interest rates on risk-taking, Ashcraft (2006) notes that
quarterly data reduce the ability to control for differences across banks in the re-
sponse of loan demand to monetary policy, and also demonstrates the robustness
of a stripped-down version of its results to data frequency. As Fitch Connect does
not provide quarterly data4, we consider annual data sound enough to explain the
interaction of monetary policy with leverage in bank risk-taking. The fact that our
empirical analysis focuses on the level of interest rates (which considers by nature
a longer-term phenomenon) and only secondarily on their change also supports this
view. In Appendix A, Table A1 provides variables’ definition, source, and level, and
Pairwise Pearson correlation coefficients in Table B1 show that independent vari-
ables used in the empirical methodology (see Section 2.4) are not highly correlated,
so multicollinearity is not a major concern. Table B1 describes a slightly downward
trend of the yearly average of leverage ratio over the sample period for EU banks.
In what follows, we describe the choice of our dependent and explanatory variables.
3The countries in the analysis are Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, and Spain.
4Or only scarcely, which would considerably reduce the number of bank-year observations in
the sample.
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2.3.1 Bank credit risk
The present study is built at the loan level. As such, we consider an ex–ante credit
risk rating indicator using the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans (noted as
Loan loss provision hereafter), and an ex–post credit risk rating indicator using
the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (denoted as Non-performing loans
hereafter). Descriptive statistics are reported in panel A from Table 2.15. Loan
loss provision index shows the share of gross loans used as an allowance for uncol-
lected loans and loan payments to cover factors associated with potential loan losses
(including bad loans, customer defaults, and renegotiated terms of a loan causing
lower than previously estimated payments). An increase in Loan loss provision is
associated logically with a riskier position. We collect a total number of 27,072 ob-
servations for this variable. In the wake of the GFC, Loan loss provision the annual
average falls drastically between 2009 (72.94%, i.e., the sample’s highest average
value) and 2011 (19.86%, i.e., the sample’s lowest average value). The variable re-
mains relatively stable between 2012 (46.16%) and 2015 (46.49%) to decline again
in 2016 (25.85%) and 2017 (22.72%).
In turn, Non-performing loans index identifies problems with asset quality in
banks’ loan portfolios and highlights the potential adverse exposure to earnings and
asset market values due to worsening loan quality. Commercial loans are considered
non-performing if the debtor has made zero payments of either interest or principal
within 90 days, or is 90 days’ past due payment. Regarding consumer loans, 180
5As Fitch Connect database provides bank financials expressed as a decimal, we left unchanged
this measure unit. Apart from HHI variable which is also expressed as a decimal, all other variables
are expressed as a percentage.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Unit Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum Observations Banks Countries
Panel A: Variables of interest
Loan loss provision Decimal 0.4382 0.2900 1.0318 -5.0000 5.0000 27,072 3,898 16
Non-performing loans Decimal 0.0678 0.0421 0.0732 0.0000 0.6822 15,650 2,993 16
ECB rate Percent 0.5775 0.5534 0.5049 0.0000 1.2788 27,072 3,898 16
Short-term rate Percent 0.4252 0.2200 0.5784 -0.3300 1.3900 27,072 3,898 16
Medium-term rate Percent 0.7905 0.5400 0.7158 -0.1500 2.0100 27,072 3,898 16
Long-term rate Percent 2.1605 1.7133 1.6205 0.0900 22.4983 27,072 3,898 16
Leverage Decimal 0.9057 0.9160 0.0652 0.0004 0.9990 27,072 3,898 16
Panel B: Bank-level controls
Size ln(e) 6.7612 6.5344 1.8367 1.1641 14.6225 27,072 3,898 16
ROAA Decimal 0.3154 0.2600 0.7580 -9.7100 11.6000 27,072 3,898 16
Inefficiency Decimal 0.6861 0.6786 0.2074 -1.3415 3.8791 27,072 3,898 16
Net loans Decimal 0.5897 0.6108 0.1850 0.0000 0.9985 27,072 3,898 16
Panel C: Nationwide controls
GDP Percent 0.8341 1.6000 2.5822 -9.1000 8.8000 27,072 3,898 16
Inflation Percent 1.2351 1.1000 0.9645 -1.7000 4.7000 27,072 3,898 16
HHI Decimal 0.0794 0.0587 0.0594 0.0447 0.6962 27,072 3,898 16
Notes. The table reports summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Variables’ definitions are
provided in Table A1 (see appendix section). The sample consists of bank panel data for 16 euro area countries over the
period 2009-2017. Data on bank financials provide exclusively unconsolidated accounts, making the assumption that each
subsidiary manages its own assets. This implies that foreign owned banks are classified abroad and not in the home country.
The number of banks broken down by country is respectively: 327 banks in Austria; 40 banks in Belgium; 19 banks in
Cyprus; 139 banks in Finland; 335 banks in France; 1,829 banks in Germany; 17 banks in Greece; 22 banks in Ireland; 676
banks in Italy; 21 banks in Latvia; 11 banks in Lithuania; 87 banks in Luxembourg; 37 banks in Netherlands; 119 banks in
Portugal; 20 banks in Slovenia and 199 banks in Spain.
days’ past due classifies them as non-performing. A high value for this ratio means
greater bank risk. A total of 15,650 observations are gathered for this variable. The
sample’s highest mean value is observed in 2011 (7.63%) and the lowest is in 2017
(5.83%). Non-performing loans index is complementary to Loan loss provision, as
it assesses ex–post the forecast quality of the ex–ante credit risk rating indicator.
Figure D1 graphically shows the yearly average declining trends of these two bank
credit risk proxies between 2009 and 2017.
2.3.2 Interest rates
To assess the interaction of monetary policy with leverage in bank risk-taking, we
experiment with four types of interest rates: the central bank rate, a short-term
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rate, a medium-term rate, and a long-term rate. Data are collected from Eurostat
and concern annual averages, for which descriptive statistics are reported in panel A
from Table 2.1. The central bank rate is the annual average of the ECB policy rate
on the main refinancing operations, which provides the bulk of liquidity to the euro
area banking system. We use the 3-month and 12-month Euribor interbank rates as
representative of the annual average of, respectively, the short-term and medium-
term interest rates at which euro interbank term deposits are offered by prime
banks to one another6. In turn, the long-term rate is the annual average of central
government bond yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with a residual
maturity of approximately 10 years. These indicators are referred to, respectively,
as ECB rate, Short-term rate, Medium-term rate, and Long-term rate, and they
all account for 27,072 bank-year observations. As it is measured at the country-
level, Long-term rate exhibits a higher standard deviation compared to other rates
gauged at the European-level. Ultimately, it also helps to capture various aspects
of the impact of monetary policy changes on leverage and risk-taking and acts as a
robustness check for our empirical results.
The four rates used in the analysis broadly follow the same path: they all
decline in 2009 and 2010 to reach a peak in 2011, and then decline constantly up
to 2017. This makes ECB rate, Short-term rate, Medium-term rate and Long-term
rate achieve their highest average in 2009 (with values of 1.28%, 1.22%, 1.61%,
and 3.62%, respectively) and their lowest average in 2017 (with values of 0.00%, -
6We experiment with alternative interest rate maturities (i.e., 1-month, 6-months) in empirical
estimations and find practically unchanged results.
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0.33%, -0.15%, and 0.79%, respectively). Greece exhibits the highest Long-term rate
average value over the sample period (9.40%), whereas Finland shows the lowest
value, with an overall average of 1.10%. Figure D1 graphically shows the yearly
average declining trends of monetary policy proxies used in our empirical analysis.
2.3.3 Bank-level controls
To avoid the omitted-variables’ bias, we collect several bank-level indicators from
Fitch Connect that may impact credit risk. The last variable of interest included
in panel A from Table 2.1 measures how bank business relies on debt rather than
fresh equity. Leverage variable is proxied by the ratio of short-term and long-
term debt to total assets, also known as the debt-to-assets ratio. Though Leverage
magnifies profits when asset yields more than offset borrowing costs, it may also
magnify losses. A bank borrowing too much money might face bankruptcy during
a business downturn, whereas a less-levered entity might survive. Leverage is an
important element in shaping bank risk and is inversely related to tightening of
capital requirements. This variable decreases continuously over the sample period,
as it reaches its highest mean value in 2009 (91.80%) and the sample’s lowest mean
value in 2017 (89.53%). On average, the Netherlands’ banking system relies the
most on leverage between 2009 and 2017 (with an overall average of 91.92%) whereas
Greece’s shows the most moderate use of this financing strategy (85.65%).
We complement the Leverage variable with four other bank-level controls de-
scribed in panel B from Table 2.1. Size index is gauged by the natural logarithm
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of bank total assets. Though the overall sample average value is 6.7612, it is worth
noting that the yearly average log-transformed size of banks in the sample shows
a constant increase between 2010 (6.6591) and 2017 (6.9237). A negative sign of
the Size coefficient would confirm the theory that larger banks are more risk averse
(Delis and Kouretas, 2011). Next, we consider ROAA as a bank profitability indi-
cator. The return on average assets is proxied by the ratio of net income on average
total assets and explains how well bank assets are being used to generate profits.
After a decline between 2009 (29.87%) and 2013 (28.90%), ROAA rises steeply in
2014 (35.01%) to decrease again in 2015–2016 and then reach the sample’s highest
mean value in 2017 (i.e., 36.22%). A high level of profitability may be associated
with higher risk-taking (especially in good times), as profits at time t may be allo-
cated to more loans at time t+1. However, when a bank’s balance sheet becomes
too risky, the share of non-performing loans may also rise and hamper profitability.
Eventually, this leads to reduction of bank risk assets. This may explain cyclical
fluctuations we observe for ROAA over the sample period. Hence, the impact of
ROAA on bank credit risk remains ambiguous.
In addition, we measure bank Inefficiency, thanks to the ratio of total expenses
to total revenue. Theoretically, more efficient banks could perform better in terms
of risk management, or else take greater risks to improve their revenues compared
to their expenses. Therefore, the relation between Inefficiency and credit risk is
not fixed and may go one way or the other. Following the 2008 financial crisis, EU
banks from our sample reduced their level of expenses compared to their revenues
up to 2014 (sample’s lowest average value at 67.15%) to finally see a sharp increase
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in expenses until 2016 (sample’s highest average value at 70.59%). Lastly, we con-
trol for the level of traditional banking intermediation in which banks are involved
using the ratio of net loans to total assets (denoted as Nets loans hereafter). This
proxy gauges the volume of total loans granted to banks’ customers and, accord-
ingly, are listed on the balance sheet assets side. The relationship between Net
loans and credit risk strongly depends on customers’ solvency and the quality of
banks’ screening standards. After an increase between 2009 and 2011 (sample’s
highest mean value at 59.75%), Nets loans declines markedly to the sample’s lowest
mean value in 2012 (58.46%). Afterwards, it experiences a constant growth phase,
especially between 2014–2017.
Over the period 2009–2017, Table 2.1 shows that Leverage and ROAA constitute,
on average, 90.57% and 31.54% of bank total assets, respectively. The share of
Nets loans accounts for 58.97% of total assets, which means loans constitute, on
average, the largest component of banks’ balance sheets. This makes our focus on
bank credit risk relevant and of special interest for the euro area banking industry
over the period surveyed. In turn, total expenses represent, on average, 68.61%
of banks’ total revenue. Finally, as variations of bank Size are smoothed out by
log-transformation, ROAA proxy appears to be particularly volatile compared to
other bank-level controls, exhibiting a 75.80% standard deviation.
2.3.4 Nationwide controls
We augment the set of bank-level variables with three nationwide controls described
in Table 2.1 (see panel C) and defined in Table A1. Conventionally, we include
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macroeconomic conditions in our estimations using the percentage change in the
previous year of real GDP growth rate (noted as GDP). We also control for the
general price level among countries in the sample (as referred to Inflation hereafter)
through the annual average rate of change of the Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices. Both indicators are collected from the Eurostat database. Moreover, we
compute the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (denoted as HHI ) to capture banking in-
dustries’ concentrations, which may differ substantially from one country to another
in the euro area.
Over the sample period, Lithuania presents the highest real GDP growth rate
variation, with an overall average value of 3.30%, while Greece is ranked lowest,
with an overall average of -3.00%. GDP exhibits the highest standard deviation
among nationwide control variables. In turn, Ireland has the most stable inflation
environment, with an overall average value of -0.0023% and Austria has an average
value of 1.75%, which means that its domestic economy is relatively more impacted
by price changes between 2009–2017. Broadly speaking, the European Central
Bank (2017) emphasizes that banking systems in many of the larger countries are
more fragmented, which reduces concentration levels. By contrast, banking systems
in smaller euro area countries, with the exception of Austria and Luxembourg,
tend to be more concentrated. In Austria, this higher level of fragmentation is
due to a banking sector structure that is similar to those of the larger countries,
whereas, in Luxembourg, it is attributable to the presence of a large number of
foreign credit institutions. Our data support this view: with only 139 entities
operating, the Finnish banking system is the most concentrated (according to the
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HHI indicator, with an average value of 0.3968), whereas Germany has the most
fragmented industry (with an average HHI of 0.0505) but holds the largest amount
of assets at the country-level in the sample.
2.4 Empirical methodology
We employ dynamic panel techniques to investigate the relationship between inter-
est rates and bank credit risk in the euro area between 2009–2017. The general
empirical model to be estimated is as follows:
Riskb,c,t = α + β Riskb,c,t−1 + γ Ratec,t +
δ Bankb,c,t + ζ Macroc,t + λb + εb,c,t
(2.1)
where b, c and t subscripts, respectively, stand for bank b in country c at time
t. Vector λb represents time invariant bank fixed effects, and εb,c,t gauges the id-
iosyncratic error term for bank b in country c at time t, which is clustered at the
bank-level. The dependent variable Riskb,c,t refers to the credit risk of bank b from
country c at time t and is measured ex–ante via the Loan loss provision indicator
and ex–post through the Non-performing loans variable. The Riskb,c,t−1 index is
the first-order auto-regressive term assessing the persistence of bank risk over time.
Delis and Kouretas (2011) provide theoretical insights to explain why bank risk is
persistent. First, given that risk-taking is usually procyclical, time is needed for
banks to absorb macroeconomic shocks in their balance sheets. Second, bank risk
may be delayed (or exacerbated) by regulatory capital requirements7. Third, as
7In the euro area, the Capital Requirements Directive IV package (CRD IV) became, on Jan-
uary 1, 2014, the new global standards on bank capital, with the purpose of tightening legislation
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the banking industry is highly competitive, herding behaviors in this sector may
be more pronounced than are those in other sectors and eventually impact risk
stickiness over time. Discussions opposing the competition–fragility view to the
competition–stability view provide clear evidence of the influence of competition on
risk persistence (see Beck et al. (2013), Fu et al. (2014)). Finally, loans’ performance
may influence risk for an extended period of time, especially for relationship-banking
entities or when the nationwide industry is being opaque. Accordingly, β coefficient
may be interpreted as the speed of convergence to equilibrium. It ranges from 0
(i.e., very fast adjustment of bank risk to equilibrium) to 1 (i.e., very slow adjust-
ment or impossibility to reach equilibrium), and values between 0 and 1 suggest
that bank risk indeed persists but will eventually return to its average level.
The independent test variable Ratec,t is measured with four types of rates de-
scribed in Section 2.3 and defined in Table A1: ECB rate, Short-term rate, Medium-
term rate and Long-term rate. Consistent with the literature on the portfolio re-
allocation effect, we expect the coefficient of interest γ to be negative. Bankb,c,t is
a set of bank-specific control variables (Size, ROAA, Inefficiency and Net loans)
collected from Fitch Connect that may affect credit risk (see descriptive statistics
in Table 2.1). Macroc,t is a set of country-specific controls (GDP, Inflation and
HHI ).
Based on Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) methodology testing whether the effect of
interest rates on bank credit risk depends on the level of leverage, we extend the
empirical model presented in Equation 2.1 by including the Leverage variable and
on banking prudential requirements.
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an interaction term, as follows:
Riskb,c,t = α + β Riskb,c,t−1 + γ Ratec,t + δ Leverageb,c,t +
(
ζ Ratec,t ∗ Leverageb,c,t
)
+ η Bankb,c,t + θ Macroc,t + λb + εb,c,t
(2.2)
where Leverageb,c,t is the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total assets
(i.e., the debt-to-assets ratio). The focus of Equation 2.2 is on the interaction term
between interest rates and bank leverage. A negative coefficient ζ would confirm
the presence of a “search for yield” effect in our estimations. We estimate Equation
2.1 and Equation 2.2 using the System Generalized Method of Moments, where
first-difference equations are instrumented with their own lags in levels, and levels’
equations are instrumented with their own lagged first differences. In what follows,
we treat interest rate variables and bank-level controls Leverage, Size, ROAA, In-
efficiency and Net loans as endogenous, similarly to the dependent variable. In
turn, nationwide controls GDP, Inflation and HHI enter the estimated equations
as predetermined variables, because we assume that the banks surveyed are fully
aware of their macroeconomic environment when choosing risk-taking strategies.
2.5 Discussion of findings
In this section, we present the main findings on the effect of monetary policy on bank
credit risk in the euro area over the period 2009–2017 (Table 2.2 and Table 2.3).
We further analyze how bank leverage may influence this relationship in Table 2.4
and Table 2.5.
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Our results survive a battery of robustness tests to allay concerns about mone-
tary policy endogeneity and the threat that interest rate changes may be exogenous
to bank risk-taking (Table 2.6 to Table 2.9). Robust standard errors are clustered
at the bank-level throughout the empirical analysis. We also check first-order and
second-order autocorrelation using Arellano–Bond tests. The Hansen test controls
for instruments’ correlation with residuals.
2.5.1 Risk-taking channel of monetary policy: the “portfolio
reallocation” effect
Table 2.2 presents general estimations based on Equation 2.1. Regressions (1) to
(4) include the Loan loss provision index as a dependent variable, whereas the Non-
performing loans index is used in regressions (5)–(8). The coefficients on the lagged
dependent variables suggest that bank credit risk is much more persistent when us-
ing the Non-performing loans variable than the Loan loss provision variable, which
returns more rapidly to equilibrium. Consistent with the portfolio reallocation ef-
fect, the relationship between interest rates and bank credit risk is significantly
negative in all regressions (except in regression (8) for the relationship between
Non-performing loans and Long-term rate). This first result provides evidence that
a low interest rates’ environment increases bank credit risk and supports findings
from an extensive body of literature dedicated to this issue (see Adrian and Shin
(2014); Altunbas et al. (2014); Buch et al. (2014); Neuenkirch and Nöckel (2018),
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Table 2.2: Monetary policy conditions & bank credit risk in the EU (2009-2017):
the portfolio reallocation channel
Loan loss provision to gross loans Non-performing loans to gross loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loan loss provision(t-1) 0.2587* 0.1252* 0.1362** 0.2115
(0.1525) (0.0644) (0.0661) (0.2194)
Non-performing loans(t-1) 0.9485*** 0.9072*** 0.8950*** 0.9966***
(0.1045) (0.0857) (0.0727) (0.1090)
ECB rate -0.4070*** -0.0072***
(0.0928) (0.0028)
Short-term rate -0.1478** -0.0047***
(0.0606) (0.0016)
Medium-term rate -0.1106** -0.0038***
(0.0455) (0.0012)
Long-term rate -0.1463* -0.0044
(0.0873) (0.0035)
Size -0.7531*** -0.6758*** -0.6361*** -1.3271*** -0.0180*** -0.0177*** -0.0154*** -0.0280*
(0.1262) (0.1393) (0.1187) (0.4337) (0.0044) (0.0050) (0.0043) (0.0155)
ROAA 0.3011 -1.0712*** -1.0994*** 0.1221 -0.0158** -0.0185** -0.0146* -0.0233***
(0.3244) (0.3221) (0.3680) (0.4082) (0.0073) (0.0080) (0.0078) (0.0069)
Inefficiency -2.1151*** -4.0903*** -3.8556*** -2.5698** -0.0812*** -0.1227*** -0.1147*** -0.1373***
(0.6865) (0.9507) (0.9688) (1.2698) (0.0249) (0.0254) (0.0227) (0.0219)
Net loans -2.7018** -1.4577 -1.4163 -1.2658 0.0119 -0.0139 -0.0232 0.0248
(1.0663) (0.9553) (0.9499) (1.3836) (0.0457) (0.0425) (0.0392) (0.0543)
GDP -0.1143*** 0.0028 -0.0047 -0.1253*** -0.0057*** -0.0014* -0.0016** -0.0061**
(0.0187) (0.0161) (0.0170) (0.0357) (0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0025)
Inflation 0.0139 -0.0185 -0.0140 -0.1690** -0.0006 0.0038*** 0.0039*** 0.0016
(0.0378) (0.0209) (0.0215) (0.0733) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0028)
HHI 7.9615*** 5.7946*** 5.8391*** 16.5397*** 0.3423*** 0.0542 0.0400 0.4585*
(1.6433) (1.4679) (1.4192) (4.2367) (0.1259) (0.0740) (0.0774) (0.2697)
Constant 8.0885*** 8.5405*** 8.1199*** 11.2019*** 0.1660*** 0.2228*** 0.2091*** 0.2603**
(0.9725) (1.2541) (1.1022) (4.0268) (0.0373) (0.0474) (0.0432) (0.1275)
Observations 22,657 22,657 22,657 22,657 11,893 11,893 11,893 11,893
Number of banks 3,622 3,622 3,622 3,622 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
Wald χ2 331.65*** 212.66*** 238.49*** 236.78*** 2,165.12*** 923.22*** 1,239.34*** 1,410.80***
Arellano-Bond (1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Arellano-Bond (2) 0.1500 0.2640 0.2050 0.5750 0.1530 0.1750 0.1330 0.2490
Hansen 0.0700 0.1870 0.2980 0.3190 0.4520 0.1360 0.2100 0.2890
Notes. The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimations.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans in
regressions (1) to (4) and the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans in regressions (5) to (8). All other variables are defined as in
Table A1 (see appendix section). The Wald test shows the goodness-of-fit of regressions. The Arellano-Bond (1) and (2) tests report
p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in first differences regression do not exhibit, respectively, first-order and second-order
autocorrelation. The Hansen test reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with residuals.
*Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
among others). This also confirms empirically the presence in the post–2008 euro
area of a risk-taking channel (Borio and Zhu, 2012) as regards the effects of monetary
policy on banks’ risk-taking behavior.
Bank size coefficient is negative and highly significant, which means that larger
banks are more capable at managing credit risk. We obtain a similar relation for our
profitability indicator: the more profitable a bank, the better its risk management.
The negative coefficients associated to the Inefficiency variable suggest that between
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2009 and 2017, euro area banks’ efficiency has come at the cost of higher credit risk.
Net loans coefficient does not appear to be significant in estimations from Table 2.2,
except in the relation between Loan loss provision and ECB rate. This suggests that
when banks are more involved in traditional banking intermediation, they present
a relatively lower credit risk.
This may be due to a better knowledge of risk profiles of their borrowers. Re-
garding macroeconomic variables, the relation between GDP and credit risk is sig-
nificantly negative. This indicates that banks operating in a growing economy are
inclined to reduce credit risk. Such a result shows that good economic conditions
foster borrowers’ repayment capacity. In turn, Inflation coefficient presents different
results depending on the dependent variable used: a negative sign appears in the re-
lation between Loan loss provision and Long-term rate relation, whereas a positive
sign characterizes the relation between Non-performing loans and both Short-term
rate and Medium-term rate. Finally, industry concentration is significant and pos-
itively related to bank credit risk: more concentrated banking industries seem to
better manage credit risk over the period 2009–2017.
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2014) provide theoretical insights on the link between indus-
try concentration and the magnitude of the portfolio reallocation effect. Specif-
ically, they suggest that it depends on how policy rate changes are reflected in
lending rates, which, in turn, are related to the market structure of the banking
industry. In the case of a monopolist facing an inelastic demand function, the mag-
nitude of this effect is minimal, and the pass-through onto the lending rates is zero.
Conversely, it is maximal in the case of perfect competition, when lending rates
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Table 2.3: Monetary policy conditions & bank credit risk in the EU (2009-2017):
portfolio reallocation channel & industry concentration
Loan loss provision to gross loans
High Low High Low High Low High Low
competition competition competition competition competition competition competition competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loan loss provision(t-1) 0.7196* 0.3180** -0.0773 0.2327* -0.0263 0.2270* 0.4747* 0.1781
(0.4187) (0.1315) (0.1477) (0.1335) (0.1028) (0.1353) (0.2715) (0.1278)
ECB rate -1.2456*** -0.2212***
(0.2276) (0.0740)
Short-term rate -0.4076*** -0.1228**
(0.1522) (0.0510)
Medium-term rate -0.7615*** -0.0949**
(0.1870) (0.0404)
Long-term rate -0.4759** -0.0610**
(0.1946) (0.0300)
Size -1.8748*** -0.4148*** -1.2399*** -0.4132*** -2.7861*** -0.4273*** -5.0175*** -0.5080***
(0.4788) (0.1137) (0.2767) (0.1185) (0.5630) (0.1211) (1.5790) (0.1481)
ROAA -1.0294*** -0.2174 -0.5542*** -0.2535 -0.7408*** -0.2562 -1.0045*** -0.7769***
(0.3292) (0.2021) (0.1981) (0.2071) (0.2387) (0.2038) (0.3850) (0.2428)
Inefficiency -2.4643*** -3.6268*** -1.1509*** -4.0978*** -1.2032** -3.9881*** -2.2286** -4.4625***
(0.7121) (0.5251) (0.4280) (0.5989) (0.5960) (0.5806) (0.9872) (0.6492)
Net loans -6.8717 -3.9824*** -8.7968*** -4.2368*** -15.7206*** -4.2978*** -21.9032*** -3.2809***
(4.4461) (0.9888) (1.6953) (0.9828) (2.6207) (0.9849) (4.9065) (0.7717)
GDP 0.0417 -0.0633*** 0.1191*** -0.0488** 0.1573** -0.0506** -0.1986*** -0.0609**
(0.0410) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0232) (0.0656) (0.0230) (0.0706) (0.0255)
Inflation 0.1754** 0.0927* -0.0761 0.0517 0.0484 0.0494 -0.1039** 0.0356
(0.0817) (0.0477) (0.0463) (0.0446) (0.0655) (0.0449) (0.0450) (0.0506)
HHI 54.5728*** -0.7631 13.2263** -0.8291 10.3694 -0.7316 -56.8700*** 2.0293
(10.7174) (1.4961) (6.0817) (1.6354) (7.2017) (1.5969) (17.2956) (1.2562)
Constant 15.7982*** 8.5390*** 13.6068*** 9.0632*** 28.1641*** 9.1518*** 51.5359*** 9.4797***
(5.0138) (1.3616) (1.7321) (1.4093) (4.4075) (1.4415) (13.8359) (1.4478)
Observations 12,809 9,848 12,809 9,848 12,809 9,848 12,809 9,848
Number of banks 1,798 1,824 1,798 1,824 1,798 1,824 1,798 1,824
Wald χ2 305.65*** 591.72*** 426.96*** 535.43*** 248.18*** 536.31*** 101.11*** 617.88***
Arellano-Bond (1) 0.0110 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000
Arellano-Bond (2) 0.0850 0.4460 0.6910 0.6390 0.8930 0.6530 0.0440 0.9300
Hansen 0.2830 0.7830 0.4550 0.5630 0.0830 0.5590 0.6110 0.0540
Ho: Rate [High competition] 0.0000a 0.0613b 0.0004c 0.0330d
= Rate [Low competition] χ2(1) = 20.26 χ2(1) = 3.50 χ2(1) = 12.71 χ2(1) = 4.55
Notes. The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimations. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans in all regressions. All
other variables are defined as in Table A1 (see appendix section). High competition subsample in regressions (1), (3), (5) and (7) and low
competition subsample in regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8) refer to observations for which HHI is, respectively, below and above the full sample
median value. The Wald test shows the goodness-of-fit of regressions. The Arellano-Bond (1) and (2) tests report p-values for the null hypothesis
that the errors in first differences regression do not exhibit, respectively, first-order and second-order autocorrelation. The Hansen test reports
p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with residuals. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical
significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
a χ2-statistics p-values testing that ECB rate coefficient from high competition subsample = ECB rate coefficient from low competition subsample.
b χ2-statistics p-values testing that short-term rate coefficient from high competition subsample = short-term rate coefficient from low competition
subsample.
c χ2-statistics p-values testing that medium-term rate coefficient from high competition subsample = medium-term rate coefficient from low
competition subsample.
d χ2-statistics p-values testing that long-term rate coefficient from high competition subsample = long-term rate coefficient from low competition
subsample.
fully reflect policy rate changes. So, the portfolio reallocation effect should be
greater within highly competitive banking industries and weaker as competition
vanishes. In Table 2.3, we decompose the sample into two subsamples depending on
the level of concentration of banking industries. The high competition subsamples
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in regressions (1), (3), (5), and (7) refer to observations for which the HHI variable
is below the full sample median value. Regressions (2), (4), (6), and (8) are based on
the low competition subsample. Though the relationship between interest rates and
bank credit risk remains significantly negative, we observe that the magnitude of the
portfolio reallocation effect is invariably greater in highly competitive industries.
Differences between samples in interest rate coefficients appear to be consistently
significant, specifically at the 0% level for the ECB rate and the Medium-term rate,
at the 3.3% level for the Long-term rate, and at the 6.1% level for the Short-term
rate. For instance, a one percentage point decrease in the ECB rate is associated
with a 1.24 basis-point increase in the Loan loss provision index for the high com-
petition subsample compared to a 0.22 basis-point increase for the low competition
subsample.
This confirms that the intensity of the interest rates’ pass-through differs de-
pending on industries’ concentrations. It also empirically supports Dell’Ariccia
et al. (2014) theoretical contributions on the role of market structure on the port-
folio reallocation channel. Finally, we notice significant coefficients on the negative
link between Net loans and Loan loss provision, which is consistent with a lower
credit risk on behalf of entities oriented towards relationship-banking in competitive
markets.
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2.5.2 Leverage & risk-taking channel of monetary policy: the
“search for yield” effect
Next, we consider the differential effect of bank leverage on the link between interest
rates and credit risk to gauge the importance of the “search for yield” channel pro-
posed by Rajan (2006). This theoretical framework suggests that banks are induced
to switch to riskier assets (and higher yields) when monetary easing lowers the yield
on short-term assets relative to long-term liabilities. If yields on safe assets remain
low for long, banks may ultimately default on their long-term commitments, so that
switching to riskier assets may improve the likelihood to match their obligations.
Table 2.4 presents estimations based on Equation 2.2 inspired by Dell’Ariccia et al.
(2017) methodology. Accordingly, we augment Equation 2.1 with both the Lever-
age variable and its interaction with interest rates. From a theoretical perspective,
this interaction implies that leverage influences the relationship between interest
rates and bank credit risk, as we consider that it is no longer linear. Therefore, the
product term allows the main effect to depend on leverage levels in banks’ balance
sheets. The significance of the sum of the main effect and the interaction term is
verified for each regression.
Consistent with the “search for yield” effect, the estimations provide statistically
significant and negative coefficients on the interaction between bank leverage and
interest rates (except for the link between Non-performing loans and Long-term
rate variables in regression (8), similar to the results obtained for the portfolio
reallocation channel). This effect is economically significant and implies that an
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Table 2.4: Monetary policy conditions & bank credit risk in the EU (2009-2017):
the search for yield channel
Loan loss provision to gross loans Non-performing loans to gross loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loan loss provision(t-1) 0.4061 0.2503 0.2137 0.1057
(0.2517) (0.1582) (0.1464) (0.2957)
Non-performing loans(t-1) 0.7922*** 0.8941*** 0.8996*** 0.7752***
(0.1643) (0.0705) (0.0700) (0.1632)
ECB rate 21.6855** 0.6260*
(9.8304) (0.3195)
Short-term rate 10.2116*** 0.4684**
(3.9231) (0.2238)
Medium-term rate 7.0273** 0.4190**
(3.0889) (0.1725)
Long-term rate 9.9841** 0.1939
(4.6545) (0.1640)
Leverage 12.7952 -12.9236 -9.9524 7.4594 0.3738 -0.4439** -0.1638 0.4904
(15.1513) (7.8741) (8.2203) (12.6645) (0.2651) (0.1872) (0.2223) (0.7779)
ECB rate * Leverage -24.5949** -0.7037**
(10.7679) (0.3529)
Short-term rate * Leverage -11.3734*** -0.5094**
(4.3026) (0.2456)
Medium-term rate * Leverage -7.8598** -0.4594**
(3.3821) (0.1893)
Long-term rate * Leverage -11.0468** -0.2177
(5.1681) (0.1811)
Size -0.5158 -0.3024 -0.4112 -1.0037 -0.0039 0.0081** 0.0073** -0.0148
(0.3589) (0.2609) (0.2689) (0.8086) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0138)
ROAA -0.6140 -1.2885** -1.1371** -1.4045 -0.0177 -0.0471*** -0.0429*** -0.0425**
(0.5752) (0.5335) (0.5001) (0.9903) (0.0120) (0.0159) (0.0141) (0.0199)
Inefficiency -8.6627*** -7.9928*** -7.7933*** -8.9369* -0.1021*** -0.1195*** -0.1378*** -0.1621***
(1.9586) (1.2105) (1.1511) (4.9187) (0.0386) (0.0295) (0.0274) (0.0299)
Net loans -4.9848* -3.2840** -3.1902** -8.7901*** -0.0542 -0.0947* -0.0995* -0.0641
(2.6338) (1.4833) (1.4268) (2.7663) (0.1088) (0.0568) (0.0586) (0.0731)
GDP 0.0887 0.0456 0.0379 0.2502 -0.0080*** -0.0039*** -0.0052*** -0.0045*
(0.0610) (0.0385) (0.0331) (0.2027) (0.0016) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0026)
Inflation 0.1374** -0.0198 -0.0244 0.3461 0.0010 -0.0003 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0535) (0.0416) (0.0397) (0.3251) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0025)
HHI 7.1456** 5.9137* 7.3718** 15.7611*** 0.2913 0.0006 -0.0047 0.5603**
(2.9214) (3.1397) (2.8823) (6.0400) (0.1993) (0.0614) (0.0605) (0.2650)
Constant 0.6874 21.4371*** 19.1939** 10.1467 -0.1991 0.5082*** 0.2754 -0.1969
(13.2896) (7.5737) (7.9607) (14.6590) (0.2125) (0.1750) (0.2014) (0.7476)
Observations 22,657 22,657 22,657 22,657 11,893 11,893 11,893 11,893
Number of banks 3,622 3,622 3,622 3,622 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
Wald χ2 256.88*** 247.98*** 253.70*** 159.25*** 2,100.20*** 3,189.15*** 3,814.27*** 1,154.83***
Arellano-Bond (1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Arellano-Bond (2) 0.1500 0.2300 0.2710 0.5960 0.1150 0.8100 0.6960 0.1870
Hansen 0.7190 0.0570 0.0440 0.4210 0.0360 0.0440 0.0760 0.6210
Ho: Rate + (Rate * Lev.) = 0 0.0028a 0.0036b 0.0069c 0.0427d 0.0219a 0.0616b 0.0175c 0.1729d
χ2(1)= 8.92 χ2(1)= 8.48 χ2(1)= 7.30 χ2(1)= 4.11 χ2(1)= 5.25 χ2(1)= 3.49 χ2(1)= 5.65 χ2(1)= 1.86
Notes. The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimations. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans in regressions (1) to (4)
and the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans in regressions (5) to (8). All other variables are defined as in Table A1 (see appendix section).
The Wald test shows the goodness-of-fit of regressions. The Arellano-Bond (1) and (2) tests report p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors
in first differences regression do not exhibit, respectively, first-order and second-order autocorrelation. The Hansen test reports p-values for the
null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with residuals. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the
5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
a p-values of χ2-statistics testing that coefficients ECB rate + (ECB rate * Leverage) = 0.
b p-values of χ2-statistics testing that coefficients Short-term rate + (Short-term rate * Leverage) = 0.
c p-values of χ2-statistics testing that coefficients Medium-term rate + (Medium-term rate * Leverage) = 0.
d p-values of χ2-statistics testing that coefficients Long-term rate + (Long-term rate * Leverage) = 0.
increase in credit risk caused by a low interest rate environment is more important
for highly levered banks. We further analyze the link between Loan loss provision
and interest rates in Table 2.5. We find that a decrease in ECB rate from its 75th
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Table 2.5: Monetary policy conditions & bank credit risk in the EU (2009-2017):
risk variations to interest rates depending on leverage
High leverage Low leverage Differential effect
(1) (2) (3)
Loan loss provision to gross loans
ECB rate 1.231177 0.304164 0.927013**
Short-term rate 0.345047 -0.029482 0.374529***
Medium-term rate 0.373908 0.005941 0.367967**
Long-term rate 0.804607 -0.238504 1.043111**
Non-performing loans to gross loans
ECB rate 0.029906 0.003384 0.026522**
Short-term rate 0.006285 -0.010489 0.016774**
Medium-term rate 0.012046 -0.009461 0.021507**
Long-term rate 0.022659 0.002100 0.020559
Notes. The table reports the impact on credit risk of a decrease in interest rates from their 75th percentile
to their 25th percentile depending on the level of banking leverage (this effect being evaluated by assigning
mean values to other covariates from our base specification in Table 2.4). Predictive margins in column (1)
assess credit risk variations to decreasing interest rates for a bank with a relatively high ratio of short-term and
long-term debt to total assets (i.e., at its 75th percentile). Predictive margins in column (2) assess credit risk
variations to decreasing interest rates for a bank with a relatively low ratio of short-term and long-term debt
to total assets (i.e., at its 25th percentile). The differential effect in column (3) reports the difference in credit
risk variations – and its significance – between a highly-levered bank and a slightly-levered bank operating in a
decreasing interest rates environment. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the
5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
percentile of 1.00% to its 25th percentile of 0.05% results in an increase in credit
risk of 123.1 basis-point for a highly levered bank (i.e., at its 75th percentile of
93.44%) and only of 30.4 basis-point for a bank with a low level of leverage (i.e., at
its 25th percentile of 89.47%)8. In this case, the differential effect of 92.7 basis-point
between a highly levered and a lowly levered bank is significant. We find similar
results for the relation between Loan loss provision and other interest rates, and
also between Non-performing loans variable and ECB rate, Short-term rate and
Medium-term rate.
Contrary to Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017), who shows that the effect of interest rates
8These results are evaluated by assigning mean values to other variables included in Equation
2.2.
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on bank risk-taking is less pronounced for poorly capitalized banks in the U.S. bank-
ing system over the period 1997–2011, our results extend to the euro area Jiménez
et al. (2014) findings for the Spanish industry from 2002 to 2008. In the same vein,
we find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant
more loan applications to ex–ante risky firms than do highly capitalized banks and
that, when granted, the committed loans are larger in volume and are more likely
to be uncollateralized.
Implications drawn from this empirical evidence are two-fold. First, it sup-
ports the need to go beyond the traditional portfolio reallocation channel in the
theoretical literature on bank leverage and monetary policy and, therefore, to con-
sider alternative channels of bank risk-taking. Second, it is also confirmation that
macroprudential policy is likely to influence the transmission mechanism of mon-
etary policy (Angelini et al., 2014), as bank leverage is a key factor driving the
risk-taking channel of monetary policy. As restricting leverage helps to contain EU
banks’ credit risk despite the post–2008 low interest rates’ environment, our results
support leverage ratio as a useful complement to monetary policy for meeting the
twin objectives of price and financial stability.
2.5.3 Endogeneity of monetary policy & robustness checks
Whether considering the portfolio reallocation effect (Table 2.2) or the “search for
yield” effect (Table 2.4 and Table 2.5), we have shown previously that banks oper-
ating in growing economies tend to lower risk-taking. Reasonably, we question our
findings on the “search for yield” channel to be driven directly by macroeconomic
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conditions. For instance, banks may be more optimistic in boom times regarding
the granting of loans, causing them to underestimate credit risk. They may also
want to adjust their level of leverage depending on business cycles or the cost of
capital. Therefore, it is crucial to check whether our results are endogenously de-
termined by the state of the economy and to check for the presence of bias in our
estimations.
We control for the effect of macroeconomic variations in Table 2.6, augmenting
Equation 2.2 with an interaction term between interest rates and changes in real
GDP growth rate (GDP variable gauges growth or recession in countries included
in the sample). This new empirical configuration shows that coefficients on the
interaction between interest rates and bank leverage are left significantly negative
in regressions (1) to (7) when controlling for business cycle. Though the interaction
between Long-term rate and Leverage variables when Non-performing loans is set
as the dependent variable does not appear to be significant in Table 2.2 and Ta-
ble 2.4, we notice in regression (8) from Table 2.6 a slightly significant and positive
coefficient in the interaction term. This suggests there may be some endogeneity
issues in regression (8), so we cannot draw any substantive conclusion based on this
result. Such an outcome is likely to be explained by national economic conditions
captured by central government bond yields when other interest rates are measured
at the European level. It does not impact the quality of the other findings on
the interaction between interest rates and leverage, and it allays our concerns on
potential dependencies toward the macroeconomic environment. However, as a
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Table 2.6: Monetary policy conditions & bank credit risk in the EU (2009-2017):
search for yield channel & macroeconomic variations
Loan loss provision to gross loans Non-performing loans to gross loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Loan loss provision(t-1) 0.1054*** 0.0993*** 0.1074*** 0.2341***
(0.0247) (0.0311) (0.0286) (0.0409)
Non-performing loans(t-1) 0.8118*** 0.8789*** 0.8799*** 0.8842***
(0.0864) (0.0661) (0.0588) (0.0568)
ECB rate 10.7366* 0.8864***
(5.6078) (0.3230)
Short-term rate 9.0878** 0.4384*
(4.6262) (0.2555)
Medium-term rate 5.8765* 0.3212*
(3.4297) (0.1670)
Long-term rate 10.4285** -0.0698*
(4.3270) (0.0417)
Leverage -8.1266 -12.9513 -9.4909 1.3862 -1.1340** -0.9355*** -0.9620*** -1.2634***
(7.4036) (8.6721) (8.3747) (17.7762) (0.4787) (0.2371) (0.3008) (0.3743)
ECB rate * Leverage -12.8738** -0.9762***
(6.1365) (0.3508)
Short-term rate * Leverage -10.1682** -0.4851*
(5.1124) (0.2834)
Medium-term rate * Leverage -6.5502* -0.3506*
(3.7847) (0.1842)
Long-term rate * Leverage -11.9911** 0.0826*
(4.9223) (0.0468)
Size -0.2052 -0.2878 -0.4299 -0.0868 0.0085*** 0.0058** 0.0056** -0.0000
(0.1988) (0.2977) (0.2971) (0.5291) (0.0033) (0.0028) (0.0026) (0.0023)
ROAA -0.6684 -1.0917** -0.9895** -1.9538** -0.0234*** -0.0178*** -0.0177*** -0.0105***
(0.4467) (0.5159) (0.4981) (0.8473) (0.0054) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0033)
Inefficiency -7.9832*** -7.5934*** -7.1793*** -10.8041*** -0.0588*** -0.0424*** -0.0428*** -0.0214**
(1.0728) (1.2453) (1.1606) (2.3304) (0.0139) (0.0120) (0.0109) (0.0084)
Net loans -1.9847 -3.6522** -3.5025** -3.4937** -0.3715*** -0.2200*** -0.2304*** -0.1181***
(1.5256) (1.4630) (1.3675) (1.7822) (0.1312) (0.0599) (0.0535) (0.0407)
GDP -0.2201*** 0.0056 0.0194 -0.4154*** -0.0098*** -0.0075*** -0.0071*** -0.0039***
(0.0802) (0.0415) (0.0524) (0.1406) (0.0018) (0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0014)
ECB rate * GDP 0.3090*** 0.0084***
(0.1106) (0.0021)
Short-term rate * GDP 0.0390 0.0047**
(0.0918) (0.0021)
Medium-term rate * GDP -0.0023 0.0022
(0.0624) (0.0013)
Long-term rate * GDP 0.1698*** 0.0001
(0.0635) (0.0002)
Inflation 0.0612* -0.0569** -0.0580** 0.1726** -0.0003 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0027***
(0.0350) (0.0256) (0.0240) (0.0860) (0.0010) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0009)
HHI 12.2780*** 8.7076*** 9.0619*** 10.5141** -0.1291** -0.0934** -0.1038** -0.0908**
(2.6084) (2.3345) (2.3036) (4.7440) (0.0595) (0.0473) (0.0450) (0.0378)
Constant 15.5085** 21.1907** 18.5839** 9.8002 1.2712** 0.9980*** 1.0276*** 1.2464***
(7.5321) (8.4511) (8.1935) (16.0906) (0.5004) (0.2314) (0.2876) (0.3634)
Observations 22,657 22,657 22,657 22,657 11,893 11,893 11,893 11,893
Number of banks 3,622 3,622 3,622 3,622 2,715 2,715 2,715 2,715
Wald χ2 342.28*** 285.90*** 326.05*** 207.61*** 2,127.89*** 1,749.54*** 2,083.31*** 2,801.93***
Arellano-Bond (1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Arellano-Bond (2) 0.0890 0.3160 0.2400 0.1730 0.5890 0.7790 0.9530 0.1310
Hansen 0.0750 0.0890 0.0590 0.641 0.1260 0.2880 0.3070 0.1010
Notes. The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimations.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans in regressions
(1) to (4) and the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans in regressions (5) to (8). All other variables are defined as in Table A1 (see
appendix section). The Wald test shows the goodness-of-fit of regressions. The Arellano-Bond (1) and (2) tests report p-values for the
null hypothesis that the errors in first differences regression do not exhibit, respectively, first-order and second-order autocorrelation. The
Hansen test reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with residuals. *Statistical significance at the
10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
precautionary measure, we remove the Long-term rate variable in the remainder of
the empirical analysis to preserve results from endogeneity.
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Similar to the portfolio reallocation effect, we investigate in Table 2.7 the link
between industry concentration and the magnitude of the “search for yield” effect.
We find that it is systematically greater in highly competitive banking industries
represented in regressions (1), (3), and (5). As the portfolio reallocation effect, the
“search for yield” effect better diffuses to banks’ balance sheet in conditions of fair
competition, and the two effects reinforce each other in this case. In turn, we expect
the “search for yield” channel to be minimal in cases of banks operating on highly
concentrated markets, as market power reduces the extent to which lending rates
reflect changes in policy rates.
Differences in the “search for yield” intensity between high competition and low
competition subsamples appear to be significant for estimations using ECB rate (at
the 7.60% level) and Short-term rate (at the 1.19% level) variables as an interest
rates’ index. A one percentage point decrease in the ECB Bank interest rate induces
a 97.34 basis-point increase in the “search for yield” effect for the high competition
subsample and only a 9.64 basis-point increase for the low competition subsample.
However, we do not find a significant difference between the two subsamples when
using the Medium-term rate variable. Similar to the portfolio reallocation channel,
we acknowledge the interaction between the local market structure of the banking
industry and the impact of the “search for yield” channel on banks’ balance sheets.
In a context of enhanced capital requirements since the GFC, we analyze in
Table 2.8 whether capitalization is decisive in the way the interaction between bank
leverage and interest rates influences credit risk. This offers insight into the impact
of post–GFC changing regulations on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy:
Bruno De Menna Chapter 2
74 2.5. Discussion of findings
Table 2.7: Monetary policy conditions & bank credit risk in the EU (2009-2017):
search for yield channel & industry concentration
Loan loss provision to gross loans
High Low High Low High Low
competition competition competition competition competition competition
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan loss provision(t-1) 0.6906** 0.1203*** 0.0089 0.1119*** 0.0216 0.1159***
(0.2837) (0.0378) (0.1325) (0.0391) (0.1869) (0.0390)
ECB rate 86.4572* 8.5669**
(44.8865) (3.8731)
Short-term rate 34.7133*** 8.2869**
(10.6880) (3.4602)
Medium-term rate 20.5578** 6.1250**
(10.2904) (2.6159)
ECB rate * Leverage -97.3477** -9.6475**
(49.4302) (4.2760)
Short-term rate * Leverage -38.7745*** -9.3549**
(11.6979) (3.8107)
Medium-term rate * Leverage -23.2207** -6.8985**
(11.2702) (2.8856)
Leverage 109.3622*** -3.1004 56.8165*** -4.3308 67.8951*** -2.7336
(20.1373) (3.4138) (7.2709) (3.0649) (8.1797) (3.3766)
Size 0.4813 -0.1659 0.8044* -0.1180 0.7824 -0.1202
(0.7595) (0.1114) (0.4670) (0.1114) (0.5342) (0.1069)
ROAA -1.0622 -0.6630*** -0.1202 -0.6833*** 0.3530 -0.6190***
(1.8012) (0.2335) (0.7756) (0.2390) (0.6521) (0.2140)
Inefficiency -21.6812 -4.2780*** -3.7179 -4.8323*** 0.8093 -4.5767***
(13.5638) (0.5862) (4.8569) (0.6528) (5.4265) (0.6279)
Net loans -16.8065* -4.0295*** -10.5605*** -3.4739*** -9.0702** -3.6718***
(9.5866) (0.8975) (3.3569) (1.0511) (4.5821) (1.0669)
GDP -0.0449 -0.0866*** 0.0212 -0.0895*** 0.0207 -0.0831***
(0.1048) (0.0265) (0.0339) (0.0271) (0.0345) (0.0271)
Inflation 0.0986 0.0424 -0.0757* 0.0339 -0.0246 0.0212
(0.1090) (0.0269) (0.0458) (0.0256) (0.0536) (0.0248)
HHI 15.2938 -1.7348 -30.6463** -0.5921 -17.6772 -0.4771
(26.8543) (1.4543) (12.2386) (1.4473) (15.2329) (1.4693)
Constant -76.9550*** 10.4964*** -46.2523*** 11.1884*** -60.9217*** 9.7002***
(19.7963) (3.4256) (10.7123) (3.1255) (13.0804) (3.4506)
Observations 12,809 9,848 12,809 9,848 12,809 9,848
Number of banks 1,798 1,824 1,798 1,824 1,798 1,824
Wald χ2 194.25*** 621.74*** 454.74*** 580.82*** 512.57*** 585.03***
Arellano-Bond (1) 0.0020 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0160 0.0000
Arellano-Bond (2) 0.0490 0.8780 0.7910 0.7860 0.6510 0.8120
Hansen 0.0240 0.7790 0.0690 0.4640 0.0090 0.4010
Ho: Rate * Lev. [High competition] 0.0760a 0.0119b 0.1475c
= Rate * Lev. [Low competition] χ2(1) = 3.15 χ2(1) = 6.32 χ2(1) = 2.10
Notes. The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for two-step system GMM dynamic
panel estimations. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan
loss provision to gross loans in all regressions. All other variables are defined as in Table A1 (see appendix section). High
competition subsample in regressions (1), (3) and (5) and low competition subsample in regressions (2), (4) and (6) refer
to observations for which HHI is, respectively, below and above the full sample median value. The Wald test shows the
goodness-of-fit of regressions. The Arellano-Bond (1) and (2) tests report p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors
in first differences regression do not exhibit, respectively, first-order and second-order autocorrelation. The Hansen test
reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with residuals. *Statistical significance at
the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
a χ2-statistics p-values testing that (ECB rate * Leverage) coefficients from high competition subsample = (ECB rate *
Leverage) coefficients from low competition subsample.
b χ2-statistics p-values testing that (Short-term rate * Leverage) coefficients from high competition subsample = (Short-term
rate * Leverage) coefficients from low competition subsample.
c χ2-statistics p-values testing that (Long-term rate * Leverage) coefficients from high competition subsample = (Long-term
rate * Leverage) coefficients from low competition subsample.
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Table 2.8: Monetary policy conditions & bank credit risk in the EU (2009-2017):
search for yield channel & capitalization
Loan loss provision to gross loans
Above Basel III Under Basel III Above Basel III Under Basel III Above Basel III Under Basel III
minimum capital minimum capital minimum capital minimum capital minimum capital minimum capital
adequacy ratio adequacy ratio adequacy ratio adequacy ratio adequacy ratio adequacy ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan loss provision(t-1) 0.1001*** 0.2797*** 0.0713*** 0.2316*** 0.0692*** 0.2345***
(0.0294) (0.0456) (0.0260) (0.0453) (0.0266) (0.0455)
ECB rate 7.7195** 36.4769***
(3.9205) (12.0133)
Short-term rate 7.4237** 30.9584***
(3.4244) (9.6012)
Medium-term rate 6.1120** 24.4484***
(2.7217) (7.6006)
Leverage 3.0698 25.9792** -5.7537 9.9659 0.3527 18.0853
(6.1608) (11.9723) (5.7176) (10.7828) (6.9926) (11.7228)
ECB rate * Leverage -9.1542** -39.1924***
(4.3882) (12.8141)
Short-term rate * Leverage -8.5068** -33.0977***
(3.8700) (10.2469)
Medium-term rate * Leverage -7.0961** -26.1557***
(3.0811) (8.1119)
Size -0.5242* -0.0680 -0.3430 -0.2127 -0.6533 -0.2095
(0.2790) (0.1151) (0.4471) (0.1766) (0.4879) (0.1659)
ROAA -0.2886 -0.7584 -0.7156 -0.5875 -0.6666 -0.5797
(0.5320) (0.4878) (0.5159) (0.4890) (0.5019) (0.4969)
Inefficiency -6.2597*** -6.4971*** -7.9498*** -5.7403*** -7.6871*** -5.8607***
(1.3526) (1.3630) (1.3485) (1.4369) (1.4322) (1.4767)
Net loans -1.5400 -4.4343** -2.9000** -5.5615*** -2.5105* -5.6572***
(1.4093) (1.9737) (1.4493) (1.9235) (1.4859) (1.9637)
GDP -0.0134 -0.0345 0.0488 -0.0339 0.0666* -0.0309
(0.0330) (0.0245) (0.0363) (0.0288) (0.0369) (0.0286)
Inflation -0.0259 -0.0025 -0.0972*** -0.0993** -0.0735** -0.0908*
(0.0413) (0.0565) (0.0243) (0.0481) (0.0293) (0.0495)
HHI 6.3180*** 11.7287*** 3.8095** 14.0280*** 5.0778*** 13.8689***
(2.1692) (3.2156) (1.7223) (4.2864) (1.9521) (3.9925)
Constant 5.9399 -16.9628 14.7843*** -0.9335 10.8658** -8.4097
(5.2718) (11.2969) (3.7458) (10.5062) (4.8568) (11.1949)
Observations 13,182 9,475 13,182 9,475 13,182 9,475
Number of banks 2,782 2,310 2,782 2,310 2,782 2,310
Wald χ2 298.19*** 219.01*** 263.46*** 207.23*** 258.29*** 206.93***
Arellano-Bond (1) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Arellano-Bond (2) 0.0630 0.4060 0.2450 0.6260 0.2820 0.6670
Hansen 0.1330 0.2060 0.0240 0.4200 0.0590 0.4020
Ho: Rate * Lev. [Above Basel III] 0.0000a 0.0000b 0.0000c
= Rate * Lev. [Under Basel III] χ2(1) = 46.86 χ2(1) = 40.38 χ2(1) = 38.27
Notes. The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for two-step system GMM dynamic panel estimations. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans in all regressions. All other
variables are defined as in Table A1 (see appendix section). Above Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio subsample in regressions (1), (3) and
(5) and under Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio subsample in regressions (2), (4) and (6) refer to observations for which the equity-to-asset
ratio is, respectively, above and below the Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio that banks must maintain (i.e. 8%). The Wald test shows the
goodness-of-fit of regressions. The Arellano-Bond (1) and (2) tests report p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in first differences regression
do not exhibit, respectively, first-order and second-order autocorrelation. The Hansen test reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments
are not correlated with residuals. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the
1% level.
a χ2-statistics p-values testing that (ECB rate * Leverage) coefficients from above Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio subsample = (ECB rate
* Leverage) coefficients from under Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio subsample.
b χ2-statistics p-values testing that (Short-term rate * Leverage) coefficients from above Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio subsample =
(Short-term rate * Leverage) coefficients from under Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio subsample.
c χ2-statistics p-values testing that (Medium-term rate * Leverage) coefficients from above Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio subsample =
(Medium-term rate * Leverage) coefficients from under Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio subsample.
banks complying with Basel III capital requirements would be better prepared to
face the challenges induced by a “low for long” interest rates environment on their
balance sheet. Therefore, we expect the “search for yield” effect to weaken as capi-
Bruno De Menna Chapter 2
76 2.5. Discussion of findings
talization increases in light of the results obtained in Table 2.4, where highly levered
banks are more sensitive to interest rate variations. We perform another sample
split between banks having a capitalization level either above or below the minimal
capital adequacy ratio required by the third instalment of the Basel Accords (fixed
at 8% in total9) in response to the deficiencies in financial regulation and intending
to decrease bank leverage.
Consistent with these predictions, we find the “search for yield” effect to be
much larger for banks falling below the Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio
compared to banks complying with Basel Accords. As we notice in Table 2.8,
differences in the search for a yield between the two subsamples are significant in
every case. A one percent decrease in the ECB rate (Short-term rate and Medium-
term rate, respectively) implies only a 9.15 basis-point increase (8.50 basis-points
and 7.09 basis-points, respectively) in the “search for yield” effect for banks above
the Basel III minimum capital adequacy ratio, whereas while it rises by 39.19 basis-
points (33.09 basis-points and 26.15 basis-points, respectively) for banks below this
threshold. This result suggests that there are nonlinearities in the way the “search
for yield” effect operates on bank credit risk.
Table 2.9 reports additional robustness checks to address further endogeneity
issues of monetary policy. First, we expect times of distress to match with relatively
higher levels of bank leverage and cause the “search for yield” channel to be stronger.
The last financial crisis was undoubtedly blamed in part on excessive
9Broken down according to the type of bank capital, namely 4.5% for “Core Tier 1” capital,
1.5% for “Additional Tier 1” capital, and 2% for “Tier 2” capital.
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Table 2.9: Monetary policy conditions & bank credit risk in the EU (2009-2017):
additional robustness checks
Post–2010 period Small banks
Low correlation with
euro area GDP
Loan loss prov. NPL Loan loss prov. NPL Loan loss prov. NPL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Loan loss provision(t-1) 0.1165*** 0.2395 0.2427***
(0.0268) (0.2249) (0.0663)
Non-performing loans(t-1) 0.8954*** 0.9614*** 0.7559***
(0.3290) (0.1024) (0.1082)
ECB rate 21.3225*** 0.6466* 11.6356* 0.9995*** 23.1933** 0.5067*
(8.0979) (0.3493) (7.0029) (0.3877) (9.4413) (0.2750)
Leverage 7.7058 -1.0961** -9.1615 -0.4572 2.5856 -0.1677
(12.4602) (0.5054) (10.0274) (0.2784) (4.5084) (0.2036)
ECB rate * Leverage -23.7801*** -0.6954* -13.0515* -1.0928** -25.3788** -0.5548*
(8.8490) (0.3857) (7.9116) (0.4287) (10.3038) (0.3054)
Size 0.1131 0.0013 -1.2502* -0.0277 -0.1513 -0.0057
(0.2767) (0.0084) (0.6719) (0.0175) (0.1937) (0.0068)
ROAA -0.8254 -0.0190** -0.9173* -0.0287*** -0.8501*** -0.0291**
(0.5638) (0.0082) (0.4769) (0.0077) (0.1777) (0.0128)
Inefficiency -8.9742*** -0.0576** -8.5168*** -0.1057*** -1.9546*** -0.0476**
(1.4613) (0.0240) (2.5598) (0.0237) (0.3974) (0.0221)
Net loans -5.1438** -0.2914** -8.1133*** -0.2950*** -2.7246** -0.1308*
(2.0259) (0.1167) (1.8215) (0.0837) (1.1267) (0.0768)
GDP 0.0422 -0.0066** 0.1932*** -0.0006 -0.0329 -0.0005
(0.0356) (0.0033) (0.0701) (0.0012) (0.0537) (0.0018)
Inflation 0.0418 -0.0086*** 0.0355 -0.0018 -0.0448 0.0006
(0.0395) (0.0029) (0.0592) (0.0014) (0.0476) (0.0027)
HHI 6.5357* -0.0336 -14.7648** -0.1608 0.5187 -0.2262*
(3.3360) (0.3367) (6.7498) (0.1324) (0.8352) (0.1279)
Constant 1.5318 1.2245** 28.0134** 0.8529*** 2.3072 0.3773
(11.5810) (0.5230) (11.4795) (0.2670) (3.7602) (0.2294)
Observations 19,860 11,084 18,113 9,011 1,968 992
Number of banks 3,562 2,682 2,965 2,159 462 233
Wald χ2 246.09*** 841.16*** 103.26*** 821.95*** 106.34*** 307.55***
Arellano-Bond (1) 0.0000 0.0090 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0010
Arellano-Bond (2) 0.1950 0.9460 0.2960 0.8650 0.5350 0.1220
Hansen 0.0580 0.4210 0.1990 0.3970 0.0220 0.6430
Notes. The table reports coefficients and robust standard errors (in parentheses) for two-step system GMM dynamic
panel estimations. Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank-level. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan
loss provision to gross loans in regressions (1), (3) and (5) and the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans in
regressions (2), (4) and (6). All other variables are defined as in Table A1 (see appendix section). Post–2010 period
subsample in regressions (1) and (2) excludes the impact of the last financial turmoil. Small banks subsample in
regressions (3) and (4) refers to banks for which assets are below the sample top quintile. Low correlation with euro
area GDP subsample in regressions (5) and (6) refers to banks located in countries in which national GDP growth is
not highly correlated with euro area GDP growth (i.e. below-median correlation). The Wald test shows the goodness-
of-fit of regressions. The Arellano-Bond (1) and (2) tests report p-values for the null hypothesis that the errors in
first differences regression do not exhibit, respectively, first-order and second-order autocorrelation. The Hansen test
reports p-values for the null hypothesis that the instruments are not correlated with residuals. *Statistical significance
at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
leverage. In this case, monetary policy may be more responsive to bank risk as
the threat of a spate of insolvencies looms over the economy. Such a case typically
corresponds to stronger monetary policy responses to financial volatility and exac-
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erbates endogeneity bias in the empirical results. Therefore, we exclude the crisis
period from our sample — starting in 2008, when the ECB initiated its first inter-
est rate reduction, and ending in 2010 — and run our main specification described
in Equation 2.2. Regressions (1) and (2) provide negatively significant coefficients
for the interaction between interest rates and bank leverage. This result confirms
the absence of endogeneity due to the 2008 global financial turmoil and provides
additional robustness to our empirical analysis.
Second, we may assume that monetary policy transmits mainly to large banks’
balance sheets, whereas small banks are impacted marginally (if impacted) by the
“search for yield” channel. Endogeneity would be more of a concern for major banks
whose loan portfolio is closely related to nationwide economic activities. Accord-
ingly, we put aside top quintile banks (listed by assets’ size), for which endogene-
ity may be challenging, to focus on small banks and check whether the “search for
yield” channel is left unchanged. Similar to the full sample estimations in Table 2.4,
columns (3) and (4) ensure negative and still significant interactions between inter-
est rates and bank leverage, so our results are not contaminated by the inclusion of
large banks. We conclude that small banks’ balance sheets also transmit monetary
policy stimulus to the economy.
Finally, in columns (5) and (6) from Table 2.9, we question whether monetary
policy is driven by the euro zone business cycle. We do so by first classifying coun-
tries in our sample depending on the correlation of national economic conditions
(gauged by the GDP variable) with euro area GDP growth (collected from Euro-
stat) and then testing the baseline model from Equation 2.2 only for banks located
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in countries below the median correlation. Once again, we find a negative and
significant relation between credit risk and the interaction term including interest
rates and bank leverage. Accordingly, this suggests that our findings are free from
endogeneity caused by correlation with euro area cycles.
2.6 Conclusion
This study investigates, for the euro area, the effects of interest rates variations on
bank credit risk over the period 2009–2017. We also analyze how this relationship
interacts with the degree of bank leverage. Empirical evidence is provided that a low
interest rate environment significantly triggers bank credit risk, which confirms the
existence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission in the aftermath
of the GFC. Our results also suggest that the degree of competition in national
banking industries is key in the transmission of monetary policy to credit risk. As
high competition lowers opportunity for banks to enjoy high market power, herding
behaviors are likely to arise, intensifying the negative impact of interest rates on
risk-taking.
Consistent with the “search for yield” effect, we also find that highly levered
banks react most to changes in interest rates, taking more risks when monetary
policy is eased. While confirming, for the whole euro area, Jiménez et al. (2014)
insights into the Spanish banking industry, this indicates an essential difference
with the U.S. banking system, where the negative link between risk-taking and
interest rates is steeper for highly capitalized banks (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2017). One
interpretation of such result is the presence of a “skin-in-the-game” effect (De Nicolò
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et al., 2010) in the European banking industry: the more a bank has to lose in case
of failure (i.e., having high levels of capitalization), the less severe the moral hazard
problem. Similarly, a bank with a high franchise value has a lot to lose and little
incentive to take excessive risk, whereas a zombie bank is willing to take great risks
to gamble for resurrection. Accordingly, the theoretical literature should consider
alternative channels of bank risk-taking to fully understand the multiple facets of
monetary policy’s impacts on credit risk depending on countries, time, and local
banking market conditions.
We also identify nonlinearities in the “search for yield” effect depending on the
level of bank capitalization: it becomes increasingly more pronounced as capital is
depleted and limited liability is more likely to be binding. This outcome has impli-
cations for the impact of post–GFC changing regulations on the risk-taking channel:
banks complying with Basel III capital requirements would be better prepared to
face the challenges induced by a “low for long” interest rates environment. Our
results survive several robustness checks to allay concerns about monetary policy
endogeneity. Specifically, we test whether our findings are not driven directly by na-
tional economic conditions, effects of the GFC before 2010, larger banks’ behavior,
or euro area economic conditions.
This paper has several policy implications. First, besides supporting new re-
sponsibilities to the European Central Bank (ECB) as regards macroprudential
supervision (Diamond and Rajan, 2012) and on whether monetary policy should
concern itself explicitly with financial stability, we emphasize the importance of con-
sidering banks heterogeneity and geographical circumstances to gauge the relative
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significance of monetary policy’s risk-taking channel. The evidence presented here
for the whole euro area suggests opportunities for further research on differences
within euro area countries on the transmission of the common monetary policy.
Second, results achieved for credit risk may differ from other types of risk-taking in
banks’ balance sheets. Indeed, several other channels exist through which interest
rates bear on bank risk, including liquidity, market risk, and maturity mismatches
(Adrian and Shin, 2009). Taking different aspects of bank risk into account might be
also relevant in linking microprudential and macroprudential frameworks. We leave
these issues for future research. Third, as leverage ratio is central to macropruden-
tial measures for financial stability, this paper also links to literature dedicated to
the impact of macroprudential regulation on monetary policy. We provide evidence
that a macroprudential tool such as leverage ratio is effective in influencing the
transmission mechanism of monetary policy (Angelini et al., 2014) and in modify-
ing risk-taking. As Table C1 shows only a slight decrease in the yearly average of
the leverage ratio for EU banks between 2009–2017, our results reiterate the need
to keep restricting such indicator in the near future.
Lately, the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed euro area economies — and world-
wide — into a Great Lockdown (Gopinath, 2020) accompanied by exceptional policy
support from the ECB, including additional monetary policy easing and flexibility
on macroprudential supervisory timelines, deadlines, and procedures. However, this
papers shows that a strong and thorough macroprudential framework is more nec-
essary than ever under a low interest rates environment that the pandemic is likely
to further extend.
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Appendix A. Variables’ definition
Table A1: Variables’ definition
Variable Definition Data source Level
Panel A: Variables of interest
Loan loss provision
Ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans. It indicates the ability of a bank to absorb
losses from non-performing loans and to determine the quality of its loans
Fitch Connect Bank
Non-performing loans
Ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. It measures a bank health and efficiency
by identifying problems with asset quality in the loan portfolio
Fitch Connect Bank
ECB rate
Interest rate on the main refinancing operations (MRO) banks pay when they borrow
money from the European Central Bank (ECB) for one week as they
provide collateral to guarantee that the money will be paid back
Eurostat Euro area
Short-term rate
3-month Euribor interest rate at which European banks lend one another funds
denominated in euros whereby the loans have a maturity of 3 months. When
the Euribor interest rates rise or fall, there is a high likelihood that the interest rates on
banking products will also be adjusted
Eurostat Euro area
Medium-term rate
12-month Euribor interest rate at which European banks lend one another funds
denominated in euros whereby the loans have a maturity of 12 months. When
the Euribor interest rates rise or fall, there is a high likelihood that the interest rates
on banking products will also be adjusted
Eurostat Euro area
Long-term rate
Central government bond yields on the secondary market, gross of tax, with a residual
maturity of around 10 years. To compute this indicator, bonds are
regularly replaced to avoid any maturity drift
Eurostat Country
Leverage
Ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total assets, also known as the debt-to-assets
ratio. It shows how a bank’s assets and business operations are
financed using debt
Fitch Connect Bank
Panel B: Bank-level controls
Size Natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets to proxy the scope of its business activities Fitch Connect Bank
ROAA
Return on average assets ratio as a measure of profitability of a bank’s assets. It
gauges financial performance by showing how well a bank’s assets are being
used to generate profits
Fitch Connect Bank
Inefficiency
Ratio of total expenses to total revenue as a measure of a bank’s inefficiency. It
assesses the ability of a bank to turn assets into revenue (the lower such ability,
the higher its inefficiency)
Fitch Connect Bank
Net loans
Ratio of net loans to total assets referring to how much of a bank’s assets are tied
up in loans. It can be interpreted as the share of business devoted to traditional
banking intermediation as an alternative to the ratio of off-balance sheet items to
total assets for which data is many times missing in bank financial statements.
Fitch Connect Bank
Panel C: Macro-level controls
GDP
Percentage change on previous year of real GDP growth rate. It proxies a country’s
economic activity defined as the value of all goods and services produced less
the value of any goods or services used in their creation
Eurostat Country
Inflation
Annual average rate of change of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP)
as the official measure of consumer price inflation in the euro area for the
purposes of monetary policy and the assessment of inflation convergence
Eurostat Country
HHI
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) defined as the sum of the squares of the market
shares of nationwide banks. Increases in the HHI indicate a decrease in
competition or alternatively an increase in banking industry concentration
Author’s calculation Country
Notes. The table reports name, definition, data source and level of the variables employed in the empirical analysis. Descriptive statistics are
reported in Table 2.1.
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Appendix B. Pairwise Pearson correlations coeffi-
cients
Table B1: Pairwise Pearson correlations coefficients
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 ECB rate 1.0000
2 Short-term rate 0.9622 1.0000
(0.0000)
3 Medium-term rate 0.9703 0.9933 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
4 Long-term rate 0.7014 0.6807 0.6859 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
5 Leverage 0.1174 0.1133 0.1130 0.0178 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0033)
6 Size -0.0391 -0.0395 -0.0402 0.0188 0.2391 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0020) (0.0000)
7 ROAA -0.0282 -0.0243 -0.0256 -0.0853 -0.1832 -0.0263 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
8 Inefficiency -0.0245 -0.0290 -0.0289 -0.0440 -0.0346 -0.1666 -0.3978 1.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
9 Net loans 0.0084 0.0098 0.0099 0.0264 0.0453 0.0235 -0.0180 -0.1105 1.0000
(0.1673) (0.1071) (0.1025) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0031) (0.0000)
10 GDP -0.3807 -0.3280 -0.2712 -0.4640 -0.0210 0.0056 0.0430 0.0149 -0.0378 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0006) (0.3537) (0.0000) (0.0140) (0.0000)
11 Inflation 0.4235 0.3560 0.4274 0.3230 0.0263 -0.0398 -0.0035 0.0150 0.0287 0.1723 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.5675) (0.0136) (0.0000) (0.0000)
12 HHI -0.0618 -0.0649 -0.0615 0.2529 -0.1037 0.0758 0.0338 -0.0592 0.0586 -0.0766 -0.0151 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0131)
Notes. The table reports correlation coefficients for the explanatory variables used in the empirical analysis and defined in Table A1.
Appendix C. Changes in leverage ratio in the post-
2008 European banking industry
Table C1: Yearly average of leverage ratio for euro area banks (2009-2017)
Year 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Leverage ratio 91.80% 91.58% 91.23% 90.84% 90.54% 90.08% 89.93% 89.58% 89.53%
Notes. The table reports changes in the ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total assets, also
known as the debt-to-assets ratio, over the period 2009-2017 for the full sample used in the empirical
analysis.
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Appendix D. Credit risk & interest rates in the post-
2008 European banking industry
Figure D1: Yearly average of credit risk proxies for euro area banks (source: Fitch
Connect, 2009-2017)
Figure D2: Yearly average of interest rates proxies in the euro area (source: Euro-
stat, 2009-2017)




The joint influence of bank capital &
funding liquidity on the monetary
policy’s risk-taking channel
3.1 Introduction
The 2008 global financial crisis (GFC) has been a milestone for banking regulation,
suggesting a crucial need to understand how financial stability interacts with the
real economy. Accordingly, risk-taking is considered to be a primary source of banks’
vulnerability with the potential to be passed onto the whole banking industry or
even undermine other sectors as systemic issues arise.
First, a broad literature seeks to understand the joint influence of capital and
liquidity on banks’ risk-taking (DeYoung et al., 2018). While banks have been
required to maintain minimum capital ratios for three decades, the Basel III accords
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aim to strengthen capital thresholds at the same time as liquidity standards1. In
addition to the existing capital-based regulation, the introduction of new liquidity
requirements such as the net stable funding ratio (NSFR)2 has led to debate in
academic and policy arenas on the need for such regulatory tools, their interaction,
and their potential contrasting effects on financial stability (Carletti et al., 2020).
Still, banks’ funding liquidity and their desired levels of equity are interrelated
in ways that are not fully understood by regulators and researchers. Gorton and
Winton (2017) examines such a path with the hypothesis of a “crowding-out of
deposits” effect when higher capital ratios shift investors’ funds from relatively
liquid deposits (as a proxy for funding liquidity) to relatively illiquid equity capital.
This mainly happens because deposits are insured and withdrawable at par value,
whereas bank equity has a stronger stochastic value depending on the liquidity of
the stock exchange as well as bank fundamentals (Distinguin et al., 2013).
Second, another growing strand of the literature (Adrian et al., 2019; Morais
et al., 2019; Bonfim and Soares, 2018; Neuenkirch and Nöckel, 2018; Dell’Ariccia
et al., 2017; Paligorova and Santos, 2017) has focused on the transmission of mon-
etary policy to banks’ risk, assuming that variations in monetary policy affect the
risk appetite of financial intermediaries and shift the supply curve for credit to the
real economy. The key results suggest that monetary policy easing decreases overall
credit risk in the short run (due to borrowers’ higher capacity to repay outstanding
loans), but triggers risk-taking behavior in the medium term with a deterioration
1In this study, we focus exclusively on a specific type of liquidity, namely funding liquidity.
2The NSFR became a minimum standard applicable to all internationally active banks on a
consolidated basis on January 1, 2018, although national supervisory committees may also apply
it to any subset of entities of large internationally active banks or to all other banks (BIS, 2018).
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in banks’ asset quality. The existence of a “risk-taking channel of monetary pol-
icy transmission” (Borio and Zhu, 2012) is also well documented for the euro area.
Under low interest rates, European banks are more likely to accept higher risk (Al-
tunbas et al., 2014), lax lending standards (Maddaloni and Peydró, 2011), or low
interest rate margins (Claessens et al., 2018).
Concerned by the close link between solvency and liquidity crises3, the present
study examines the joint influence of bank capital and funding liquidity on monetary
policy’s risk-taking channel since the introduction of the euro. As one of the largest
bank-based financial systems worldwide (Bats and Houben, 2020), the euro area
displays great diversity in banking industries, which makes it of special interest.
Moreover, while the previous literature considers separately the causal relation from
capital to funding liquidity and the transmission channel of monetary policy, this
study is the first, to the best of our knowledge, to empirically investigate how
credit risk is affected by the dual constraints of capital and funding liquidity in an
environment of changing—and, lately, low—interest rates in the euro area.
Based on the triple interactions among monetary policy, equity capital, and
funding liquidity4, we use yearly data from 1999 to 2018 to show that euro area
banks faced a “crowding-out of deposits” effect (Gorton and Winton, 2017) in the
risk-taking channel of monetary policy before the GFC. These findings support
the Basel III framework and need to strengthen the minimum funding liquidity
3Hong et al. (2014) evidence that liquidity risk leads to bank failures through systematic and
idiosyncratic channels and was therefore an important contributor to banks’ failures during 2009–
2010.
4Following Acharya and Naqvi (2012), we use the ratio of total deposits to total assets to proxy
for banks’ funding liquidity in our empirical analysis.
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standards concomitant to capital ratios to temper monetary policy transmission to
credit risk. We also evidence a missing “crowding-out of deposits” effect on behalf
of inefficient banks in the post-GFC period when interest rates decline to the zero
lower bound. Accordingly, a trade-off arises between financial stability (achieved
through higher capital ratios) and funding liquidity: when interest rates are low,
imposing capital and funding liquidity standards on inefficient banks at the same
time might further expose them to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.
Our findings have major implications for bank regulators and policymakers in
the euro area. We provide new insights into the joint influence of capital and
funding liquidity regulation on monetary policy’s risk-taking channel for inefficient
banks in the post-GFC period. Hence, when interest rates are low, we suggest first
addressing banks’ inefficiency issues before requiring them to display simultaneously
good levels of capital and funding liquidity. This outcome is all the more important
given that the share of inefficient banks increased in most euro area countries (except
for Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Malta, and Slovenia) between 2011 and 2018.
The COVID-19 pandemic, which has led to the Great Lockdown (Gopinath, 2020),
might also raise the interest of these results, as the low interest rate environment
in the European banking industry is likely to extend further.
Accordingly, we present new empirical evidence extending the current literature
in two directions. First, we add to the strand of the literature on the risk-taking
channel of monetary policy in that the joint influence of capital and funding liq-
uidity requirements on the latter has not yet been examined empirically for the
euro area. Second, we assess the accuracy of the Basel III regulatory framework,
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particularly the extent to which funding liquidity regulation should consider the ef-
ficiency profiles of financial intermediaries before implementing uniform standards
across the euro area.
The remainder of the paper is structured into five sections. Section 3.2 reviews
the literature on the causal link between bank capital and funding liquidity as
well as theories addressing the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Section
3.3 presents the data and empirical strategy addressing our theoretical motivations,
before Section 3.4 defines the variables of interest and controls. Section 3.5 discusses
the empirical results and robustness checks, while Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature overview
We build our empirical approach by linking the causal relation between bank capital
and funding liquidity with the framework of monetary policy’s risk-taking channel.
First, we briefly review the literature on how capital and funding liquidity affect
banks’ risk-taking behaviors (Subsection 3.2.1). We then discuss the causal link
between capital and funding liquidity (Subsection 3.2.2) and theories on the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy (Subsection 3.2.3).
3.2.1 Effects of capital & funding liquidity on banks’ risk
Studies of the impact of capital on banks’ risk lack consensus. Calem and Rob (1999)
support the idea of a U-shaped relation: while under-capitalized banks lower risk
as their level of capital rises, well-funded banks increase their risk-taking behavior
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in the long run. Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) note that banks’ risk can be either
negatively or positively related to capitalization depending on the relative forces
of the incentives determining asset risk and risk/return of asset choices (i.e., the
shareholder, manager, and deposit insurer). However, another stream of the litera-
ture suggests that banks with high levels of equity are less willing to take risks than
banks with low equity.
Unlike established U.S. evidence, Altunbas et al. (2007) prove that inefficient
European banks holding more capital appear to actually take on less risk. As
shareholders of well-capitalized banks are risk-averse and fear huge losses in the
case of default, Repullo (2004) argues that banks with high equity levels rather
prefer to mitigate their risk-taking behavior. Similarly, Konishi and Yasuda (2004)
find that capital requirements have reduced Japanese commercial banks’ risk and
Lindquist (2004) also suggest a negative relationship between capital buffers and
risk-taking for Norwegian savings banks. Berger et al. (2008) establish that publicly
traded U.S. bank holding companies actively manage their capital ratios, set target
capital levels above well-capitalized regulatory minima, and make rapid adjustments
toward their targets. Still in support of the risk reduction view, Hyun and Rhee
(2011) and Lee and Hsieh (2013) evidence that banks restrict high-risk assets rather
than issuing new equity when complying with capital requirements.
Regarding the relation between funding liquidity and banks’ risk, Acharya and
Naqvi (2012) theoretically show that excessive funding liquidity—proxied by the
level of deposits on banks’ balance sheets—induces greater risk-taking on the part
of bank managers. This occurs when managerial performance is assessed on the
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basis of loan volume delivered to customers or when long-term risk is ignored in
setting managers’ premiums. As banks collect funds from depositors and lend them
to borrowers, excess deposits might trigger managers’ overconfidence in their lending
practices and strengthen their belief that the bank will not experience any funding
liquidity crisis in the near future. To induce bank managers to accept higher degrees
of risk, Cheng et al. (2015) note that they need to be given higher compensation.
However, to achieve such compensation levels, flexibility toward aggressive lending
strategies is necessary, especially when funding liquidity is in abundance. Eventu-
ally, this creates the reverse causality of risk causing pay as opposed to pay causing
risk.
Similarly, Hong et al. (2014) show that systemic liquidity risk contributed to
bank failures in 2009 and 2010, suggesting that an effective framework of funding
liquidity risk management needs to target liquidity risk at both the individual and
the system levels. Wagner (2007) argues that the higher funding liquidity of bank
assets increases banking instability and the externalities associated with banking
failures. Lucchetta (2007) also emphasizes that bank funding liquidity might rise
because of monetary policy tightening. Higher risk-free interest rates boost risk-free
bond investment, which, in turn, pushes up funding liquidity supply and stimulates
interbank lending. This eventually results in massive investment in risky assets
emanating from other banks. As pointed out by Keeley (1990), deposit insurance
is also a breeding ground of moral hazard that leads to banks taking more risks:
the higher the level of deposits, the higher the risk exposure of deposit insurers.
Overall, there is a clear positive relationship between bank funding liquidity and
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risk-taking behavior.
3.2.2 The causal link between capital & funding liquidity
Among the theoretical literature on the relationship between bank capital and fund-
ing liquidity, Gorton and Winton (2017) suggest the presence of a “crowding-out of
deposits” effect to explain why higher levels of bank capital reduce the volume of
deposits. The reasoning goes as follows. Although equity capital reduces the proba-
bility of bank failure, to investors, bank equity is an information-sensitive asset that
makes a poor hedge against liquidity needs. In the equilibrium in a banking system,
investors hold deposits to the extent they need coverage against potential liquidity
shocks. A system-wide increase in the required bank capital forces investors to re-
duce their deposit holdings in favor of equity, increasing the odds that the marginal
bank shareholder will have to sell to meet his/her liquidity needs and increasing
the resulting discount for expected trading losses. Once investors have acquired
bank shares, they have an incentive to acquire costly information about the value
of the bank. Although deposits are totally or partially insured and withdrawable
at par value, bank equity capital has an important stochastic value depending on
bank fundamentals and stock exchange liquidity (Distinguin et al., 2013). If capital
ratios rise, then investors’ funds shift from liquid deposits to illiquid bank equity.
Another consequence of rising capital adequacy ratios is the opportunity for
banks to exit the industry because of the gap between the private and social costs
of capital. While exit reduces the production of liquid demand deposits,
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Figure 3.1: Trends in bank equity capital & deposits in the euro area (1999–2018)
Source: Fitch Connect (1999-2018).
Gorton and Winton (2017) emphasizes that this might lead to a “shadow banking”
system and result in a socially suboptimal level of capital. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
combined trends in bank equity and deposits in the euro area from 1999 to 2018.
While capitalization steadily increased over the sample period, deposits as a share
of banks’ total assets declined from 2004 to 2007 before rising again after the GFC.
3.2.3 The risk-taking channel of monetary policy
Over the past decade, interest in the risk-taking channel of monetary policy has risen
in the banking and financial literature. Since the GFC, unconventional monetary
conditions have led banks to navigate a “low-for-long” interest rate environment,
urging the need to understand monetary easing’s impacts on risk-taking behaviors.
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Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2013) account for the existence of a “search-for-yield”
effect through which the monetary policy channel operates. This occurs on the asset
side of balance sheets when a drop in interest rates undermines bank profitability
and leads either to monitoring laxity or riskier search-for-yield strategies. The final
outcome is greater risk-taking in the banking industry overall.
Further, the “risk-shifting” effect occurs through the liabilities side of balance
sheets when decreasing interest rates lower the cost of bank liabilities. As banks
target a leverage ratio (Bruno and Shin, 2015), they choose to either increase market
funding or expand credit (with the potential for covering riskier projects) to return
to their target. Valencia (2014) and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2013) argue that
such a strategy results in banks taking more risks. Moreover, if banks demand
more assets, their price will rise and this will expand banks’ balance sheets as
well as leverage. Gambacorta (2009) suggests that a “low-for-long" interest rate
environment might thus affect asset and collateral valuation and, therefore, reduce
market volatility as well as risk perception.
While most empirical studies (Morais et al., 2019; Paligorova and Santos, 2017;
Angeloni et al., 2015; Ioannidou et al., 2015; Altunbas et al., 2014) find a negative
relationship between monetary policy and banks’ risk, evidence is mixed in the U.S.
case. For instance, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017) show that this negative relationship
is less pronounced for weakly capitalized banks or during financial distress. While
Delis et al. (2017) evidence that monetary policy easing lessens banks’ risk in the
short run but raises it in the medium run, Buch et al. (2014) highlight important
differences depending on the type of bank: small domestic banks increase their
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exposure to risk, while foreign banks behave the same but only when interest rates
are “too low for too long.”
Finally, the risk-taking channel is stronger for banks with lower levels of liquidity
(Brissimis and Delis, 2010), smaller banks (Buch et al., 2014), and those involved
in non-traditional banking activities than for other banks (Altunbas et al., 2014).
Maddaloni and Peydró (2011) also draw on agency issues to justify that the impact
of monetary easing on lending standards is amplified under weak capital supervision.
3.3 Data & empirical strategy
3.3.1 Data
The sample includes banks from the euro area (EA11-1999, EA12-2001, EA13-2007,
EA15-2008, EA16-2009, EA17-2011, EA18-2014, EA19-2015) over 1999–2018. An-
nual unconsolidated financial statements are taken from the Fitch Connect database
for the following bank categories: private, retail & consumer, trade finance, trading
& investment, trust & processing, universal commercial, and wholesale commer-
cial. We exclude bank-year observations with missing information on total assets
over the full sample period. We also consider data from Eurostat to compute the
macroeconomic controls. As outlier values may distort our results, all the variables
except the macroeconomic controls are winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles,
as it is common in the literature (Acharya and Mora, 2015)5.
The final sample consists of 58,280 bank-year observations for 4,023 euro area
5We found qualitatively similar results for variables winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.
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Table 3.1: Variables’ description & summary statistics
Description Unit Source Obs. Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: Variables of interest
LLP Loan loss provisions over the total gross loans of the bank % Fitch Connect 58,280 0.6025 0.4400 0.7803 -0.6200 2.7100
NPL Non-performing loans over the total gross loans of the bank % Fitch Connect 22,029 6.1806 3.9900 5.9493 0.3500 22.1800
ECB rate ECB main refinancing rate at the end of the year % Eurostat 58,280 1.5357 1.0000 1.4683 0 4.7500
Taylor residuals
Residuals of the regression of the ECB rate on country contemporaneous
GDP growth and inflation, applied to the
country where the bank is headquartered
p.p. Eurostat 58,280 -2.14e-09 -0.5931 1.3726 -3.1598 3.1450
EONIA
Weighted average at the end of the year of all overnight unsecured
lending transactions in the interbank market
% Eurostat 58,280 1.4410 0.7100 1.6501 -0.3600 4.3900
Taylor residuals EONIA
Residuals of the regression of the EONIA rate on country
contemporaneous GDP growth and inflation, applied to the country
where the bank is headquartered
p.p. Eurostat 58,280 -1.05e-08 -0.5295 1.5261 -3.4372 2.7725
EURIBOR 1-month
Representative short-term interest rate series with 1-month maturity
at the end of the year (benchmark at which euro interbank
term deposits are offered by prime banks to one another)
% Eurostat 58,280 1.5376 0.8900 1.6961 -0.3700 4.3300
EURIBOR 6-month
Representative short-term interest rate series with 6-month maturity
at the end of the year (benchmark at which euro interbank
term deposits are offered by prime banks to one another)
% Eurostat 58,280 1.7783 1.4300 1.6941 -0.2700 4.7300
EURIBOR 12-month
Representative medium-term interest rate series with 12-month maturity
at the end of the year (benchmark at which euro interbank
term deposits are offered by prime banks to one another)
% Eurostat 58,280 1.9388 1.6100 1.6775 -0.1700 4.8300
Capital Equity capital over the total assets of the bank % Fitch Connect 58,280 8.5902 7.4500 5.0872 3.1100 32.3600
High capital
Dummy = 1 if the bank’ equity capital over total assets is
above the full sample median value (computed for each country-
year combination) ; = 0 otherwise
{0,1} Fitch Connect 58,280 0.4999 0 0.5000 0 1
Deposits Total deposits over the total assets of the bank % Fitch Connect 58,280 63.4840 70.8000 22.0906 3.4900 87.4000
Liquid assets Natural logarithm of the total liquid assets of the bank ln(e) Fitch Connect 58,252 18.2474 18.0217 1.7517 15.1268 22.0424
Panel B: Bank-level controls
Size Natural logarithm of the total assets of the bank ln(e) Fitch Connect 58,280 20.3412 20.1909 1.6074 17.4860 23.6317
Profitability Operating profits over the total assets of the bank % Fitch Connect 58,280 0.7025 0.6200 0.6729 -0.5800 2.7700
Inefficiency Expenses over the total revenues of the bank % Fitch Connect 58,280 68.8822 69.1400 13.7607 35.0600 98.9600
Net loans Net loans over the total assets of the bank % Fitch Connect 58,280 58.1675 61.0800 18.5655 7.3700 87.0100
Panel C: Country-level controls
Real GDP
Percentage change on previous period of the GDP at market
prices (chain linked volumes)
% Eurostat 58,280 1.3192 1.7000 2.2110 -9.1000 25.2000
Recession Dummy = 1 if the real GDP is negative ; = 0 otherwise {0,1} Eurostat 58,280 0.1510 0 0.3580 0 1
Unemployment Percentage of the active population being unemployed % Eurostat 58,280 7.6845 7.6000 3.1663 1.9000 27.5000
Government debt General government consolidated gross debt (percentage of GDP) % Eurostat 58,280 77.1308 72.1000 23.0970 6.1000 181.2000
NF corporations debt Non-financial corporations consolidated debt (percentage of GDP) % Eurostat 58,280 56.9857 49.3000 25.3042 31.3000 256.6000
Notes. The table reports the description, along with the unit, source, number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum for the variables used in
the empirical analysis. The sample consists of yearly bank panel data from euro area countries (EA11–1999, EA12–2001, EA13–2007, EA15–2008, EA16–2009, EA17–2011, EA18–2014,
EA19–2015) over the period 1999–2018. The top and bottom 5% observations of all variables have been winsorized to limit the impact of extreme values, except for country–level controls,
ECB rate, Taylor residuals, EONIA, Taylor residuals EONIA, EURIBOR 1–month, EURIBOR 6–month, and EURIBOR 12–month.
banks. Table 3.1 presents the description, source, and summary statistics of the
winsorized variables used in the empirical analysis. Table A1 in the Appendix
compares the country-level aggregates of total assets from the banks included in
the final sample using data from Fitch Connect between 1999 and 2018. The last
row of the table reports a weighted average ratio (computed using the number
of banks available in Fitch Connect for each country) of 83.59%, indicating the
representativeness of our sample.
On average, loan loss provisions and non-performing loans (our bank credit risk
proxies) represent 0.60% and 6.18% of the total gross loans of banks included in the
final sample, respectively. With a value of 0.78%, the standard deviation of loan
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loss provisions is notably lower than that of non-performing loans (5.95%). The
monetary policy indicators display a mean value of -2.14e-09 percentage points for
the Taylor residuals, 1.54% for the ECB rate, 1.44% for the EONIA, 1.67% for the
3-month EURIBOR, and 1.94% for the 12-month EURIBOR. The average share of
equity capital to banks’ total assets is 8.59% and this increased steadily from 1999
to 2018 in the euro area (see Figure 3.1). Following Acharya and Naqvi (2012) and
Khan et al. (2017), we proxy for bank funding liquidity using the ratio of deposits
to total assets, which displays an average value of 63.48% throughout the sample
period.
In addition, the bank-level controls report an average share of operating prof-
its to banks’ total assets of 0.70% and a standard deviation of 0.67%. Expenses
represent 68.88% of banks’ total revenues on average (with a standard deviation
of 13.76%), and net loans display a mean value of 58.17% relative to banks’ total
assets (with a slightly higher standard deviation of 18.57%). We also include four
country-level controls to examine the impact of the macroeconomic environment on
the way bank capital and funding liquidity interact in the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy. The mean percentage change on the previous period of real GDP
is 1.32% over the sample period, with a standard deviation of 2.21%. On average,
the share of the unemployed relative to the active population is 7.68% in the euro
area. We also investigate the debt level of public sector and non-financial firms. In
terms of the share of GDP, the average consolidated gross debt of general govern-
ment is 77.13% between 1999 and 2018 in the euro area compared with 56.99% for
non-financial firms. The standard deviations of both debt indicators are 23.10%
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Figure 3.2: ECB main refinancing rate & estimated Taylor residuals for the euro
area (1999-2018)
Source: Fitch Connect (1999-2018).
and 25.30%, respectively.
Table B1 in the Appendix reports the pairwise cross-correlation coefficients of
the variables used in the empirical analysis. We do not find the bank-level ex-
planatory variables to be highly correlated, indicating that multicollinearity is not
a major issue in our estimations. The correlation coefficients of the monetary policy
indicators (ECB rate and Taylor residuals) with the risk-taking proxies are 0.17,
-0.05, 0.22, and 0.04, respectively. The correlation coefficients of deposits (funding
liquidity proxy) with bank credit risk are -0.12 and -0.20, respectively.
Figure 3.2 reports the evolution of the ECB rate and Taylor residuals from 1999
to 2018. For a more indepth analysis on the conduct of monetary policy since the
euro area was implemented, we divide the sample period into five subperiods:
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I. To contain inflationary pressures against the backdrop of strong economic
growth, increasing import prices, and high monetary growth, key interest rates
first rose from 1999 to mid-2000 (European Central Bank, 2011);
II. In response to receding inflationary pressures in an environment of subdued
economic growth, marked adjustments in financial markets, and high geopo-
litical uncertainty, interest rates were cut between May 2001 and June 2003
and then left unchanged until December 2005 (European Central Bank, 2011);
III. Owing to increasing inflation against the background of sound economic growth
and a rapid expansion in the supply of money and credit, the degree of mone-
tary policy accommodation was then gradually reduced. With upside risks to
price stability prevailing until mid-2008, interest rates rose again, bringing the
main refinancing rate to 4.25% in July 2008 (European Central Bank, 2011);
IV. Taking account of the subdued inflationary pressures in a setting in which
financial strains had weakened the economic outlook and significantly dimin-
ished upside risks to price stability, the ECB rate was reduced between Octo-
ber 2008 and May 2009 and then remained at the 1% level until April 2011
(European Central Bank, 2011);
V. The last subperiod corresponds to the low interest rate environment in the
euro area starting from 2011 and remaining at historical lows.
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3.3.2 Empirical strategy
To investigate the causal link between bank capital and funding liquidity in the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy, we use a panel regression with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. The empirical model includes both bank-level and country-
level controls (described in Table 3.1 and discussed in Subsection 3.4.4), which
may modify the monetary policy impact on banks’ risk-taking. Bank-, country-
, and time-specific effects are captured using bank, country, and year dummies,
respectively.
The baseline specification developed to initially examine the way the risk-taking
channel of monetary policy has operated since the launch of the single currency is
as follows:
Riskb,c,t = α + β Monetaryc,t + γ Capitalb,c,t
+ δ Liquidityb,c,t + ζ Controlsb,c,t
+ ηb + θt + εb,c,t
(3.1)
where the b, c, and t subscripts stand for bank b headquartered in country c in
year t, respectively. The coefficients β, γ, δ, ζ, η, and θ reflect the extent to which
the relative factors contribute to the change in the dependent variable. While α
serves as a constant variable, εb,c,t represents the heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors for bank b headquartered in country c in year t. Standard errors are clus-
tered by banks in the preliminary analysis (see Table 3.2) and then clustered at
the bank and country levels in the remaining empirical analysis. The coefficients ηb
and θt account for omitted bank-specific and time fixed effects, respectively. The
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dependent variable Riskb,c,t is measured alternatively by loan loss provisions and
non-performing loans. The three independent variables of interest used in the em-
pirical analysis are Monetaryc,t, Capitalb,c,t, and Liquidityb,c,t, which assess the
monetary policy stance, level of bank capitalization, and level of funding liquidity
(proxied by deposits), respectively.
The Controlsb,c,t include a set of bank- and country-specific variables. The list of
bank-level controls are those commonly adopted in the literature. Consistent with
Bonfim and Soares (2018); Dell’Ariccia et al. (2017); Delis et al. (2017), and Khan
et al. (2017), we consider bank size, profitability, inefficiency, and net loans (see
Subsection 3.4.4 for definitions and a discussion) as potential determinants of banks’
risk-taking. We also include macroeconomic variables in our panel regressions to
investigate the joint influence of bank capital and funding liquidity on the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy. Further, we use the four nationwide controls
discussed in Subsection 3.4.4: economic growth, unemployment, government debt,
and non-financial firms’ debt.
To examine the compositional changes of bank capital and funding liquidity
on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, we extend Equation 3.1 by drawing
on the methodology of Jiménez et al. (2014) and Delis et al. (2017) based on the
triple interaction coefficients. For our empirical analysis, we assess the following
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specification:
Riskb,c,t = α + β Monetaryc,t + γ Monetaryc,t ∗High capitalb,c,t
+ δ Monetaryc,t ∗ Liquidityb,c,t + ζ High capitalb,c,t ∗ Liquidityb,c,t
+ η Monetaryc,t ∗High capitalb,c,t ∗ Liquidityb,c,t + θ Controlsb,c,t
+ ιb + κc + λt + εb,c,t
(3.2)
where High capitalb,c,t is a dummy equaling 1 if bank equity capital is above the full
sample median value computed for each country-year combination and 0 otherwise.
Here, we are particularly interested in the coefficient η on the triple interactions
among monetary policy, bank capital, and funding liquidity. Considering a cycle of
monetary easing, a positive (negative) coefficient on this “triple” implies that banks
with high levels of capital and low (high) levels of funding liquidity are inclined
to more risk-taking, which might therefore exacerbate the strength of the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy. The variables Monetaryc,t, High capitalb,c,t,
and Liquidityb,c,t in their simple forms and in the double interactions are included
in Table 3.3 to Table 3.8 but left unreported for the ease of readability of the results.
We briefly define the variables included in Equation 3.1 and Equation 3.2 in the
following section.
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3.4 Variables’ definition
3.4.1 Bank risk-taking
The dependent variable Riskb,c,t is the vector of the alternative bank credit risk
variables for bank b in country c in year t. Banks’ risk-taking is assessed using
the two ratios of loan loss provisions to banks’ total gross loans (LLP) and non-
performing loans to banks’ total gross loans (NPL). LLP captures the asset quality
of banks (Delis et al., 2014) and shows the share of gross loans used as an allowance
for uncollected loans and loan payments to cover possibilities of impairments. An
increase in LLP is associated with a riskier position. In turn, NPL identifies prob-
lems with asset quality in bank loan portfolios and highlights the potential adverse
exposure to earnings and asset market values due to worsening loan quality. A high
value of this ratio also means greater risk-taking by banks. Table 3.1 presents the
summary statistics for both indicators.
3.4.2 Monetary policy
To capture the monetary policy stance, we first use the ECB’s main refinancing rate
(ECB rate) at the end of each year6. In addition, we consider a Taylor rule residual
as an alternative measure to examine the exogenous component of monetary policy
(Dell’Ariccia et al., 2017). Taylor residuals are the residuals of rolling regressions
of ECB rate on CPI inflation and the difference between current and previous
6We obtain qualitatively similar results when computing the annual average of the ECB policy
rate.
Bruno De Menna Chapter 3
106 3.4. Variables’ definition
real GDP. We proceed by following the essence of the methodology proposed by
Maddaloni and Peydró (2011). Figure 3.2 shows the trend of these two monetary
policy proxies.
To check the robustness of our results, we also run Equation 3.2 using EONIA,
EURIBOR 3-month, and EURIBOR 12-month. Table 3.8 reports the results. While
EONIA represents the weighted average at the end of the year of all overnight
unsecured lending transactions in the interbank market, EURIBOR 3-month and
EURIBOR 12-month stand for the short-term interest rate with a 3-month maturity
at the end of the year and the medium-term interest rate with a 12-month maturity,
respectively. Table 3.1 (panel A) provides the summary statistics.
Since the major contribution of Borio and Zhu (2012) on the risk-taking channel
of monetary policy, numerous theoretical (Acharya and Naqvi, 2012; Dell’Ariccia
and Marquez, 2006) and empirical (Ioannidou et al., 2015; Bekaert et al., 2013) stud-
ies have documented that lax monetary policy is associated with higher risk-taking
in the banking industry. As a result, we expect to observe a negative relationship
between, on the one hand, LLP and NPL and, on the other hand, ECB rate and
Taylor residuals.
3.4.3 Bank capital & funding liquidity
This empirical study analyzes how the causal link between bank capital and fund-
ing liquidity influences the way monetary policy acts on the risk-taking behavior
of banks. To this end, we consider the Capital variable as the ratio of equity cap-
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ital to banks’ total assets to proxy for the level of capitalization of each financial
intermediary in the final sample.
Similarly to Khan et al. (2017), we use the ratio of total deposits to total assets
as a proxy for funding liquidity. Following Acharya and Naqvi (2012), we assume
that banks with high levels of deposits benefit from lower bankruptcy risk and might
encourage managers to take more risk as they are less likely to face a funding crisis in
the near future. Another reason relates to deposit insurance acting as a put option
on the assets of banks. Hence, banks display greater risk-taking when their levels
of deposits rise because of deposit insurance contracts. Accordingly, we anticipate
a positive relationship between the Deposits variable and credit risk proxies LLP
and NPL. Panel A in Table 3.1 provides a description and the summary statistics
for the capital and funding liquidity proxies.
3.4.4 Control variables
The bank-level controls used in our estimations are commonly adopted in the liter-
ature. Consistent with Dinger and te Kaat (2020); Danisman and Demirel (2019)
and Lee and Hsieh (2013), we use the natural logarithm of total assets to measure
bank Size. We also consider three additional ratios that might be important factors
in shaping banks’ risk: the ratio of operating profits to total assets as a measure of
Profitability, the ratio of expenses to total revenues as an Inefficiency indicator, and
the ratio of net loans to total assets (Net Loans) as a proxy for banks’ involvement
in financial intermediation. If we assume that larger banks better manage risk than
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smaller banks, then a negative relationship prevails between Size and the risk-taking
indexes. We also expect a negative relation between, on the one hand, Profitability,
Inefficiency, and Net loans and, on the other hand, the credit risk proxies. As
too high risks might lead to greater volumes of problem loans and eventually affect
profitability, we anticipate a negative relationship between Profitability and banks’
risk-taking.
Moreover, if greater risks explain the high technical efficiency levels (as they
are responsible for the level of banks’ income, the latter therefore acting as an
incentive for greater risk-taking), a negative link is most likely between Inefficiency
and both LLP and NPL. In addition, the relation between Net loans and banks’
risk-taking behavior strongly depends on the quality of the screening of borrowers.
A positive sign implies low screening standards, whereas a negative sign means
sound screening practices. Panel B in Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics of
the variables controlling for bank characteristics and activities.
We also include country-level controls in the panel regressions to consider the
impact of the macroeconomic environment on banks’ risk-taking. We enrich our
model with the percentage change in the previous period of GDP at market prices
(Real GDP), the percentage of the active population being unemployed (Unem-
ployment), the level of general government debt expressed as a percentage of GDP
(Government debt), and the level of non-financial firms’ debt as a share of GDP
(NF firms debt). Panel C in Table 3.1 shows the summary statistics of the variables
controlling for the macroeconomic conditions in which euro area banks operate.
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3.5 Discussion of findings
In this section, we present early results on the joint influence of bank capital and
funding liquidity on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy in Subsection 3.5.1
and account for endogeneity issues regarding monetary policy in Subsection 3.5.2.
From that point, we provide comprehensive results on the presence of a “crowding-
out of deposits" effect before the GFC in the euro area banking industry (Subsection
3.5.3) and, interestingly, the absence of such an effect among inefficient banks in
the aftermath of the GFC (Subsection 3.5.4). Subsection 3.5.5 provides several
robustness checks.
3.5.1 Preliminary analysis
Table 3.2 provides the results of a preliminary analysis on the risk-taking channel of
monetary policy specified in Equation 3.1 over 1999 to 2018. OLS panel regressions
are estimated with standard errors clustered at the bank level; both bank-level
and country-level controls are included. When they are significant, the monetary
policy proxies ECB rate and Taylor residuals display negative relationships with
risk-taking. The impact of ECB rate on bank credit risk is economically significant,
as a one standard deviation decrease implies that LLP rises by 0.0765 in regression
(1) and NPL increases by 1.0945 in regression (3). Conversely, the economic impact
of Taylor residuals is also significant, as a one standard deviation decrease causes
NPL to increase by 0.4869 in regression (4).
Capital appears to be negatively related to credit risk, suggesting that well-
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Table 3.2: Preliminary analysis on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy trans-
mission (1999–2018)
LLP NPL
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ECB rate -0.0521*** -0.7454**
(0.0041) (0.2912)
Taylor residuals -0.0093 -0.3547***
(0.0185) (0.0570)
Capital -0.0078*** -0.0049* -0.1514*** -0.1057***
(0.0026) (0.0029) (0.0348) (0.0323)
Deposits 0.0010* 0.0015** 0.0107 0.0208**
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0087) (0.0082)
Size -0.1752*** -0.1428*** -1.9282*** -1.3575***
(0.0191) (0.0229) (0.3491) (0.2813)
Profitability -0.8497*** -0.8411*** -1.5779*** -1.6816***
(0.0142) (0.0146) (0.0875) (0.0889)
Inefficiency -0.0346*** -0.0342*** -0.0418*** -0.0443***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0048) (0.0049)
Net loans -0.0034*** -0.0033*** -0.0933*** -0.0980***
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0083) (0.0083)
Real GDP -0.0072*** 0.0043 0.3581*** 0.1582***
(0.0013) (0.0036) (0.0448) (0.0226)
Unemployment 0.0497*** 0.0513*** 0.5105*** 0.5220***
(0.0020) (0.0029) (0.0415) (0.0390)
Government debt 0.0003 0.0005 0.0335*** 0.0637***
(0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0101) (0.0072)
NF corporations debt 0.0008* 0.0006 0.0027 -0.0002
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0136) (0.0131)
Constant 6.8287*** 6.1399*** 49.4208*** 34.0709***
(0.4234) (0.4947) (8.2046) (6.4740)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes Yes No
Clustered s.e. Bank Bank Bank Bank
Adjusted R-squared 0.6609 0.6643 0.8167 0.8109
Sample period 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018
Observations 57,792 57,792 21,813 21,813
Notes. The table reports results of estimating panel regressions regarding banks’ credit risk in the euro area
(EA11–1999, EA12–2001, EA13–2007, EA15–2008, EA16–2009, EA17–2011, EA18–2014, EA19–2015) over the pe-
riod 1999–2018. Description and summary statistics of all variables used are reported in Table 3.1. The dependent
variables are the ratios of loan loss provision to gross loans (LLP) in regressions (1) and (2), and non-performing
loans to gross loans (NPL) in regressions (3) and (4). The variables of interest are the two measures of interest rates
(ECB rate and Taylor residuals), the measure of bank equity capital (Capital), and the measure of bank funding
liquidity (Deposits). Both bank–level and country–level controls are included and reported. All regressions include
bank fixed effects. Year fixed effects are also included in regressions (2) and (3). P–values are computed using
heteroskedasticity–robust standard errors clustered by banks (in parentheses). *Statistical significance at the 10%
level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
capitalized banks are less risky. A one standard deviation increase in bank capi-
talization decreases LLP by 0.0397 in regression (1) and lowers NPL by 0.7702 in
regression (3). Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Acharya and Naqvi
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(2012) and empirical results of Khan et al. (2017), we find that funding liquidity
(proxied by Deposits) significantly increases the risk-taking behavior of banks (a one
standard deviation increase in funding liquidity raises LLP by 0.0331 in regression
(2)).
We include bank characteristics in all the panel regressions as well as bank
and year fixed effects to capture other unobservable factors that may affect risk-
taking. As reported in Table 3.2, most of these controls are significant and in the
expected direction. Size appears to be negatively linked to bank credit risk, which
implies that larger banks display better risk management. Profitability is also an
important component in taming bank credit risk, as evidenced by the negative
coefficients related to this indicator. The negative Inefficiency coefficients confirm
that higher technical efficiency is responsible for riskier positions. The negative
sign of the Net loans proxy indicates that banks granting higher volumes of loans
have better risk management. This result suggests the greater ability to reduce
information asymmetries on behalf of banks highly involved in traditional financial
intermediation.
As regards the country-level controls, the Real GDP coefficient is negative and
insignificant when LLP is used as the dependent variable and significantly positive
when we use NPL as the dependent variable7. Interestingly, Unemployment is
positively related to banks’ risk-taking behavior: a one standard deviation increase
in unemployment leads LLP to increase by 0.1574 in regression (1) and NPL to
7Delis and Kouretas (2011) argue that during more favorable macroeconomic conditions, banks
increase their lending in search of higher yields; hence, a positive relationship between GDP growth
and banks’ risk is expected.
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rise by 1.6164 in regression (3). While there is no significant relationship between
Government debt and LLP, public debt is positively linked to NPL (see regressions
(3) and (4)). However, the NF firms debt index is only significantly positive in
regression (1), as a one standard deviation increase in non-financial sector debt
results in a 0.0202 upward shift in LLP.
Next, we examine the compositional change of bank capital and funding liq-
uidity on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy over the full sample period
(see Table 3.3). We estimate Equation 3.2, which includes the triple interactions
among monetary policy, capital, and funding liquidity (the simple forms and double
interactions of these variables are included but left unreported for ease of readabil-
ity). The bank-level and country-level controls are included, but the latter are left
unreported for brevity. Also included are the bank*country fixed effects and year
fixed effects in regressions (2), (4), (6), and (8). Standard errors are clustered at
the bank-country level in regressions (3), (4), (7), and (8).
Interestingly, the η coefficients on the triple interactions are mostly negative
and statistically significant regardless of the ECB rate or Taylor residuals we use
to examine monetary policy. However, it is still impossible to interpret these early
findings because interest rates presented different trends from 1999 to 2018 (see
Figure 3.2). Accordingly, we would not reach the same conclusions on capital and
funding liquidity interactions whenever monetary policy is eased or tightened.
The results of the bank-level control variables are in line with those in Table
3.2. Before further exploring the above early findings, we address endogeneity issues
regarding the response of monetary policy to bank credit risk in Subsection 5.2.
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Table 3.3: The joint influence of bank capital & funding liquidity on the monetary
policy’s risk-taking channel: early findings (1999–2018)
LLP NPL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ECB rate * High capital * Deposits -0.0008*** -0.0008*** -0.0036* -0.0033†
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Taylor residuals * High capital * Deposits -0.0010*** -0.0009*** -0.0084** -0.0070*
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0035) (0.0034)
Size -0.1468*** -0.1161*** -0.1566*** -0.1188*** -1.1538*** -1.2680*** -1.0303 -1.3093**
(0.0078) (0.0083) (0.0252) (0.0207) (0.0979) (0.1035) (0.6744) (0.4885)
Profitability -0.8497*** -0.8393*** -0.8505*** -0.8405*** -1.7123*** -1.7153*** -1.7509* -1.6974**
(0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0571) (0.0558) (0.0473) (0.0471) (0.8387) (0.7874)
Inefficiency -0.0345*** -0.0341*** -0.0346*** -0.0342*** -0.0430*** -0.0410*** -0.0437* -0.0412**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0214) (0.0188)
Net loans -0.0033*** -0.0032*** -0.0034*** -0.0032** -0.0997*** -0.0948*** -0.0998*** -0.0956***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0109) (0.0091)
Constant 6.3772*** 5.5875*** 6.5933*** 5.6062*** 31.2929*** 34.8970*** 26.4888* 32.7562***
(0.1696) (0.1864) (0.4900) (0.4707) (2.1941) (2.3378) (14.9636) (11.2471)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Bank*Country) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes










Adjusted R-squared 0.6622 0.6657 0.6609 0.6653 0.8118 0.8164 0.8109 0.8162
Sample period 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018
Observations 57,792 57,792 57,792 57,792 21,813 21,813 21,813 21,813
Notes. The table reports results of estimating panel regressions regarding banks’ credit risk in the euro area (EA11–1999, EA12–2001, EA13–2007,
EA15–2008, EA16–2009, EA17–2011, EA18–2014, EA19–2015) over the period 1999–2018. Description and summary statistics of all variables
used are reported in Table 3.1. The dependent variables are the ratios of loan loss provision to gross loans (LLP) in regressions (1) to (4), and
non–performing loans to gross loans (NPL) in regressions (4) to (8). The variables of interest in triple interactions are included and reported. For
ease of readability, all the variables of interest and the variables of interest in double interactions are included but left unreported. Bank–level
controls are included and reported. For brevity, country–level controls are included but left unreported. All regressions include bank∗country
and year fixed effects. P–values are computed using heteroskedasticity–robust standard errors multiclustered at the bank and country level (in
parentheses). †The coefficient has a p–value that equals 10.5 percent. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5%
level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
3.5.2 Endogeneity of monetary policy
Our empirical approach relies on the key assumption that monetary policy changes
are exogenous to banks’ risk. Since the GFC, regulators and policymakers have
discussed at length the need for monetary policy to include financial stability as an
explicit target. Therefore, we perform several checks and sample splits to address
endogeneity issues and eliminate risks of bias in our estimations (see Table 3.4).
First, we are concerned that our results are driven by the business cycle. This
would happen if capital or funding liquidity fluctuates with the economic conditions
or because the risk-taking scale adjusts endogenously with the state of the economy
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Table 3.4: The joint influence of bank capital & funding liquidity on the monetary
policy’s risk-taking channel: endogeneity issues
Business cycle and recession Crisis years excluded Large banks excluded Lagged bank–level controls
LLP NPL LLP NPL LLP NPL LLP NPL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Taylor residuals * High capital * Deposits -0.0009*** -0.0072* -0.0008*** -0.0100** -0.0012*** -0.0217***
(0.0003) (0.0035) (0.0002) (0.0037) (0.0003) (0.0049)
Taylor residuals * High capital(t−1) * Deposits(t−1) -0.0011** -0.0091**
(0.0004) (0.0035)
Size -0.1195*** -1.3667** -0.1205*** -1.1296** -0.1351*** -1.5088**
(0.0207) (0.4789) (0.0224) (0.5290) (0.0367) (0.6229)
Profitability -0.8390*** -1.6640** -0.8279*** -1.5484* -0.8893*** -1.6085*
(0.0571) (0.7789) (0.0480) (0.8209) (0.0417) (0.8937)
Inefficiency -0.0340*** -0.0416** -0.0338*** -0.0359* -0.0408*** -0.0492*
(0.0035) (0.0189) (0.0028) (0.0178) (0.0026) (0.0246)
Net loans -0.0032** -0.0933*** -0.0021* -0.0837*** -0.0037*** -0.1100***







Net loans(t−1) -0.0014 -0.0576***
(0.0021) (0.0107)
Taylor residuals * Real GDP 0.0062 0.0218
(0.0039) (0.0655)
Recession dummy 0.0717*** -1.3776***
(0.0216) (0.2431)
Taylor residuals * Recession dummy -0.0040 -0.8106
(0.0321) (0.5766)
Constant 5.5323*** 33.8520*** 5.6155*** 26.6196** 6.3223*** 37.2944** 0.2506 14.4510
(0.4439) (10.6635) (0.4898) (12.0047) (0.7455) (13.3954) (0.6340) (10.3097)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Bank*Country) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered s.e.
Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank &
Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Adjusted R-squared 0.6656 0.8175 0.6814 0.8409 0.6892 0.8226 0.4805 0.8272





1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018
Observations 57,792 21,813 48,270 18,792 43,237 14,256 51,226 20,263
Notes. The table reports results of estimating panel regressions regarding banks’ credit risk in the euro area (EA11–1999, EA12–2001, EA13–2007, EA15–2008,
EA16–2009, EA17–2011, EA18–2014, EA19–2015) over the period 1999–2018 (except in regressions (3) and (4)). Description and summary statistics of all variables
used are reported in Table 3.1. The dependent variables are the ratios of loan loss provision to gross loans (LLP) in regressions (1), (3), (5) and (7), and
non–performing loans to gross loans (NPL) in regressions (2), (4), (6) and (8). The variables of interest in triple interactions are included and reported. For ease
of readability, all the variables of interest and the variables of interest in double interactions are included but left unreported. Current and lagged bank–level
controls are included and reported. For brevity, country–level controls are included but left unreported. All regressions include bank∗country and year fixed effects.
P–values are computed using heteroskedasticity–robust standard errors multiclustered at the bank and country level (in parentheses). †Qualitatively similar results
are obtained when using the ECB rate variable to proxy the monetary policy stance. *Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5%
level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
(Dell’Ariccia et al., 2017). We control directly for changes in the economic cycle
in regressions (1) and (2). We include the interaction terms between the monetary
policy proxy Taylor residuals and state of the economy based on Real GDP ; the
time-specific Recession dummy takes one if Real GDP is negative and zero other-
wise. We find that the coefficients on the triple interactions among interest rates,
capital, and funding liquidity remain negative and statistically significant8. These
8We found qualitatively similar results using ECB rate as the proxy for monetary policy.
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results are a first step in allaying concerns that our results are influenced by a cycli-
cal bias in risk ratings or close links among capital, funding liquidity, and economic
cycles.
Second, monetary policy is likely to be more responsive to risk-taking behavior
during periods of financial instability. Therefore, endogeneity issues should be more
of a concern in times of crisis. In regressions (3) and (4), we rerun our main regres-
sions from Equation 3.2 excluding the GFC period (2008 to 2010) when monetary
policy responded strongly to financial stability. Again, the triple interactions among
monetary policy, bank capital, and funding liquidity are significantly negative. This
result confirms the absence of endogeneity due to the GFC turmoil and provides
additional robustness to our empirical results.
Third, endogeneity might be more of a concern for large national banks than
smaller financial institutions affected primarily by regional shocks. Columns (5)
and (6) in Table 3.4 report the regression results when removing large banks from
the sample, with large banks defined as those with total assets in the top quartile
of the full sample (with a value of 21.372). Similarly to the estimates including
large banks, we continue to find significant and negative triple interactions, which
confirms that our results are not contaminated by the inclusion of large financial
institutions.
Endogeneity bias might also arise from the reverse causality between the bank-
level variables (Delis et al., 2017). To rule out that possibility, we rerun Equation 3.2
using the bank-specific characteristics in their lagged form (lagged by one year), as
this methodology provides robust estimates of the effects of bank-level coefficients.
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Once again, we observe that the triple interactions among interest rates, capital,
and funding liquidity remain negative and statistically significant. Taken together,
the above tests and sample splits confirm that our empirical results are unaffected
by the endogenous response of monetary policy to banks’ risk-taking.
3.5.3 The “crowding-out of deposits” effect before to the GFC
Figure 3.2 shows the interest rate variations in the early days of the euro area. At
the beginning of the euro system, interest rates initially rose in 1999 and the first
half of 2000. However, because of insufficient observations, we exclude this short
subperiod (identified under area I. in Figure 3.2) from our analysis.
We examine two distinct subperiods of monetary policy before the outbreak of
the GFC. First, from 2000 to 2005, interest rates were cut in response to inflationary
pressures in an environment of subdued economic growth, marked adjustments in
financial markets, and high geopolitical uncertainty. This moment, shown under
area II. in Figure 3.2, typically reflects the first prolonged period of decreasing
interest rates in the euro area. Second, interest rates again rose from December
2005 until mid-2008 as the subprime crisis hit the European banking industry. After
a prolonged period of monetary policy easing, the ECB communication changed in
October 2005, signaling a possible increase in interest rates. In the words of Bonfim
and Soares (2018), “this leads to a substantial revision of interest rate expectations“
as “this revision was fast and sizeable." This moment is identified under area III.
in Figure 3.2. Accordingly, the end of 2005 was a key turning point in pre-GFC
monetary policy.
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We analyze this turning point in Table 3.5. In regressions (1) and (3), we
define the low interest rate expectations subsample as the first prolonged period of
decreasing interest rates from 2000 to 2005. In addition, we build in regressions
(2) and (4) the high interest rate expectations subsample as the pre-crisis monetary
tightening between 2006 and 2008. Interestingly, we find significantly different signs
from one sample to the other regarding the triple interactions among interest rates,
bank capital, and funding liquidity.
In the low interest rate expectations subsample, we observe the significantly
positive sign of triples. This result implies that when interest rates edge higher,
well-capitalized banks with relatively low levels of deposits display greater risk-
taking. Similarly, we identify negative triple interactions in the high interest rate
expectations subsample, meaning that when interest rates are expected to rise,
well-capitalized banks with relatively less funding liquidity also increase their risk
exposure. This confirms that financial institutions concerned with the “crowding-
out of deposits" effect (Gorton and Winton, 2017) (i.e., displaying low levels of
deposits when equity capital is high) are more sensitive to the risk-taking channel
of monetary policy regardless of whether interest rates are eased (2000–2005) or
tightened (2006–2008).
Accordingly, in the presence of such a “crowding-out of deposits” effect, impos-
ing capital and funding liquidity standards on the banking industry simultaneously
would help offset the monetary policy transmission to credit risk. This result sup-
ports the Basel II specifications in the pre-crisis period, namely, adopting systems
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
ECB rate * High capital * Deposits 0.0012*** -0.0029***
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Taylor residuals * High capital * Deposits 0.0012*** -0.0025***
(0.0003) (0.0005)
Size -0.0984 -0.0102 -0.1012 -0.0102
(0.0808) (0.0913) (0.0816) (0.0916)
Profitability -1.1212*** -0.9219*** -1.1206*** -0.9257***
(0.1325) (0.1876) (0.1325) (0.1891)
Inefficiency -0.0485*** -0.0394*** -0.0485*** -0.0390***
(0.0056) (0.0097) (0.0056) (0.0096)
Net loans -0.0036 -0.0019 -0.0037 -0.0021
(0.0030) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0024)
Constant 6.5261*** 2.8793 8.1035*** 2.2800
(1.3834) (2.3797) (1.3178) (2.3350)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Bank*Country) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered s.e. Bank & Country Bank & Country Bank & Country Bank & Country
Adjusted R-squared 0.7207 0.6873 0.7213 0.6891
Sample period 2000-2005 2006-2008 2000-2005 2006-2008
Observations 12,109 9,209 12,109 9,209
Ho: (Rate * High capital * Deposits) [Low expectations] = 0.0000a 0.0000b
(Rate * High capital * Deposits) [High expectations] F(1,10) = 124.22 F(1,10) = 129.16
Notes. The table reports results of estimating panel regressions regarding banks’ credit risk in the euro area (EA11–1999, EA12–2001, EA13–2007,
EA15–2008, EA16–2009, EA17–2011, EA18–2014, EA19–2015) over the subperiods 2000–2005 and 2006–2008. Description and summary statistics
of all variables used are reported in Table 3.1. The dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provision to gross loans (LLP) in all regressions.
Low interest rate expectations subsample in regressions (1) and (3), and high interest rate expectations subsample in regressions (2) and (4) refer to
observations from, respectively, the subperiod 2000–2005 and and the (pre–crisis) subperiod 2006–2008. The variables of interest in triple interactions
are included and reported. For ease of readability, all the variables of interest and the variables of interest in double interactions are included but
left unreported. Bank–level controls are included and reported. For brevity, country–level controls are included but left unreported. All regressions
include bank∗country and year fixed effects. P–values are computed using heteroskedasticity–robust standard errors multiclustered at the bank and
country level (in parentheses). *Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the
1% level.
a p-value of F-statistics testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient (ECB rate * High capital * Deposits) from Low interest rate expectations
subsample equals the coefficient (ECB rate * High capital * Deposits) from High interest rate expectations subsample.
b p-value of F-statistics testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient (Taylor residuals * High capital * Deposits) from Low interest rate expectations
subsample equals the coefficient (Taylor residuals * High capital * Deposits) from High interest rate expectations subsample.
to measure and monitor funding liquidity risk as well as evaluating the adequacy of
capital ratios. We now explore whether these results hold after the GFC.
3.5.4 The missing “crowding-out of deposits” effect for inef-
ficient banks after the GFC
Area IV. in Figure 3.2 reflects the GFC period during which the ECB rate was
drastically reduced between October 2008 and May 2009 because of subdued in-
flationary pressures, weakened economic conditions, and diminished upside risks to
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price stability (European Central Bank, 2011). Subperiod IV. is a time of high
uncertainty, calling for special attention that goes beyond the scope of this study.
Although we provide show in Subsection 3.5.2 that our results are not contami-
nated by the endogenous response of monetary policy to banks’ risk-taking during
the GFC (see columns (3) and (4) in Table 3.4), we do not analyze this short and
exceptional subperiod and rather focus on the post-crisis years.
We observe in area V. in Figure 3.2 that the post-GFC period signals the start
of decreasing interest rates fueled by monetary authorities’ actions to stimulate eco-
nomic growth and prevent deflation. As a result, the ECB rate for main refinancing
operations has stagnated at the 0% level since March 16, 2016. Table 3.6 focuses on
the 2011–2018 subperiod to study the triple interactions among monetary policy,
equity capital, and funding liquidity in the post-GFC period.
The Inefficient banks subsample in regressions (1) and (3) includes banks whose
ratio of expenses to total revenues is above the full sample quintile. Conversely, the
Efficient banks subsample in regressions (2) and (4) groups banks with a ratio of
expenses to total revenues below the 15th percentile of the full sample. Interestingly,
we find significantly different results depending on bank efficiency. Inefficient banks
exhibit significantly negative triple interactions among interest rates, bank capital,
and deposits. As we consider a period of decreasing interest rates, this suggests
that inefficient banks take more risk if they display high levels of equity capital
and funding liquidity at the same time. Given the positive relation between capital
and deposits, this result speaks of the absence of a “crowding-out of deposits" effect
among inefficient banks in the wake of the GFC.
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Table 3.6: The missing “crowding-out of deposits" effect for inefficient banks after
the GFC (2011–2018)
LLP NPL
Inefficient banks Efficient banks Inefficient banks Efficient banks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taylor residuals * High capital * Deposits -0.0048** 0.0030* -0.0436* 0.0224*
(0.0022) (0.0018) (0.0248) (0.0132)
Size -0.0561 -0.0899 -1.7970* -2.1790***
(0.0670) (0.0622) (1.0253) (0.5234)
Profitability -0.4794*** -0.6264*** -0.5730* -1.1579***
(0.1306) (0.0464) (0.2876) (0.2009)
Inefficiency -0.0290*** -0.0413*** -0.0135 -0.0772***
(0.0026) (0.0033) (0.0198) (0.0194)
Net loans -0.0030 -0.0004 -0.0886*** -0.0530**
(0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0225) (0.0210)
Constant 4.5062** 4.7262*** 43.0005* 54.8903***
(1.5755) (1.4004) (22.0729) (13.3650)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Bank*Country) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects No No No No
Clustered s.e. Bank & Country Bank Bank & Country Bank
Adjusted R-squared 0.5553 0.7924 0.8700 0.8901
Sample period 2011-2018 2011-2018 2011-2018 2011-2018
Observations 5,120 3,783 2,103 2,512
Ho: (Taylor residuals * High capital * Deposits) [Inefficient banks] = 0.0027 0.0159
(Taylor residuals * High capital * Deposits) [Efficient banks] F(1,18) = 12.12 F(1,18) = 7.08
Notes. The table reports results of estimating panel regressions regarding banks’ credit risk in the euro area (EA11–1999, EA12–2001,
EA13–2007, EA15–2008, EA16–2009, EA17–2011, EA18–2014, EA19–2015) over the period 2011–2018. Description and summary statistics of
all variables used are reported in Table 3.1. The dependent variables are the ratios of loan loss provision to gross loans (LLP) in regressions
(1) to (2), and non–performing loans to gross loans (NPL) in regressions (3) to (4). Inefficient banks subsample in regressions (1) and (3) and
Efficient banks subsample in regressions (2) and (4) refer to observations for which the ratio of expenses over the total revenues is, respectively,
above the full sample 80th percentile and below the full sample 15th percentile. The variables of interest in triple interactions are included and
reported. For ease of readability, all the variables of interest and the variables of interest in double interactions are included but left unreported.
Bank-level controls are included and reported. For brevity, country–level controls are included but left unreported. All regressions include
bank∗country and year fixed effects. P–values are computed using heteroskedasticity–robust standard errors multiclustered at the bank and
country level in the Inefficient banks subsample, and clustered at the bank level in the Efficient banks subsample (in parentheses). *Statistical
significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5% level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
After 2010, the least efficient credit institutions are more sensitive to the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy when they have high levels of capital and fund-
ing liquidity simultaneously. This means that the concomitant capital ratios and
NSFR would become counterproductive in taming risk-taking behaviors. Accord-
ingly, the Basel III requirements on capital and funding liquidity might exacerbate
the risk-taking behavior of inefficient banks in such a low interest rate environment.
Conversely, the results suggest a positive sign of triples regarding efficient banks
in regressions (2) and (4) in Table 3.6. As interest rates decline between 2011 and
2018, this shows that efficient banks increase credit risk if they deal with high lev-
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els of equity capital but low levels of deposits. Similarly to before the GFC (see
Subsection 3.5.3), banks recovering in terms of efficiency after the GFC continue
to display a “crowding-out of deposits" effect, which makes the case for the Basel
III regulation on capitalization and funding liquidity. As reported in Table 3.6, the
results are significantly different from one subsample to another, confirming this
empirical evidence.
Table 3.7 reports the distribution of inefficient banks between 2011 and 2018 in
the euro area. Surprisingly, most national banking industries increased their share
of inefficient banks between 2011 and 2018, apart from Belgium, Estonia, Finland,
Greece, Malta, and Slovenia. In 2011, Germany and Italy had the highest shares
of inefficient banks in the euro area (39.58% and 23.58%, respectively)9. In 2018,
Germany and Italy still accounted for an important share of inefficient banks in the
euro area (35.03% and 16.56%, respectively), with Austria accounting for 22.29%
(compared with 8% in 2011).
We also note two trends in the euro area depending on industry concentration
(see the Herfindahl–Hirschman indexes reported in Table 3.7). On the one side,
Austria, Cyprus, France, Germany, and Portugal have a growing share of ineffi-
cient banks as well as a deconcentration of their national industry. On the other
side, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Spain are banking
industries that have a rising share of inefficient banks but higher levels of concentra-
tion. This means that banking industry concentration does not systematically help
solving banks’ efficiency issues. Nevertheless, we leave this open path for future
9This result is partly due to the relatively large number of banks in these countries.
Bruno De Menna Chapter 3
122 3.5. Discussion of findings
Table 3.7: Distribution of inefficient banks & industry concentration in the euro
area after the GFC (2011–2018)
National banking industry Euro area banking industry
Share of inefficient
banks in 2011 (%)
HHI in 2011 (%)
Share of inefficient
banks in 2018 (%)
HHI in 2018 (%)
Share of inefficient
banks in 2011 (%)
Share of inefficient
banks in 2018 (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Austria 15.8333 2.1377 34.7222 1.5911 8.0000 22.2930
Belgium 34.2857 6.2380 20.8333 6.7527 2.5253 0.6369
Cyprus 11.1111 20.8619 50.0000 16.0124 0.2105 0.8918
Estonia 50.0000 48.0814 0.0000 28.4678 0.6348 0.0000
Finland 37.5000 13.6083 36.8421 9.5563 1.2632 1.7834
France 18.1818 0.7472 25.8964 0.7367 10.1043 8.2803
Germany 10.9430 0.2990 18.2724 0.2660 39.5779 35.0318
Greece 35.2941 13.9481 23.0769 21.0623 1.2632 0.3822
Ireland 6.2500 8.2020 36.3636 11.5075 0.2105 0.5096
Italy 18.6978 0.8837 35.2303 1.0939 23.5788 16.5605
Latvia – – 35.7143 15.8885 – 0.6369
Lithuania – – 0.0000 28.3741 – 0.0000
Luxembourg 16.0000 4.0777 39.2857 4.4837 1.6842 2.8025
Malta 22.2222 25.2688 15.3846 24.7308 0.4211 0.2548
Netherlands 25.9259 5.3175 26.0870 6.3388 1.4736 0.7643
Portugal 37.5000 8.3619 37.9630 7.6314 1.8947 5.2229
Slovakia 6.6667 12.9610 8.3333 17.8392 0.2105 0.1274
Slovenia 23.5294 16.3592 7.6923 15.7431 0.8421 0.1274
Spain 22.6563 2.1384 28.1553 3.0692 6.1053 3.6943
Notes. The table reports changes in banks’ inefficiency and industry concentration in the euro area (EA11–1999, EA12–2001,
EA13–2007, EA15–2008, EA16–2009, EA17–2011, EA18–2014, EA19–2015) between 2011 and 2018. We compute in columns (1)
and (3) the share of inefficient banks (i.e., observations for which the ratio of expenses over the total revenues is above the full sample
80th percentile) in each national banking industry in 2011 and 2018, respectively. Columns (2) and (4) report the Herfindahl–Hirschman
Index (HHI) (i.e., the sum of the squares of the market shares of banks within the national industry as a measure of the amount of com-
petition among them) in each national banking industry in 2011 and 2018, respectively. For each country, we also compute in columns
(5) and (6) the share of national inefficient banks regarding the whole euro area banking industry in 2011 and 2018, respectively.
research.
Banks’ inefficiency in the euro area remains an unaddressed issue. However, our
results suggest that inefficiency is a key factor in the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy when the dual constraints on capital and funding liquidity are implemented
under Basel III. Accordingly, inefficient banks in the euro area are a major concern
if regulators want to strengthen capital and funding liquidity standards simultane-
ously in such a “low-for-long” interest rate environment.
3.5.5 Robustness checks
First, we explore the robustness of our results with respect to four alternative
measures of interest rates. Regressions (1), (2), (3), and (4) in Table 3.8 rely
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Table 3.8: The joint influence of bank capital & funding liquidity on the monetary
policy’s risk-taking channel: robustness checks (1999–2018)
LLP NPL
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Funding liquidity
EONIA * High capital * Deposits -0.0005**
(0.0002)
EURIBOR 1-month * High capital * Deposits -0.0005**
(0.0002)
EURIBOR 6-month * High capital * Deposits -0.0005**
(0.0002)
EURIBOR 12-month * High capital * Deposits -0.0005**
(0.0003)
Assets liquidity
ECB rate * High capital * Liquid assets -0.1474*
(0.0718)
Taylor residuals * High capital * Liquid assets -0.1430*
(0.0811)
EONIA * High capital * Liquid assets -0.1233**
(0.0553)
Taylor residuals EONIA * High capital * Liquid assets -0.1083*
(0.0620)
Size -0.1174*** -0.1172*** -0.1168*** -0.1165*** -1.1413** -1.1062** -1.1216** -1.0732**
(0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.4427) (0.4185) (0.4404) (0.4142)
Profitability -0.8397*** -0.8399*** -0.8401*** -0.8402*** -1.6577** -1.6530** -1.6580** -1.6581**
(0.0558) (0.0558) (0.0558) (0.0558) (0.7614) (0.7670) (0.7661) (0.7697)
Inefficiency -0.0341*** -0.0341*** -0.0341*** -0.0341*** -0.0399** -0.0398** -0.0401** -0.0401**
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0172) (0.0178) (0.0172) (0.0177)
Net loans -0.0032** -0.0032** -0.0032** -0.0032** -0.1019*** -0.1031*** -0.1021*** -0.1038***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0099) (0.0105) (0.0099) (0.0106)
Constant 5.5744*** 5.5746*** 5.5822*** 5.5918*** 43.1969*** 36.8051*** 42.0255*** 37.1554***
(0.5035) (0.5036) (0.5054) (0.5075) (11.9889) (10.6366) (11.7963) (10.5612)
Bank-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
(Bank*Country) fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered s.e.
Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank & Bank &
Country Country Country Country Country Country Country Country
Adjusted R-squared 0.6654 0.6654 0.6654 0.6654 0.8179 0.8177 0.8178 0.8173
Sample period 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018 1999-2018
Observations 57,792 57,792 57,792 57,792 21,807 21,807 21,807 21,807
Notes. The table reports robustness checks of estimating panel regressions regarding banks’ credit risk in the euro area (EA11–1999, EA12–2001, EA13–2007,
EA15–2008, EA16–2009, EA17–2011, EA18–2014, EA19–2015) over the period 1999–2018. Description and summary statistics of all variables used are reported
in Table 3.1. The dependent variables are the ratios of loan loss provision to gross loans (LLP) in regressions (1) to (4), and non–performing loans to gross loans
(NPL) in regressions (5) to (8). The variables of interest in triple interactions are included and reported. For ease of readability, all the variables of interest
and the variables of interest in double interactions are included but left unreported. Bank–level controls are included and reported. For brevity, country–level
controls are included but left unreported. All regressions include bank∗country and year fixed effects. P–values are computed using heteroskedasticity–robust
standard errors multiclustered at the bank and country level (in parentheses). *Statistical significance at the 10% level. **Statistical significance at the 5%
level. ***Statistical significance at the 1% level.
on EONIA, EURIBOR 1-month, EURIBOR 6-month, and EURIBOR 12-month,
respectively to explain the triple influence of monetary policy, capitalization, and
funding liquidity on bank credit risk (the dependent variable is LLP). The findings
from the triple interactions remain significant and quantitatively similar to the
baseline results in Table 3.3 when applying these alternative identification schemes.
The maturity of interest rates used to conduct monetary policy does not appear
to affect the coefficients on the triples, which remain negative and statistically
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significant at the 5% level.
Second, we contrast our findings to examine another aspect of liquidity in banks’
balance sheets in the remaining regressions in Table 3.8, namely Liquid assets (mea-
sured by the natural logarithm of the total liquid assets of banks included in our final
sample). As our key results remain qualitatively robust, we observe that they are
quantitatively more important than our early findings using the full sample period
and NPL as the dependent variable (see Table 3.3). Finally, we combine the alter-
native Taylor residuals computed from EONIA with our asset liquidity indicator
in regression (8) and find similar results to those provided in our baseline analysis.
In summary, the previous results on funding liquidity have direct implications for
the NSFR in the Basel III framework. Conversely, the robustness checks on assets
liquidity are more relevant for the liquidity coverage ratio, which goes beyond the
scope of this research.
3.6 Concluding remarks
This study examines the joint influence of capital and funding liquidity on the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy. Based on previous studies suggesting that bank
equity and funding liquidity are closely intertwined, we draw on the methodology
of Jiménez et al. (2014) and Delis et al. (2017) to investigate the triple interactions
among monetary policy, capital, and deposits (as a proxy for funding liquidity) to
assess their simultaneous impact on credit risk.
Using an extensive dataset on the euro area from 1999 to 2018, we provide em-
pirical evidence that before the GFC, banks concerned with the “crowding-out of
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deposits" effect (Gorton and Winton, 2017) (i.e., displaying low levels of deposits
when equity capital is high) are more sensitive to the risk-taking channel of mon-
etary policy. However, in the aftermath of the GFC, only efficient banks continue
to display such an effect. Under low interest rates, inefficient banks become more
sensitive to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy if they have to comply with
capital and funding liquidity requirements at the same time. Under this scenario,
concomitant capital ratios and the NSFR might be counterproductive in taming
risk-taking behaviors. These results have important implications for bank regula-
tors and policymakers.
First, our findings on the “crowding-out of deposits" effect before the GFC make
the case for the Basel III accords, as imposing capital and funding liquidity stan-
dards simultaneously helps offset the monetary policy transmission to credit risk.
Second, this study argues for special treatment for banks unable to recover in terms
of efficiency after the GFC. As inefficient banks lack the “crowding-out of deposits"
effect, it might be harmful for them to require funding liquidity standards along with
the existing capital ratios. The growing share of inefficient banks in most euro area
countries between 2011 and 2018 also suggests that inefficiency is a major concern
when regulators strengthen capital and funding liquidity standards simultaneously
under “low-for-long” interest rates.
Risk persistence due to strong regulation (Delis and Kouretas, 2011) might ex-
plain this scenario. In particular, capital requirements and liquidity guarantees
might broaden moral hazard, leading to inefficient and risky investments or port-
folio rebalancing toward trading activities over a considerable period. Whereas
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prolonged low interest rates erode banks’ income and franchise value, only financial
institutions able to fix moral hazard (due to strengthened capital and funding liq-
uidity regulation) eventually mitigate the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.
In line with Distinguin et al. (2013), our results also question the implementation
of uniform funding liquidity requirements when less efficient banks seem to manage
their credit risk differently in the face of a low interest rate environment (which the
Covid-19 pandemic is likely to extend further).
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Appendix A. Distribution of euro area banks
Table A1: Distribution of euro area banks




Percentage of total assets of banks
in the final sample against total
assets of banks available in Fitch
Connect database (%)
(1) (2) (3)
Austria 787 617 93.0342
Belgium 161 48 88,9235
Cyprus 40 16 68,3288
Estonia 20 10 30,0331
Finland 90 51 89,3512
France 779 304 92,8296
Germany 3,057 1,850 76,5214
Greece 42 20 95,2358
Ireland 100 22 76,1783
Italy 1,074 638 93,2960
Latvia 36 15 32,3420
Lithuania 17 6 20,7673
Luxembourg 214 74 77,0354
Malta 35 15 38,3876
Netherlands 122 29 65,6468
Portugal 165 111 92,7406
Slovakia 37 15 57,2920
Slovenia 40 18 32,9301
Spain 319 164 92,9204
Euro area 7,135 4,023 83,5905a
Notes. To deal with sample representativeness, we compute in column (3) the ratio of total
assets of banks in our final sample to total assets of nationwide banking system available in Fitch
Connect database from 1999 to 2018. Bank categories included in the sample are: private banks,
retail & consumer banks, trade finance banks, trading & investment banks, trust & processing
banks, universal commercial banks and wholesale commercial banks.
a Weighted average of the percentage of total assets of banks in the final sample against total
assets of banks available in Fitch Connect database (based on the number of banks available for
each country).
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Appendix B. Pairwise Pearson cross-correlation co-
efficients






Net Real Unem- Govt. NF corp.




Taylor residuals 0.2152 0.0448 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ECB rate 0.1749 -0.0503 0.9348 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Capital -0.0413 0.0947 -0.2461 -0.2357 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Deposits -0.1210 -0.1970 -0.0651 -0.0627 -0.2515 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Size -0.0345 -0.1106 -0.0397 -0.0389 -0.2729 -0.2690 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Profitability -0.3325 -0.3418 -0.0858 -0.0553 0.3295 -0.0623 -0.0522 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Inefficiency -0.1294 -0.0405 -0.0032 -0.0080 -0.0636 0.2203 -0.2369 -0.4535 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.4336) (0.0528) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Net loans -0.0492 -0.0346 0.0318 0.0236 -0.1071 -0.0323 0.0495 -0.0085 -0.1075 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0411) (0.0000)
Real GDP -0.1406 -0.2183 -0.0000 0.2073 -0.0081 0.0687 -0.0012 0.1222 -0.0042 -0.0625 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (1.0000) (0.0000) (0.0492) (0.0000) (0.7702) (0.0000) (0.3094) (0.0000)
Unemployment 0.3017 0.4483 0.2130 0.1286 -0.0388 -0.1524 0.1034 -0.1735 -0.0760 0.0263 -0.1887 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Govt. debt 0.1396 0.5632 -0.2984 -0.3592 0.2052 -0.1715 -0.0207 -0.0615 -0.0242 0.0721 -0.2605 0.3190 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
NF corp. debt 0.0498 0.2385 -0.0751 -0.0431 0.0666 -0.1630 0.1629 -0.0493 -0.1403 -0.1024 -0.0204 0.1816 -0.0410 1.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Notes. The table reports the correlation coefficients of variables used in the empirical analysis for 4,023 euro area banks over the period 1999 to 2018, with a final
sample of 58,280 observations at annual frequency. The top and bottom 5% observations of all variables except macroeconomic variables have been winsorized to limit
bias impact in our results. P–values are reported in parentheses.




Monetary policy, credit risk, &
profitability: The influence of
relationship lending on cooperative
banks’ performance
4.1 Introduction
Following 10 years of accommodating monetary policy, the European Central Bank
(ECB) has provided forward guidance in response to the COVID-19 pandemic on
the future path of key interest rates, saying that it expects them to remain at their
present or even lower levels1. Therefore, it seems that the term “low-for-long" is
1See the ECB press release on monetary policy decisions on April 30, 2020,
ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2020/html/ecb.mp200430 1eaa128265.en.
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now more relevant than ever when it comes to future trends in interest rates in the
European banking industry. While promoting economic recovery and enhancing
banks’ balance sheets, persistent low interest rates might also significantly erode
bank credit risk—through the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission
(Borio and Zhu, 2012)—as well as profitability through low market valuations and
price-to-book ratios well below one (Claessens et al., 2018).
Owing to their strong commitment to traditional financial intermediation, co-
operative banks might be more vulnerable in terms of credit risk and profitability
under low rates, as they are more dependent on interest income than their non-
cooperative counterparts. Accordingly, these credit institutions are compelled to
balance their historical cooperative ethos (Ayadi et al., 2010) and their ability to
survive in the banking industry, which decreasing interest rates make all the more
competitive. Most cooperative groups have addressed this issue through structural
consolidation, which aims to reduce the operational costs associated with decen-
tralized (and, sometimes, unprofitable) networks of local and regional branches.
Ultimately, however, this reduces geographical coverage, which seriously hampers
customer proximity, a key element in relationship lending (Elsas, 2005) and the iden-
tity of cooperative banks. Table A1 confirms this trend for European cooperative
banks: between 2010 and 2019, the overwhelming majority of cooperative brands in
the European banking sector experienced a sharp rise in the number of customers
per branch, an indicator used to proxy for the territorial coverage of cooperative
banks2 (EACB, 2020a), with—in the most extreme cases—increases rising to 174%
2The higher the index, the lower is the territorial coverage of cooperative banks.
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and 208% for the cooperative groups Österreichischer Volksbanken in Austria and
Rabobank in the Netherlands, respectively.
These figures raise fundamental questions about the ability of cooperative banks
to either stand apart from the competition through relationship lending or move
further away from their raison d’être as interest rates remain low. Specifically, can
cooperative banks opting for consolidation in such a low interest rate environment
preserve their specificities or behave similarly to their non-cooperative counterparts
in terms of credit risk and profitability? What changes in credit risk and profitability
have cooperative banks, despite their increasingly small interest margins, chosen to
preserve their relationship lending model? To date, answers to these questions are
largely elusive in the literature.
To extend these lines of research and determine the impact of relationship lend-
ing on credit risk and profitability in a low interest rate environment, we investigate
the unconsolidated statements of cooperative and non-cooperative banks from 10
euro area countries between 2010 and 2019, a period characterized by historical
monetary easing by the ECB. We also rely on the territorial coverage proxy pro-
posed by the European Association of Co-operative Banks (EACB, 2020a) to clas-
sify cooperative banks in our sample as consolidated (Groeneveld, 2015) (i.e., above
the median value of the number of customers per branch in 2019) or relationship-
based (i.e., below the median value). Moreover, to be consistent with the empirical
findings that bank credit risk and profitability might be jointly determined (Athana-
soglou et al., 2008), we estimate a simultaneous equations model. Our final dataset
consists of 3998 banks, including 1862 non-cooperative banks (46.6% of the full
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sample) and 2136 cooperative banks (among which 151 are consolidated and 1985
are relationship-based).
Based on this empirical framework, we extend the literature in several directions.
First, we find no evidence of the presence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy
for consolidated cooperative banks, whereas such a channel is extensively found in
the euro area for non-cooperative banks. Consolidated cooperative banks therefore
tend to stand out from their non-cooperative counterparts in terms of monetary
policy transmission to their credit risk. Second, we highlight that the profitability
of cooperative banks preserving their relationship lending model is more severely
hit by a low interest rate environment than that of cooperative banks opting for
consolidation. This raises issues about the middle-term durability of relationship
lending in a low interest rate environment. Third, we find that non-cooperative
banks and relationship-based cooperative banks are both concerned by the risk-
taking channel of monetary policy transmission, which increases their credit risk
under accommodating monetary policy conditions.
Nevertheless, we suggest that such similarities do not occur for the same rea-
sons, as relationship lending is associated with a fundamentally different lending
process than transactions-based lending technologies that devote significantly lower
proportions of their assets to lending to small businesses (Berger and Udell, 2002).
Accordingly, the greater the relationship lending strategy of a cooperative bank, the
greater is its willingness to undertake credit risk, which is particularly valuable to
high-risk firms and small businesses, as they are often informationally opaque and
have far fewer external finance alternatives than large companies.
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In Section 4.2, we provide the motivation for the study and review the literature
on relationship lending as well as the effects of expansionary monetary policy on
bank credit risk and profitability. Section 4.3 discusses the empirical methodology,
while Section 4.4 outlines the data used in the sample. Section 4.5 describes our
findings and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Motivation for the study & related literature
4.2.1 Motivation for the study
Cooperative banking emerged in the United States during the 19th century as a
solution to imperfect markets, especially those featuring information asymmetries
between bank associates and borrowers (Hansmann, 1996). In Europe, it appeared
in the second half of the 19th century at the instigation of Franz Hermann Schulze-
Delitzsch and, later, Frédéric-Guillaume Raiffeisen who both helped disseminate
credit unions in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Nowadays, coopera-
tive banks have gained prominence across the European Union (EU). In 2019, the
European Association of Co-operative Banks recorded more than 213 million cus-
tomers, 85 million members (which represents one in every five European citizens),
42,521 branches, 4154 billion Euro in deposits, and 7932 billion Euro in total assets
(EACB, 2020b).
As stated by Ayadi et al. (2010), a key characteristic of cooperative banks is
their cooperative ethos linked to a strong focus on retail banking: cooperative banks
know their customers relatively well, including their risk profiles (Lang et al., 2016),
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and can collate a great deal of soft information (which is hard to collect) on their
creditworthiness (Berger et al., 2005). Their strong local presence and customer
proximity also reduce information asymmetries in lender–borrower relationships
(Fiordelisi and Mare, 2014).
Branch expansion also benefits local economic growth and offers tailored ser-
vices to local people (Bernini and Brighi, 2018). Cooperative banks might even
be geographically concentrated in some EU countries (e.g., Italy and Germany)
and engage in local monopolistic competition to capture a strong comparative ad-
vantage in developing close customer relationships (Catturani and Stefani, 2016).
Consequently, they end up being key financing partners of small and medium-sized
enterprises as well as retail customers looking for a bank receptive to their needs.
Nevertheless, a low interest rate environment (Altavilla et al., 2018) also pro-
vides fertile ground for the risk-taking channel of monetary policy (Borio and Zhu,
2012). In times of monetary easing such as those in the euro area since the global fi-
nancial crisis, credit institutions are highly likely to undertake credit risk in response
to squeezed profits from traditional interest-generating activities. Facing low rates
and the associated higher competition in the banking industry, cooperative banks
have strived to make their model a strength. For instance, their business model
comprises simpler structures less impacted by the global financial crisis than those
of non-cooperative banks (McKillop et al., 2020), even in countries severely hit eco-
nomically and socially (Lang et al., 2016). Moreover, their stakeholder organization
(based on the principle of “one person, one vote”) allows members to be directly
involved in the cooperative’s management to exert checks and balances at each
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business level. Greater transparency and the improved identification of customers’
creditworthiness might ultimately minimize credit risk, even when monetary policy
is eased for a prolonged period. This provides us with the first hypothesis tested in
this study.
Hypothesis 1 Thanks to the specificities of their business model, cooperative banks
are less exposed to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy than non-cooperative
banks.
Relationship lending—on which cooperative banks have historically relied—also
has potential weaknesses. Among them lies a stronger dependence on domestic
interest income, which becomes a major challenge in a low interest rate environ-
ment3. In the short run, the negative impact on profitability can be mitigated by
cost cutting and focusing on non-interest income. However, in the longer term, cap-
italization issues might encourage consolidation as financial institutions merge in
the pursuit of economies of scale (Altavilla et al., 2018; Bexley, 2016). As banking
institutions grow larger and more organizationally complex through consolidation,
Berger and Udell (2002) note that they are ultimately less likely to choose to make
relationship loans.
Accordingly, the cooperative banking sector has responded to lax monetary pol-
icy reducing their territorial coverage since the global financial crisis, mainly because
maintaining extensive networks of local branches implies significant organizational
3Another problem identified by Meyer (2018) is that cooperative banks have increasingly less
room to implement differentiated interest rates (i.e., below market rates (Agarwal and Hauswald,
2010)) than the rest of the banking industry owing to their better knowledge of customers’ cred-
itworthiness (Meyer, 2018; Ayadi et al., 2016).
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costs (Bernini and Brighi, 2018)4. Yet, branch closure seriously hampers the rela-
tionship lending model and dwindles the comparative advantage cooperative banks
have so far used to stand out in the banking industry (Jovanovic et al., 2017)5.
Therefore, “low-for-long” interest rates (Claessens et al., 2018) might jeopardize the
local-based model of cooperative banks and shed light on their dilemma of how to
reduce costs while preserving their regional entrenchment.
Assuming that bank performance is impaired by low interest rates (Bikker and
Vervliet, 2018), the second hypothesis of this study differentiates cooperative banks
opting for consolidation (to reduce their organizational costs and, ultimately, the
impact of monetary easing on their profitability) and cooperative banks preserving
their relationship lending model through (costly) decentralized territorial coverage.
Hypothesis 2 The profitability of cooperative banks preserving their relationship
lending model is more severely hit by a low interest rate environment than that of
cooperative banks opting for consolidation.
Examining the role of the bank–customer relationship in credit risk, Jiménez
and Saurina (2004) highlight that a close relationship increases the willingness of
the bank to take more risk. This occurs primarily because individuals and non-
financial companies can benefit from a close relationship with their bank through
easier access to credit (i.e., the amount of credit they obtain, how much it costs
them, the protection they have during recessions, and even the implicit insurance
4See Table A1 on the upward trend of the number of clients per branch—a proxy for customer
proximity—of European cooperative banks between 2010 and 2019.
5Jovanovic et al. (2017) also points out that branch closure leads to the greater use of online
banking, which hinders cooperative banks’ key values regarding customer proximity.
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of the cost of finance) (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). A direct result of such a close
bank–customer relationship is the production of informational rents for the bank
involved (Rajan, 1992), enabling it to exercise a degree of market power (at least
in the future). Banks might ultimately be prepared to finance riskier borrowers or
projects: the more they develop relationship lending, the greater is their credit risk
willingness.
By contrast, when a firm or an individual has a relationship with several banks,
none of them can monopolize their information on the borrower’s quality and thus
cannot extract rents, which considerably diminishes the incentive to finance higher-
risk borrowers (Jiménez and Saurina, 2004). Nevertheless, Boot (2000) stresses that
relationship lending might also help alleviate adverse selection and moral hazard
problems.
Peltoniemi (2007), furthermore, investigates data on small businesses’ loans from
a major Finnish bank, finding that a long-term bank–firm relationship is beneficial,
especially for high-risk firms that are, interestingly, more likely to provide personal
guarantees. As the relationship matures, the loan premiums for risky firms de-
crease at a higher rate than those for safe firms, meaning that high-risk firms tend
to preserve a long-term relationship with their bank to derive economic benefits.
Ultimately, lasting bank–firm relationships are particularly valuable and desirable
to small businesses.
In line with these theoretical predictions, we test whether, in a low interest rate
environment, cooperative banks committed to relationship lending are willing to
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assume increased credit risk6. In times of low interest rates such as the 2010–2019
period considered in the present analysis, we therefore expect to observe a negative
relationship between the monetary policy stance and credit risk of relationship-
based cooperative banks.
As shown in Table 4.1 and Table A2, we approximate the strength of the re-
lationship between a cooperative bank and its customers through the territorial
coverage of its local branches. Based on the most recent data provided by the Eu-
ropean Association of Co-operative Banks (EACB, 2020a), a cooperative bank is
considered to be consolidated (i.e., with lower territorial coverage and, therefore,
little commitment to relationship lending) when the number of clients per branch
is above its 2019 median value. Conversely, a cooperative bank is categorized as
relationship-based (i.e., with higher territorial coverage and, therefore, strong com-
mitment to relationship lending) when the number of clients per branch is below
its 2019 median value.
This methodological choice is driven by Berger and Udell (2002), who consider
that such banks are more often headquartered closer to potential relationship cus-
tomers, thereby reducing the problems associated with transmitting soft information
about the local firm, owner, and community to senior management. Accordingly,
this leads us to the third hypothesis empirically assessed in this study.
Hypothesis 3 Cooperative banks preserving their relationship lending model in a
low interest rate environment are prone to assume greater credit risk than coopera-
6For illustrative purposes, Table 4.3 shows that, on average, the loan loss provision of
relationship-based cooperative banks is higher than that of consolidated cooperative banks (this
difference being not significant, though).
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tive banks opting for consolidation.
4.2.2 Related literature
Our empirical analysis draws on three strands of the literature dedicated to the im-
pact of monetary policy on credit institutions: the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy transmission (Section 4.2.2.1), the impact of interest rates on bank prof-
itability (Section 4.2.2.2), and the response of cooperative banking and relationship
lending to monetary policy stances (Section 4.2.2.3). We discuss these three strands
below.
4.2.2.1 The risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, a growing debate ensued on whether
risk-taking incentives at financial institutions are shaped by the monetary conditions
prevailing in the economy (Caselli et al., 2020). As such, monetary policy might
affect bank risk through two mechanisms (Angeloni et al., 2015).
On the one hand, a first channel operates through changes in the composition of
the asset side of banks’ balance sheets (Delis et al., 2017) when a prolonged period
of low interest rates induces banks to search for yields by making riskier assets
more attractive than safe bonds. This leads to higher procyclical risk within the
financial system (Rajan, 2006) and a growing number of weakened bank portfolios
(Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006).
The second channel, on the other hand, refers to the impact of monetary policy
on banks’ funding as they find it more profitable to adjust the combination of capital
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and short-term funding by increasing leverage (Valencia, 2014). However, theory
predicts that the effects of interest rates on leverage depend on the extent to which
banks can change their capital structures (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2014) and whether
the yield curve is upward sloping.
As low interest rates boost asset and collateral values while reducing volatility,
banks might also downsize their estimates of probabilities of default and assume
higher risk positions (Delis et al., 2017). Analyzing the Spanish banking industry,
Jiménez et al. (2014) find that lower overnight rates lead weakly capitalized banks
to grant more credit and higher loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements
to ex-ante risky borrowers than higher rates. Using a factor-augmented vector
autoregressive model for the United States between 1997 and 2008, Buch et al.
(2014) prove that small domestic banks significantly increase the supply of new
loans to high-risk borrowers following an expansionary monetary policy shock.
Recently, Bikker and Vervliet (2018) indicate that a low interest rate environ-
ment might cause banks to reduce their level of credit loss provisioning and expand
their trading activities to reduce their reliance on lending business. Exploring the
existence of an international bank lending channel, Schmidt et al. (2018) also find
that monetary policy tightening abroad reduces credit supply at home, particularly
for US monetary policy changes.
Based on a sample of commercial, savings, and cooperative banks in the euro
area between 2001 and 2008, Delis and Kouretas (2011) present strong empirical
evidence that low interest rates increase bank risk-taking, although this effect is less
pronounced for French institutions, which hold a relatively low level of risk assets
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on average. Further, the distributional effects of interest rates on bank risk-taking
due to individual bank characteristics reveal that the impact of interest rates on risk
assets is diminished for banks with higher equity capital and amplified for banks
with higher off-balance sheet items. In the same vein, Bonfim and Soares (2018)
demonstrate that the impact of monetary policy on risk-taking strategies is stronger
among banks with weaker capital ratios and larger liquidity buffers than others.
When analyzing both conventional and unconventional monetary policy mea-
sures, Brana et al. (2019) find that loosening monetary policy may have harmful
effects on bank risk-taking but that such a relation is non-linear: when interest rate
indicators are below a certain threshold, the negative relationship between bank
risk and monetary policy is stronger. In particular, accounting for central banks’
balance sheet policy indicates that additional liquidity encourages banks to take
riskier positions. Similarly, Vari (2020) shows that interbank market fragmentation
might disrupt the transmission of monetary policy by leading short-term interest
rates to depart from central bank policy rates.
4.2.2.2 The impact of interest rates on bank profitability
Investigating how macroeconomic and bank variables affect banks’ net interest in-
come and profitability, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find that higher interest
rates are associated with higher net interest margins and profits, especially in coun-
tries where interest rates on deposits are more likely to be controlled and below
the market level. Based on a sample of European, American, and Japanese inter-
national banks, Borio et al. (2017) find a positive relationship between the level of
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short-term rates and slope of the yield curve, on the one hand, and bank profitabil-
ity, on the other hand. This suggests that the positive impact of the interest rate
structure on net interest income dominates the negative impact on loan loss provi-
sion and non-interest income. They point out that such an effect is stronger when
interest rates are low and the slope is steep (i.e., when non-linearities are present),
indicating that unusually low interest rates and an unusually flat term structure
erode bank profitability over time.
Alternatively, Genay (2014) argue that interest rate changes have a greater
short-run impact on small banks, as they depend more on the traditional interme-
diation of retail deposits and loans than larger banks, many of which are priced
based on floating (prime) rates. While large US banks typically have a greater
ability to manage interest rate risks and are less affected by low rates, Covas et al.
(2015) find that their funding cost advantage and net interest margins have declined
more than those of small banks since the global financial crisis. Moreover, Busch
and Memmel (2015) analyze the German banking industry where the long-run ef-
fect of a 100 basis point change on net interest margins is small (at around 7 basis
points) in “normal” interest rate environments.
Differences between small and large banks in terms of monetary policy impacts
on profitability also arise from differences in the compositions of their assets and
liabilities, in the competition for funds and lending opportunities, and in their busi-
ness models (Claessens et al., 2018). Accordingly, Gomez et al. (2020) suggest that
US banks’ assets are more sensitive to interest rate risks than are their liabilities,
while such sensitivity varies across banks and might lead lending to respond dif-
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ferently to monetary policy depending on how bank financing is affected. In this
case, the variations in exposure to interest rate changes across banks are due to
differences in competition in deposit and loan markets. Conversely, Drechsler et al.
(2017) find that deposit interest rates tend to change less with monetary policy
changes in markets where deposit competition is lower.
English et al. (2018) show that an increase in interest rates results in higher in-
terest margins for about a year, after which bank profits turn significantly negative.
Following increases in the level and slope of the yield curve, reductions in profits
reflect a shift in the composition of banks’ balance sheets. In particular, increases
in rates lead to an outflow of core deposits, which are an inexpensive source of
funding relative to market alternatives. Ultimately, changes in interest rates only
have moderate and transitory effects on bank earnings.
4.2.2.3 Response of cooperative banking & relationship lending to mon-
etary policy stances
Elsas (2005) defines relationship lending as a long-term implicit contract between
a bank and its debtor, which leads the former, thanks to information production
and repeated interaction with the borrower over time, to accumulate private in-
formation, thereby establishing close ties. Such ties create benefits for the lending
institution such as intertemporal smoothing, increased credit availability, the en-
hancement of the borrower’s project payoffs, and more efficient decisions if borrowers
face financial distress. Therefore, relationship lending is one of the most important
technologies employed by banks to extend credit to informationally opaque small
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businesses without strong financial ratios, collateral, or credit scores (Berger and
Udell, 2002). It allows them to obtain bank financing by augmenting relatively
weak hard information with soft information gained over time through contact with
firms, their owners, and their local communities at a variety of levels.
As local institutions, cooperative banks acquire specialized knowledge by cul-
tivating relationships between staff and customers. The resulting proximity facili-
tates access to soft information, defined by Berger and Udell (2002) as information
difficult to quantify, verify, and transmit through the layers of management and
ownership of a banking organization7, which is used to mitigate information asym-
metry and more readily provide credit to informationally opaque borrowers. By
contrast, large credit institutions have little commitment to relationship lending, as
they would rather place weight on hard information (also called transactions-based
technologies) and are more open to borrowers with lower informational opacity
(McKillop et al., 2020). Indeed, Uchida et al. (2012) points out that even if large
banks appear to have an equivalent potential to underwrite relationship loans, they
choose instead to focus their resources on transactions lending.
Neuberger et al. (2008) suggest that localism and cooperative ownership are
positively related to the relational orientation of financial institutions, as they avoid
the organizational diseconomies and coordination problems often associated with
large, multilayered institutions opting for standardized credit policies based on hard
information (Berger and Udell, 2002). Moreover, Presbitero and Zazzaro (2011) find
7For instance, appraisals of real estate might require the expertise of individuals with specialized
knowledge of local markets.
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that where relationship lending techniques are already widely used by numerous
cooperatives and savings banks, an increase in out-of-market competition drives
them to further cultivate their relationship ties with customers. More recently,
Donker et al. (2020) highlight that borrowing from relationship lenders lowers the
loan spread by 17 basis points compared with borrowing from non-relationship
lenders, implying that relationship lenders can benefit borrowers. They also show
that borrowers often choose to remain with their relationship bankers because of
the more favorable loan terms and high costs of switching lenders.
Based on the contracts database of a French cooperative bank, Dereeper et al.
(2020) show that a strong bank–firm relationship results in a lower spread for loan
applications during the high phase of the business cycle, while, in a downturn, the
stronger the bank–firm relationship, the higher is the interest rate. Importantly,
this means that weaker interest rates appear only in normal or good periods, while
the hold-up problem only arises during economic recessions. Focusing on the EU
banking industry, Kuc and Teply (2019) find structural differences in the priorities
and behavior of European cooperative and commercial banks in a low interest rate
environment: commercial banks tend to focus on maintaining their profitability,
whereas cooperative banks favor stability by increasing their capital buffers.
While Hasan et al. (2014) provide evidence that Polish cooperative banks lend
more to small businesses than large domestic and foreign-owned banks, Ferri et al.
(2014) conclude that stakeholder banks decrease their loan supply to a lesser extent
than shareholder banks following a monetary policy contraction. In particular,
cooperative banks continued to smooth the impact of tighter monetary policy on
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their lending during the global financial crisis, acknowledging that the presence of
stakeholder banks in the economy has the potential to reduce credit supply volatility.
In turn, Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) prove that interest rates might even decrease
with the length and strength of the relationship between a cooperative bank and
firm, as borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information. Finally,
cooperative banks might decide to set loan interest rate and saving rate ceilings
(Ferrari et al., 2018) to protect borrowers by offering access to credit at reasonable
interest rates.
4.3 Methodology
We investigate the contribution of monetary policy to explaining banks’ credit risk
and profitability depending on whether they display a cooperative ownership struc-
ture and, if so, whether they manage their network of local branches on a centralized
basis. Based on the most recent data provided by EACB (2020b) on the 2019 terri-
torial coverage of European cooperative banks, we compute the median value of the
number of clients per branch of the cooperative banks included in our sample (see
Table A1). We then categorize a cooperative bank as relationship-based8 (Cornée,
2014; Bülbül et al., 2013; Stein, 2012) (consolidated) if the number of clients per
branch is below (above) the 2019 median value described above.
As previous studies suggest that credit risk and profitability might be linked
by a bidirectional causal relationship (Athanasoglou et al., 2008), we consider a
8The relationship-based category includes cooperative banks with a relatively high territorial
coverage of local branches (i.e., a strong commitment to relationship lending) as opposed to
consolidation and integration (Ory and Lemzeri, 2012).
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dynamic simultaneous equations system to deal with endogeneity issues. In the
first equation, we regress the credit risk index on a set of explanatory variables
identified in the literature to which we add profitability variables (using several
proxies; see below) and the monetary policy stance. In the second equation, we
regress the profitability variable on a set of independent variables also identified
in the literature in addition to the credit risk proxy and an indicator of monetary
policy. All bank-level data originate from Fitch Connect, while all country-level
data stem from Eurostat (except for spreads, which are retrieved from Thompson
Reuters Eikon; see Table 4.1). The empirical model to be estimated is specified
by the following dynamic simultaneous equations system (the subscripts b and t


























LLPb,t = αb,t + βLLPb,t−1 + γΠb,t + δMP1t
+ ζEDC1b,t−1 + ηRealGDPt + εb,t
Πb,t = θb,t + ιΠb,t−1 + κLLPb,t + λMP2t
+ µEDC2b,t−1 + νRealGDPt + ξb,t
(4.1)
Where:
• LLP b,t is the loan loss provision to total gross loans ratio of bank b at year t
to measure credit risk ;
• LLP b,t−1 is the lagged loan loss provision to total gross loans ratio of bank b
at year t − 1 to consider the persistency of bank credit risk, as proposed by
Delis and Kouretas (2011) ;
Bruno De Menna Chapter 4
150 4.3. Methodology
• Πb,t is the profitability proxy (either ROAA, NIM, PTP or CTI, see Section
4) of bank b at year t ;
• Πb,t−1 is the lagged profitability proxy (either ROAA, NIM, PTP or CTI ) of
bank b at year t − 1 to leave open the possibility for profitability to adjust
over time, as suggested by Claessens et al. (2018) ;
• MP1 t is the monetary policy index included in the credit risk equation at year
t, namely either EURIBOR-1M or EURIBOR-6M ;
• MP2 t is the monetary policy index included in the profitability equation at
year t, namely either Spread:10Y-3M or Spread:10Y-6M ;
• EDC1 b,t−1 are the endogenous controls included in the credit risk equation of
bank b at year t− 1 (see Table 4.4 to Table 4.9) ;
• EDC2 b,t−1 are the endogenous controls included in the profitability equation
of bank b at year t− 1 (see Table 4.4 to Table 4.9) ;
• Real GDP t is the macroeconomic control variable at year t gauging the annual
percentage change on previous year in a country’s real gross domestic product.
We estimate System 4.1 using generalized method of moments (GMM), which is
robust to the distribution of errors and which accounts for the heteroskedasticity
of errors (Ullah et al., 2018). We also include in the regressions cross-sectional
fixed effects and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the bank
level. As previous empirical studies of credit risk and profitability highlight the
potential endogeneity with most bank-level controls9, we follow the methodology of
Distinguin et al. (2013) by instrumenting all the bank-level explanatory variables
9For each equation of System 4.1, we run the Hausman test to confirm the presence of endo-
geneity both in the credit risk and in the profitability equations.
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(i.e., EDC1 in the credit risk equation and EDC2 in the profitability equation) by
their one-year lagged value. While the two variables of interest (i.e., credit risk and
profitability) are not lagged, using a simultaneous GMM equations system addresses
endogeneity issues. As both bank-level controls and bank fixed effects enable us to
control for each bank’s credit risk and profitability, the results of our estimations can
be interpreted as the direct effects of a change in monetary policy on banks’ credit
risk and profitability. In addition, the regressions of credit risk and profitability
both control for general economic conditions (through the Real GDP variable) to
further acknowledge the difficulty in addressing endogeneity in monetary policy.
On the one hand, in the credit risk equation (see the results in Table 4.4 to
Table 4.8), the dependent variable is measured by the ratio of loan loss provision to
total gross loans, which reflects banks’ credit risk profiles. The robustness checks
in Table 4.9 also include a measure of banks’ overall risk using the Z-score index
(IJtsma et al., 2017). These two choices of bank risk proxies are guided by Khan
et al. (2017) and Houston et al. (2010). The Z-score represents the number of
standard deviations below the mean by which profits would have to fall to deplete
the bank’s equity capital. Despite being widely used in the literature (Delis et al.,
2014; Ramayandi et al., 2014), a high Z-score indicates lower overall risk-taking
by a bank (i.e., greater stability). As a measure of the distance from insolvency
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Where:
• ROAAb,t equals the return on average assets of bank b at year t ;
• Equityb,t equals the ratio of total equity over total assets of bank b at year t ;
• Standard deviation of ROAAb equals the standard deviation of asset returns
of bank b over the full sample period.
The bank-level controls in the credit risk equation are the bank characteristics and
activities commonly adopted in the literature. Similarly to Dinger and te Kaat
(2020); Abbate and Thaler (2019) and Khan et al. (2017), we consider the natu-
ral logarithm of total assets (Size) as well as the ratio of net loans to total assets
(Net loans) as potential determinants of credit risk (in addition to the profitability
proxies described hereafter). To gauge the monetary policy stance within the credit
risk equation, we employ two maturities (1-month and 6-month maturities) of the
benchmark rate at which euro interbank term deposits are offered by prime banks
to one another (EURIBOR-1M and EURIBOR-6M, respectively). These respec-
tively represent the short- and medium-term interest rate series for domestic money
markets affecting credit risk management by euro area banks. We control for the
macroeconomic conditions using the Real GDP variable in the credit risk equation.
On the other hand, following Elekdag et al. (2020) and Altavilla et al. (2018),
we use four indicators of profitability in the profitability equation described in the
second part of System 4.1:
• ROAAb,t, the return on average assets of bank b in year t. The higher this
index, the better is bank profitability;
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• NIM b,t, the net interest margin of bank b in year t. The higher this index,
the better is bank profitability;
• PTP b,t, the pretax profit over total assets of bank b in year t. The higher this
index, the better is bank profitability;
• CTI b,t, the cost to income ratio of bank b in year t. As increases in this index
imply lower bank profitability, whereas increases in the other profitability
proxies represent higher bank profitability, we multiply the values for this
ratio by -1 to provide a more consistent interpretation among the profitability
proxies. In other words, a higher value indicates greater profitability in all
instances. Hereafter, we use the -CTI variable name to refer to the bank cost
to income ratio.
Based on Claessens et al. (2018), we additionally use the ratios of total equity
to total assets (Equity) and total liquid assets to total assets (Liquid assets) as the
bank-level controls affecting profitability. We also proxy for monetary policy in the
profitability equation using the slope of the yield curve between 10-year government
bond yields and 3-month (6-month) implied sovereign bond yields accounted for by
the Spread:10Y-3M variable (Spread:10Y-6M ). Similarly to the credit risk equation,
we control for the business cycle using the Real GDP variable in the profitability
equation.
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4.4 Data & sample
We assemble a unique dataset from different sources to investigate the impact of
monetary policy on banks’ credit risk and profitability depending on whether they
display a cooperative ownership structure and, if so, whether they are committed
to relationship lending. Table 4.1 lists the variables used in the empirical analysis
along with the methodological approaches and data sources. Panel A summarizes
the variables of interest on credit risk, profitability, and the monetary policy stance.
Panel B covers bank-level controls and panel C macroeconomic controls. Panel D
describes the four subsamples used in the study, namely, cooperative banks, non-
cooperative banks, consolidated cooperative banks, and relationship-based cooper-
ative banks.
Unconsolidated bank-level balance sheets and income statements are collected
from Fitch Connect at an annual frequency, and these include three categories of
banks: Retail & Consumer, Universal Commercial, and Wholesale Commercial. To
address the potential of outliers to distort the results, all the bank-level variables are
winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles, thresholds commonly accepted in the lit-
erature (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). The final dataset consists of 30,467 observations
from 3998 banks in 10 euro area countries10 between 2010 and 2019.
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the bank- and country-level vari-
ables for the full sample (panel A) as well as the Pearson correlations of the bank-
level variables (panel B). We do not find the bank indicators employed as explana-
10Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia,
and Spain.
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Table 4.1: Definitions
Variable Methodological approach Data source
Panel A: Variables of interest
LLP
Loan loss provision over a bank’s total gross loans as the ability to absorb




Natural logarithm of the following ratio: the sum of ROAA and Equity to the
numerator, and the standard deviation of ROAA to the denominator. It
relates a bank’s capital level to variability in its returns, indicating how much
variability in returns can be absorbed by capital without the bank becoming
insolvent. It acts as a an accounting-based measure of the distance to default
(see also Equation 2).
Fitch Connect
ROAA Return on average assets as the net income over a bank’s average total assets. Fitch Connect
NIM
Net interest margin as the difference between interest income (i.e., gross
interest and dividend income) and interest expense over a bank’s total
earning assets (i.e., total loans, total securities, investments in property and
earning assets not otherwise categorized).
Fitch Connect
PTP Pre-tax profit over a bank’s total assets. Fitch Connect
CTI
Cost to income ratio as total operating costs (including administrative and
fixed costs) over a bank’s total operating income.
Fitch Connect
EURIBOR-1M
Benchmark rate at which euro interbank 1-month term deposits are offered
by prime banks to one another. It acts as a representative short-term interest
rate series for domestic money markets.
Eurostat
EURIBOR-6M
Benchmark rate at which euro interbank 6-month term deposits are offered
by prime banks to one another. It acts as a representative medium-term
interest rate series for domestic money markets.
Eurostat
Spread:10Y-3M
Difference between a central government bond yield on the secondary market
with 10 years’ residual maturity and its 3-month implied sovereign bond yield.
Thompson Reuters Eikon
Spread:10Y-6M
Difference between a central government bond yield on the secondary market
with 10 years’ residual maturity and its 6-month implied sovereign bond yield.
Thompson Reuters Eikon
Panel B: Bank-level controls
Size Natural logarithm of a bank’s total assets as a measure of its size. Fitch Connect
Equity Total equity over a bank’s total assets as a measure of its capital adequacy. Fitch Connect
Net loans




Liquid assets (including cash, reserves representing surplus, securities and
interbank loans with very short maturity) over a bank’s total assets as a
measure of its level of liquidity.
Fitch Connect
Panel C: Macroeconomic controls
Real GDP
Annual percentage change on previous year in a country’s real gross
domestic product (in volume).
Eurostat
Recession
Dummy variable that equals 1 when Real GDP is negative, and 0
otherwise.
Eurostat
Panel D: Bank classifications
Cooperative banks
Retail & Consumer banks, Universal Commercial banks and Wholesale
Commercial banks displaying a cooperative ownership structure.
EACB (2020a)
Non-cooperative banks
Retail & Consumer banks, Universal Commercial banks and Wholesale
Commercial banks displaying
a non-cooperative ownership structure.
Fitch Connect
Consolidated cooperative banks
Cooperative banks displaying a number of clients per branch above the full
sample median in 2019.
EACB (2020b)
Relationship-based cooperative banks
Cooperative banks displaying a number of clients per branch below the full
sample median in 2019.
EACB (2020b)
Notes. This tables reports name, methodological approach and data source of all variables used in the empirical analysis, as well as definition of
classifications used to build subsamples cooperative, non-cooperative, consolidated cooperative and relationship-based cooperative banks.
tory variables to be highly correlated, so multicollinearity is not a major concern
in the estimations. The correlation coefficients of credit risk, LLP, with the prof-
itability proxies, ROAA, NIM, PTP, and CTI, are -0.100, 0.085, -0.144, and -0.174,
respectively. Table 4.3 refines the summary statistics by dividing the full sample
into the four subsamples described above.
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Table 4.2: Full sample descriptive statistics & bank variables’ correlations
Panel A: Descriptive statistics
Unit Mean Median Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs. Banks Countries
Bank-level variables
LLP % 0.419 0.230 0.830 -1.010 2.630 30,467 3,998 10
Zscore std. dev. 4.668 4.312 3.351 0.987 41.875 30,135 3,941 10
ROAA % 0.368 0.280 0.448 -0.490 1.850 30,467 3,998 10
NIM % 2.085 2.150 0.731 0.200 3.380 30,467 3,998 10
PTP % 0.571 0.490 0.557 -0.530 2.400 30,467 3,998 10
CTI % 69.040 68.690 13.698 39.270 99.430 30,467 3,998 10
Size ln(e) 20.375 20.225 1.708 17.451 23.860 30,467 3,998 10
Equity % 10.019 8.790 5.914 3.660 37.650 30,467 3,998 10
Net loans % 58.204 60.810 18.682 8.540 86.760 30,467 3,998 10
Liquid assets % 16.110 11.390 14.189 2.270 63.390 30,467 3,998 10
Country-level variables
EURIBOR-1M % 0.114 0.130 0.472 -0.400 1.180 30,467 3,998 10
EURIBOR-6M % 0.371 0.310 0.614 -0.300 1.640 30,467 3,998 10
Spread:10Y-3M % 1.537 1.242 1.124 -0.270 10.292 30,467 3,998 10
Spread:10Y-6M % 1.383 0.999 1.003 -1.010 10.049 30,467 3,998 10
Real GDP % 1.537 1.500 1.488 -4.100 4.900 30,467 3,998 10
Recession {0,1} 0.059 0.000 0.237 0.000 1.000 30,467 3,998 10
Panel B: Bank-level variables’ correlations
LLP Zscore ROAA NIM PTP CTI Size Equity Net loans Liquid assets
LLP 1.000
Zscore -0.023 1.000
ROAA -0.100 0.072 1.000
NIM 0.085 0.022 0.055 1.000
PTP -0.144 0.100 0.958 0.130 1.000
CTI -0.174 0.011 -0.314 -0.156 -0.361 1.000
Size -0.009 -0.088 -0.088 -0.289 -0.084 -0.251 1.000
Equity 0.070 0.204 0.377 0.021 0.362 -0.000 -0.312 1.000
Net loans -0.070 -0.066 -0.084 0.273 -0.064 -0.131 0.140 -0.202 1.000
Liquid assets -0.050 0.034 0.098 -0.318 0.047 0.178 -0.107 0.163 -0.585 1.000
Notes. This table reports descriptive statistics for the full sample and bank-level variables’ Pearson’s correlations of
the yearly data for 3998 banks from 2010 to 2019. The top and bottom 5% of all observations for bank-level variables
have been winsorized to limit the impact of extreme values on empirical results.
Bank risk-taking is gauged by two indexes: LLP for credit risk (see Table 4.4
to Table 4.8) and Z-score for overall risk (see the robustness checks in Table 4.9).
The mean LLP for the full sample is 0.419%, with a standard deviation of 0.830%.
Interestingly, Table 4.3 indicates that, on average, non-cooperative banks display
higher LLP (as well as a higher standard deviation) than cooperative banks in the
euro area between 2010 and 2019. While both consolidated and relationship-based
cooperative banks exhibit, on average, lower LLP than non-cooperative banks, there
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics of cooperative, non-cooperative, consolidated coop-
erative & relationship-based cooperative banks’ variables
LLP Zscore ROAA NIM PTP CTI
Total assets
Equity Net loans Liquid assets
(e billion)
Panel A: Cooperative banks
Mean 0.402 4.511 0.342 2.234 0.532 69.192 1.670 9.561 59.330 14.941
Median 0.250 4.399 0.300 2.240 0.520 68.970 0.316 9.070 60.190 11.340
Std. dev. 0.779 1.688 0.294 0.536 0.368 11.082 4.320 3.189 14.024 11.485
Min. -1.010 1.285 -0.490 0.200 -0.530 39.270 0.038 3.660 8.540 2.270
Max. 2.630 41.875 1.850 3.380 2.400 99.430 23.000 37.650 86.760 63.390
Panel B: Non-cooperative banks
Mean 0.437 4.843 0.396 1.922 0.613 68.873 4.370 10.523 56.966 17.396
Median 0.210 4.136 0.230 2.020 0.450 68.320 1.410 8.380 61.780 11.450
Std. dev. 0.883 4.529 0.570 0.870 0.707 16.090 6.780 7.860 22.665 16.569
Min. -1.010 0.987 -0.490 0.200 -0.530 39.270 0.038 3.660 8.540 2.270
Max. 2.630 41.617 1.850 3.380 2.400 99.430 23.000 37.650 86.760 63.390
Test t-statistica 3.717*** 8.576*** 10.597*** -37.962*** 12.748*** -2.029** 41.809*** 14.231*** -11.055*** 15.141***
Panel C: Consolidated cooperative banks
Mean 0.372 4.299 0.399 1.663 0.578 66.170 11.300 9.347 67.003 16.352
Median 0.240 4.416 0.400 1.600 0.560 64.970 11.200 8.745 72.325 13.820
Std. dev. 0.593 0.858 0.324 0.541 0.444 11.708 8.450 3.674 14.550 10.262
Min. -1.010 1.788 -0.490 0.200 -0.530 39.270 0.038 3.660 8.540 2.270
Max. 2.630 6.435 1.850 3.380 2.170 99.430 23.000 37.650 86.760 63.390
Test t-statisticb 2.519** 4.194*** -0.165 10.301*** 1.700* 5.761*** -33.805*** 5.199*** -15.255*** 2.172**
Panel D: Relationship-based cooperative banks
Mean 0.404 4.529 0.337 2.281 0.528 69.444 0.869 9.579 58.690 14.823
Median 0.250 4.396 0.300 2.280 0.510 69.270 0.285 9.080 59.600 11.020
Std. dev. 0.793 1.738 0.290 0.508 0.360 10.991 2.420 3.145 13.788 11.574
Min. -1.010 1.285 -0.490 0.200 -0.530 39.270 0.038 3.660 8.540 2.270
Max. 2.630 41.875 1.850 3.380 2.400 99.430 23.000 37.650 86.760 63.390
Test t-statisticc -1.370 -4.590*** 7.103*** -40.823*** 4.607*** -9.979*** 106.647*** -2.453** 20.210*** 4.486***
Test t-statisticd 3.359*** 7.808*** 11.195*** -43.164*** 13.000*** -3.547*** 59.025*** 13.525*** -7.875*** 15.411***
Notes. This table reports the summary statistics of cooperative, non-cooperative, consolidated cooperative and relationship-based cooperative
banks’ variables from 2010 to 2019. All variables are expressed in percentage, except Total assets expressed in e billion (see Table 4.1 for
definitions). Unconsolidated bank-level balance sheets and income statements are reported by Fitch Connect and winsorized at the 5% level.
We consider a bank cooperative if it displays a cooperative ownership structure (EACB, 2020a). We consider a bank consolidated cooperative if
it displays a cooperative ownership structure with a number of clients per branch above the full sample median in 2019, and relationship-based
cooperative if it displays a cooperative ownership structure with a number of clients per branch below the full sample median in 2019 (see Table
A2). T -statistics test the null hypothesis of identical means between, respectively, acooperative and non-cooperative, bconsolidated cooperative
and non-cooperative, crelationship-based cooperative and consolidated cooperative, and drelationship-based cooperative and non-cooperative
banks subsamples. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
is no significant difference between the two groups of cooperative banks in terms of
the average LLP. The full sample mean Z-score is 4.668, with a standard deviation
of 3.351. Table 4.3 shows that, on average, the overall risk of non-cooperative
banks is significantly lower (i.e., with a greater Z-score value)—although much
more volatile—than cooperatives’. Relationship-based cooperative banks perform
significantly better regarding overall risk than consolidated cooperative banks.
Bank profitability is measured by four indicators, namely, ROOA, NIM, PTP,
and CTI, with the latter having the highest standard deviation. The means are,
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respectively, 0.368%, 2.085%, 0.571%, and 69.040%. On average, cooperative banks
fare significantly better in terms of NIM, which might be linked to their higher
share of net loans to total assets (59.330% on average) relative to non-cooperatives’
(mean value of 56.966%). In addition, the NIM index is significantly higher for
relationship-based cooperative banks (mean value of 2.281%) than for consolidated
cooperative banks (1.663% on average). Alternatively, consolidated cooperative
banks, on average, gain better results than relationship-based cooperative banks
for ROAA (0.399% vs. 0.337%), PTP (0.578% vs. 0.528%), and CTI (66.170% vs.
69.444%). Specifically, the differences in CTI between consolidated and relationship-
based cooperative banks most likely reflect the higher costs required to set up and
maintain decentralized branch networks.
As expected, non-cooperative banks are significantly larger than cooperative
banks on average (4.370e billion vs. 1.670e billion), while consolidated coopera-
tive banks (11.300e billion) are larger than relationship-based cooperative banks
(0.869e billion). The full sample mean Equity is 10.019%, with a standard de-
viation of 5.914%. Non-cooperative banks are better capitalized (mean value of
10.523%) than cooperative banks (9.561%), which might reflect the fact that coop-
erative banks are more involved in traditional financial intermediation, while non-
cooperative banks engage more in capital market transactions to fund themselves in
wholesale markets (Claessens et al., 2018). Interestingly, relationship-based coop-
erative banks display significantly better capitalization levels (9.579% on average)
than consolidated cooperative banks (9.347%). In turn, the mean proportions of
Net loans and Liquid assets in banks’ total assets are, respectively, 58.204% and
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16.110%; the former is slightly more volatile (18.682%) than the latter (14.189%).
On average, cooperative banks hold a higher share of loans (59.330%) than non-
cooperatives’ (56.966%), as do consolidated cooperative banks (67.003%) compared
with relationship-based cooperative banks (58.690%). Regarding the mean levels of
liquid assets in the euro area, non-cooperative banks outperform (17.396% of total
assets) cooperative banks (14.941%) between 2010 and 2019, while consolidated co-
operative banks (16.352% of total assets) outperform relationship-based cooperative
banks (14.823%).
We next collect from Eurostat the yearly averages of the euro interbank of-
fered rates at which 1-month (EURIBOR-1M ) and 6-month (EURIBOR-6M ) term
deposits are offered by prime banks to one another. We also collect the annual
percentage changes in countries’ real gross domestic product (Real GDP) compared
with the previous year. Thompson Reuters Eikon provide the data on the spreads
(i.e., slopes of the yield curve) between central governments’ bond yield in the sec-
ondary market with 10 years’ residual maturity as well as the 3-month (Spread:10Y-
3M ) and 6-month (Spread:10Y-6M ) implied sovereign bond yields. The averages
of EURIBOR-1M, EURIBOR-6M, Spread:10Y-3M, Spread:10Y-6M, and Real GDP
are 0.114%, 0.371%, 1.537%, 1.383%, and 1.537%, respectively. Understandably,
monetary policy indexes based on spreads over longer periods display higher stan-
dard deviations (1.124% for Spread:10Y-3M vs. 1.003% for Spread:10Y-6M ). In
turn, Real GDP varies considerably across the observations, with a low of -4.100%
and a high of 4.900% over the full sample period and a standard deviation of 1.488%.
To explore the different impacts of monetary policy on bank credit risk and prof-
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itability by ownership structure, a bank is classified as a cooperative if it displays a
cooperative ownership structure as defined by EACB (2020a) and a non-cooperative
otherwise. Specifically, cooperative banks are owned by their customers, follow the
cooperative principle of “one person, one vote” and require their members to control
both the governance systems and capital of their cooperatives. In addition, we ex-
amine the different impacts of monetary policy on bank credit risk and profitability
depending on banks’ commitment to relationship lending (Agarwal et al., 2018) by
distinguishing consolidated cooperative banks from relationship-based cooperative
banks (Groeneveld, 2017). As described in Table A2, a cooperative bank is con-
sidered to be relationship-based (i.e., have wider geographic coverage and closer
customer relationships) if the number of clients per branch is below the 2019 me-
dian value (i.e., 3413 clients per branch) computed on the basis of EACB (2020b)
data11.
Branches’ centralization strategies used to reduce a bank’s territorial coverage
are usually based on medium-term decisions and require time to be implemented
(the closure of local branches and internal restructuring do not happen overnight).
Accordingly, we assume that our sample period is sufficiently short to consider which
centralization strategies observed in 2019 (i.e., the year in which the most recent
data are available from the European Association of Co-operative Banks) have been
relatively steady for each cooperative group in the sample since 2010. Therefore,
the categorizations of cooperative banks in 2019 are considered to represent their
11These data are elaborated by Tilburg University and based on inputs of the members of
the European Association of Co-operative Banks. The list of full members is available from
http://www.eacb.coop/en/about/membership/full-members.html.
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strategic decisions taken in 2010.
For brevity, we use LLP, Z-score, ROAA, NIM, PTP, -CTI, Size, Equity, Net
loans, Liquid assets, EURIBOR-1M, EURIBOR-6M, Spread:10Y-3M, Spread:10Y-
6M, and Real GDP to refer to the loan loss provision to gross loans ratio, natural
logarithm of the Z-score index, return on average assets ratio, net interest margin,
pretax profit to total assets ratio, cost to income ratio, natural logarithm of total
assets, ratio of equity to total assets, ratio of net loans to total assets, ratio of
liquid assets to total assets, benchmark rate at which euro interbank 1-month term
deposits are offered, benchmark rate at which euro interbank 6-month term deposits
are offered, difference between 10-year government bond yields and 3-month implied
sovereign bond yields, difference between 10-year government bond yields and 6-
month implied sovereign bond yields, and annual percentage change in a country’s
real GDP from the previous year, respectively.
4.5 Main findings
To test the effects of expansionary monetary policy on bank credit risk and prof-
itability depending on whether banks display a cooperative ownership structure
and, if so, whether they are committed to relationship lending, we estimate System
4.1. In the credit risk equation, we regress the loan loss provision ratio on prof-
itability, the monetary policy index, and a set of determinants commonly used in
the literature. We use four indicators of bank profitability: ROAA, NIM, PTP, and
-CTI. In the profitability equation, we regress one by one our four proxies of bank
profitability on the credit risk indicator, the measure of monetary policy, and a
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set of explanatory variables outlined in the literature. The presumably endogenous
bank-level indicators are instrumented by their one-year lagged value. Regarding
our two variables of interest (i.e., credit risk and profitability), which are not lagged,
we address the endogeneity issue by estimating a dynamic simultaneous equations
system using GMM techniques.
4.5.1 The effects of a interest rates on credit risk & prof-
itability: preliminary results
We first examine the effect of a interest rates on credit risk and profitability for the
full sample. Table 4.4 reports the GMM dynamic panel regression results from Sys-
tem 4.1. The significant and negative signs of both EURIBOR-1M and EURIBOR-
6M in the credit risk equation confirm the presence of a risk-taking channel of mon-
etary policy (Altunbas et al., 2014) in the euro area between 2010 and 2019. Here,
the risk-taking channel is slightly more intense when based on the medium-term
EURIBOR-6M rate than on theEURIBOR-1M rate.
The ROAA and PTP ratios are both significantly and negatively related to credit
risk, while the opposite occurs for NIM and -CTI (this result is also confirmed in the
simultaneous profitability equation). Therefore, obtaining extra (interest) income
implies taking more credit risk when monetary policy is eased; this result is a direct
consequence of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission (Neuenkirch
and Nöckel, 2018). Moreover, the negative and significant signs of the Real GDP
Chapter 4 Bruno De Menna
4.5. Main findings 163
Table 4.4: Credit risk & profitability in a low interest rate environment (2010-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Credit risk equation
LLP lagged 0.563*** 0.561*** 0.558*** 0.550*** 0.563*** 0.561 *** 0.559*** 0.550***









Size -0.002 0.007** -0.003 -0.011*** -0.002 0.007** -0.003 -0.011***
(-0.830) (2.291) (-1.109) (-4.114) (-0.880) (2.379) (-1.154) (-4.180)
Net loans -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(-4.014) (-5.221) (-3.893) (-5.184) (-3.992) (-5.299) (-3.870) (-5.171)
EURIBOR-1M -0.021** -0.027*** -0.017** -0.032***
(-2.575) (-3.072) (-2.037) (-3.784)
EURIBOR-6M -0.027*** -0.033*** -0.024*** -0.036***
(-4.392) (-4.927) (-3.767) (-5.579)
Real GDP -0.132*** -0.134*** -0.130*** -0.132*** -0.133*** -0.135*** -0.130*** -0.132***
(-37.468) (-37.250) (-37.199) (-37.006) (-37.227) (-37.111) (-36.950) (-36.876)
Profitability equation
ROAA lagged 0.695** 0.695***
(57.994) (57.974)
NIM lagged 0.896*** 0.898***
(199.297) (200.791)
PTP lagged 0.710*** 0.710***
(61.656) (61.686)
-CTI lagged 0.771*** 0.771***
(100.513) (100.336)
LLP -0.052*** 0.012*** -0.076*** 0.898*** -0.053*** 0.012*** -0.078*** 0.921***
(-12.245) (3.401) (-14.441) (-9.108) (-12.082) (3.496) (-14.167) (-9.135)
Equity 0.008*** 0.000 0.009*** -0.015 0.008*** 0.000 0.009*** -0.016
(10.557) (0.699) (10.146) (1.076) (10.551) (0.566) (10.129) (1.187)
Liquid assets 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.042*** 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.042***
(1.391) (-4.887) (-1.013) (7.685) (1.408) (-4.689) (-0.992) (7.570)
Spread:10Y-3M 0.010*** 0.027*** 0.012*** 0.664***
(3.777) (11.825) (3.826) (-9.821)
Spread:10Y-6M 0.014*** 0.023 *** 0.016*** 0.559***
(4.141) (8.864) (3.865) (-7.010)
Real GDP 0.004** 0.015*** 0.008*** 0.064 0.005*** 0.012*** 0.009*** -0.017
(2.167) (9.278) (3.836) (-1.351) (2.692) (7.644) (4.151) (0.365)
Observations 26,146 26,146 26,146 26,146 26,146 26,146 26,146 26,146
Banks 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998 3,998
Notes. This table reports the results of estimating dynamic simultaneous equations System 4.1 using two-step GMM
for an unbalanced panel of European Retail & Consumer, Universal Commercial and Wholesale Commercial banks.
Our base sample includes 3 998 banks from 10 countries over the period 2010-2019. Unconsolidated bank-level balance
sheets and income statements are reported by Fitch Connect and winsorized at the 5% level. Country-level data are
gathered from Eurostat and Thompson Reuters Eikon. See Table 1 for the definition of all explanatory variables, and
Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics and correlations. Estimations include one credit risk index (LLP in regressions
(1) to (8)), four profitability indicators (ROAA in regressions (1) and (5), NIM in regressions (2) and (6), PTP in
regressions (3) and (7), and -CTI in regressions (4) and (8)), and four monetary policy measures (EURIBOR-1M
and Spread:10Y-3M in regressions (1) to (4), and EURIBOR-6M and Spread:10Y-6M in regressions (5) to (8)).
In both the credit risk and the profitability equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably
endogenous in the existing literature are instrumented by their one-year lagged value. Time fixed effects are included
in all regressions. P -values are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks, and
z -statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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coefficients show that bank credit risk rises in economic downturns. Although the
Size coefficients are contradictory depending on the profitability proxy used as the
explanatory variable in the credit risk equation, a higher share of Net loans in a
bank’s assets seems to limit credit risk.
Focusing on the determinants of profitability, we observe a positively significant
relationship between our interest rate proxies and profitability, confirming Borio
et al. (2017)’s results on the positive link between short-term rates and bank prof-
itability, which tends to erode as a low interest rate environment extends over time.
Conversely, the increase in the spread between 10-year government bond yields and
the euro interbank deposits rate is associated with better profitability. We also note
the stronger dependence of -CTI on the monetary stance (with a significant coef-
ficient of 0.664 for Spread:10Y-3M and 0.559 for Spread:10Y-6M ) than the other
profitability proxies. When significant, the level of capitalization (Equity) and busi-
ness cycle (Real GDP) both improve bank profitability. A higher share of Liquid
assets in total assets is achieved at the expense of lower bank profitability (see the
negative coefficients, when significant).
4.5.2 The effects of interest rates on credit risk & profitabil-
ity: cooperative & non-cooperative banks
We delve deeper into the influence of monetary policy on bank credit risk and
profitability by separating cooperative banks from non-cooperative banks. The
regression results are presented in Table 4.5 for cooperative banks and Table 4.6 for
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Table 4.5: Cooperative banks’ credit risk & profitability in a low interest rate
environment (2010-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Credit risk equation
LLP lagged 0.537*** 0.578*** 0.507*** 0.548*** 0.539*** 0.580*** 0.510*** 0.550***









Size 0.013*** 0.024*** 0.016*** -0.011*** 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.016*** -0.011***
(4.251) (7.398) (5.051) (-2.921) (4.097) (7.682) (4.914) (-3.096)
Net loans -0.001* -0.001** -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001*
(-1.898) (-2.244) (-1.970) (-1.861) (-1.764) (-2.152) (-1.848) (-1.714)
EURIBOR-1M 0.031*** 0.011 0.061*** 0.010
(3.082) (0.987) (5.873) (0.918)
EURIBOR-6M 0.006 -0.014 0.031*** -0.011
(0.749) (-1.580) (3.867) (-1.336)
Real GDP -0.130*** -0.130*** -0.122*** -0.122*** -0.129*** -0.130*** -0.122*** -0.122***
(-31.231) (-30.239) (-29.046) (-29.134) (-30.751) (-29.788) (-28.505) (-28.776)
Profitability equation
ROAA lagged 0.576*** 0.575***
(35.877) (35.872)
NIM lagged 0.886*** 0.890***
(204.913) (209.013)
PTP lagged 0.581*** 0.583***
(38.485) (38.703)
-CTI lagged 0.708*** 0.706***
(63.681) (63.550)
LLP -0.091*** -0.004 -0.133*** 1.555*** -0.098*** -0.006 -0.138*** 1.596***
(-20.097) (-1.335) (-23.342) (-10.502) (-20.537) (-1.619) (-23.444) (-10.354)
Equity 0.009*** 0.002** 0.010*** 0.071*** 0.009*** 0.002** 0.010*** 0.073***
(8.360) (2.257) (8.029) (-2.844) (8.102) (1.997) (7.754) (-2.920)
Liquid assets 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.068*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000 -0.068***
(5.083) (-5.192) (-0.413) (9.928) (4.988) (-4.942) (-0.480) (9.944)
Spread:10Y-3M 0.020*** 0.037*** 0.023*** 0.603***
(7.759) (14.762) (7.358) (-6.945)
Spread:10Y-6M 0.032*** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.450***
(10.159) (11.907) (8.723) (-4.340)
Real GDP -0.002 0.015*** 0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.011*** 0.005** -0.115**
(-0.907) (8.366) (1.519) (0.067) (0.740) (6.417) (2.357) (2.090)
Observations 13,701 13,701 13,701 13,701 13,701 13,701 13,701 13,701
Banks 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136 2,136
Notes. This table reports the results of estimating dynamic simultaneous equations System 4.1 using two-step GMM
for an unbalanced panel of European Retail & Consumer, Universal Commercial and Wholesale Commercial banks
displaying a cooperative ownership structure. Our base sample includes 2 136 banks from 10 countries over the
period 2010-2019. Unconsolidated bank-level balance sheets and income statements are reported by Fitch Connect
and winsorized at the 5% level. Country-level data are gathered from Eurostat and Thompson Reuters Eikon. See
Table 4.1 for the definition of all explanatory variables, and Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics and correlations.
Estimations include one credit risk index (LLP in regressions (1) to (8)), four profitability indicators (ROAA in
regressions (1) and (5), NIM in regressions (2) and (6), PTP in regressions (3) and (7), and -CTI in regressions
(4) and (8)), and four monetary policy measures (EURIBOR-1M and Spread:10Y-3M in regressions (1) to (4), and
EURIBOR-6M and Spread:10Y-6M in regressions (5) to (8)). In both the credit risk and the profitability equations,
all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are instrumented
by their one-year lagged value. Time fixed effects are included in all regressions. P -values are computed using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks, and z -statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.6: Non-cooperative banks’ credit risk & profitability in a low interest rate
environment (2010-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Credit risk equation
LLP lagged 0.546*** 0.541*** 0.546*** 0.538*** 0.545*** 0.540*** 0.545*** 0.538***









Size -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.029*** -0.022*** -0.015*** -0.023*** -0.029***
(-4.370) (-2.888) (-4.654) (-5.682) (-4.378) (-2.884) (-4.661) (-5.693)
Net loans -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002***
(-2.893) (-4.404) (-2.914) (-3.852) (-2.908) (-4.440) (-2.929) (-3.870)
EURIBOR-1M -0.066*** -0.073*** -0.067*** -0.077***
(-5.231) (-5.531) (-5.293) (-5.879)
EURIBOR-6M -0.054*** -0.061*** -0.055*** -0.063***
(-5.659) (-6.006) (-5.724) (-6.341)
Real GDP -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.138*** -0.140*** -0.140*** -0.142*** -0.139*** -0.141***
(-24.600) (-24.515) (-24.633) (-24.444) (-24.625) (-24.606) (-24.657) (-24.546)
Profitability equation
ROAA lagged 0.723*** 0.723***
(50.992) (50.997)
NIM lagged 0.898*** 0.898***
(136.651) (136.970)
PTP lagged 0.740*** 0.740***
(55.019) (55.039)
-CTI lagged 0.798*** 0.799***
(80.259) (80.407)
LLP -0.027*** 0.025*** -0.044*** 0.515*** -0.028*** 0.026*** -0.045*** 0.534***
(-4.262) (4.526) (-5.633) (-3.847) (-4.306) (4.641) (-5.676) (-3.970)
Equity 0.007*** -0.000 0.008*** -0.024 0.007*** -0.000 0.008*** -0.025*
(8.508) (-0.116) (8.104) (1.564) (8.532) (-0.210) (8.122) (1.675)
Liquid assets -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001* -0.030*** -0.000 -0.001*** -0.001* -0.029***
(-0.785) (-3.630) (-1.868) (4.161) (-0.783) (-3.545) (-1.869) (4.068)
Spread:10Y-3M 0.005 0.017*** 0.007 0.522***
(1.129) (4.797) (1.210) (-5.158)
Spread:10Y-6M 0.007 0.015*** 0.010 0.452***
(1.446) (3.728) (1.577) (-4.003)
Real GDP 0.010*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.179** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.137*
(3.348) (6.259) (3.613) (-2.248) (3.642) (5.736) (3.922) (-1.715)
Observations 12,445 12,445 12,445 12,445 12,445 12,445 12,445 12,445
Banks 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862 1,862
Notes. This table reports the results of estimating dynamic simultaneous equations System 4.1 using two-step GMM
for an unbalanced panel of European Retail & Consumer, Universal Commercial and Wholesale Commercial banks
displaying a non-cooperative ownership structure. Our base sample includes 1 862 banks from 10 countries over the
period 2010-2019. Unconsolidated bank-level balance sheets and income statements are reported by Fitch Connect
and winsorized at the 5% level. Country-level data are gathered from Eurostat and Thompson Reuters Eikon. See
Table 4.1 for the definition of all explanatory variables, and Table 4.2 for descriptive statistics and correlations.
Estimations include one credit risk index (LLP in regressions (1) to (8)), four profitability indicators (ROAA in
regressions (1) and (5), NIM in regressions (2) and (6), PTP in regressions (3) and (7), and -CTI in regressions
(4) and (8)), and four monetary policy measures (EURIBOR-1M and Spread:10Y-3M in regressions (1) to (4), and
EURIBOR-6M and Spread:10Y-6M in regressions (5) to (8)). In both the credit risk and the profitability equations,
all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing literature are instrumented
by their one-year lagged value. Time fixed effects are included in all regressions. P -values are computed using
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks, and z -statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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non-cooperative banks.
First, we show that variations in ROAA do not significantly affect non-cooperative
banks’ credit risk12 as opposed to cooperative banks. This might be explained by
the greater business diversification of non-cooperative banks resulting in a weaker
relation between return on assets and credit risk. As cooperative banks are more
involved in traditional financial intermediation13, they often access fewer diversifica-
tion opportunities, which exacerbates the link between return on assets and credit
risk, as shown in regressions (1) and (5) in Table 4.5.
Second, the Size variable seems to affect credit risk differently depending on the
ownership structure of banks. In particular, cooperative banks’ size appears to be
positively related to credit risk (except when the cost to income ratio gauges prof-
itability in the credit risk equation; see regressions (4) and (8) in Table 4.5), which
suggests that cooperative ownership and asset growth ultimately increase credit
risk. By contrast, the regression results in Table 4.6 show the significantly nega-
tive relation between non-cooperative banks’ size and credit risk. Accordingly, the
greater non-cooperative banks’ assets, the better is their credit risk management.
Third, the signs of the monetary policy coefficients in the credit risk equa-
tion conflict with one another when distinguishing between cooperative and non-
cooperative banks. Confirming the results for the full sample presented in Table 4.4,
non-cooperative banks continue to display significantly negative EURIBOR-1M and
EURIBOR-6M coefficients, consistent with the risk-taking channel in the 2010–2019
12However, the significance of the -0.029 ROAA coefficient in regression (1) from the credit risk
equation in Table 4.6 is at the 12.8% level.
13See the significantly different means in net interest margins between cooperative and non-
cooperative banks in Table 4.3.
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euro area banking industry previously identified. However, the non-significance of
the EURIBOR-1M and EURIBOR-6M coefficients in regressions (2), (4), (5), (6),
and (8) from the credit risk equation in Table 4.5 supports, at least at the bank
level, Caselli et al. (2020)’s insights into the capacity of bank ownership diversity
to buffer the impact of exogenous monetary policy shocks on credit risk.
Fourth, the positive and significant EURIBOR-1M and EURIBOR-6M coeffi-
cients in regressions (1), (3), and (7) in Table 4.5 suggest that cooperative banks’
credit risk decreases in a low interest rate environment compared with their non-
cooperative counterparts14. This result provides, at least partially, empirical confir-
mation of Hypothesis 1, which claims that cooperative banks are less exposed to the
risk-taking channel of monetary policy than non-cooperative banks thanks to the
specificities of their business model. What matters now is to determine whether this
result persists equally for consolidated and relationship-based cooperative banks.
Differentiating cooperative banks from non-cooperative banks does not alter
the sign of the monetary policy indexes Spread:10Y-3M and Spread:10Y-6M in
the profitability equation. However, greater significance levels in the interest rate
coefficients of cooperative banks are noted, which confirms their higher sensitivity to
monetary policy. Consequently, cooperative banks’ profitability might be relatively
more exposed when interest rates remain at historical lows for a long time.
14This is supported by the summary statistics in Table 4.3, which show that cooperative banks’
mean LLP is significantly different (and in this case, lower) than that of non-cooperative banks.
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4.5.3 The effects of a interest rates on credit risk & prof-
itability: consolidated & relationship-based coopera-
tive banks
We now examine in detail the credit risk and profitability of cooperative banks that,
despite the pressure exerted by low interest rates on their balance sheets, preserve
a relationship-based network of local branches to maintain their commitment to
relationship lending (McKillop et al., 2020). The regression results are presented in
Table 4.7 for consolidated cooperative banks and Table 4.8 for relationship-based
cooperative banks.
First, the differences in the Size coefficient signs between consolidated coop-
erative and relationship-based cooperative banks suggest that a cooperative bank
increasing its business volume—in terms of assets—while remaining committed to
relationship lending is more prone to credit risk (as suggested by the significantly
positive Size coefficients in Table 4.8). By contrast, the greater the size of con-
solidated cooperative banks’ assets, the better is their credit risk management (as
suggested by the significantly negative Size coefficients in Table 4.7).
Second, the dependence of credit risk on the volume of net loans appears to
be lower for relationship-based cooperative banks, as shown by the differences in
the significance level of the Net loans variables from one group to another. When
consolidated, cooperative banks granting more loans perform better in terms of
credit risk, which could mean that a positive volume effect is operating15.
15On average, consolidated cooperative banks display a significantly higher net loans to assets
ratio than non-consolidated cooperative banks over the full sample period (see Table 4.3).
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Table 4.7: Consolidated cooperative banks’ credit risk & profitability in a low in-
terest rate environment (2010-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit risk equation
LLP lagged 0.343*** 0.346*** 0.335*** 0.337*** 0.337*** 0.327***







Size -0.013 -0.034* -0.105*** -0.016 -0.035* -0.107***
(-0.870) (-1.807) (-5.317) (-1.023) (-1.822) (-5.390)
Net loans -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001 -0.005*** -0.005***
(-0.550) (-4.161) (-2.725) (-0.567) (-4.177) (-2.707)
EURIBOR-1M 0.261*** 0.285*** 0.263***
(6.403) (6.146) (6.264)
EURIBOR-6M 0.198*** 0.221*** 0.205***
(6.167) (6.121) (6.204)
RealGDP 0.076*** 0.083*** 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.091*** 0.095***
(2.932) (2.729) (2.936) (3.157) (2.945) (3.143)
Profitability equation
ROAA lagged 0.550*** 0.547***
(11.931) (11.754)
NIM lagged 0.882*** 0.882***
(46.883) (46.657)
-CTI lagged 0.837*** 0.832***
(25.165) (24.083)
LLP -0.174*** 0.087*** 2.105*** -0.174*** 0.087*** 2.028***
(-10.217) (5.183) (3.645) (-10.254) (5.148) (3.648)
Equity 0.012*** 0.004** 0.223*** 0.012*** 0.004** 0.224***
(3.332) (2.358) (2.718) (3.330) (2.385) (2.742)
Liquid assets -0.002** -0.000 0.014 -0.002** -0.000 0.012
(-2.117) (-0.562) (0.614) (-2.137) (-0.551) (0.525)
Spread:10Y-3M 0.012 -0.005 0.138
(1.269) (-0.585) (0.424)
Spread:10Y-6M 0.015 -0.006 0.499
(1.519) (-0.795) (1.421)
Real GDP -0.029*** -0.016** -0.077 -0.029*** -0.017** -0.020
(-3.577) (-2.026) (-0.298) (-3.525) (-2.029) (-0.079)
Observations 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,071
Banks 151 151 151 151 151 151
Notes. This table reports the results of estimating dynamic simultaneous equations System 4.1 using two-
step GMM for an unbalanced panel of European Retail & Consumer, Universal Commercial and Wholesale
Commercial banks displaying a cooperative ownership structure with a number of clients per branch above
the full sample median in 2019 (see Table A2 and EACB (2020a)). Our base sample includes 151 banks from
5 countries over the period 2010-2019. Unconsolidated bank-level balance sheets and income statements are
reported by Fitch Connect and winsorized at the 5% level. Country-level data are gathered from Eurostat
and Thompson Reuters Eikon. See Table 1 for the definition of all explanatory variables, and Table 4.2 for
descriptive statistics and correlations. Estimations include one credit risk index (LLP in regressions (1) to (6)),
three profitability indicators (ROAA in regressions (1) and (4), NIM in regressions (2) and (5), and -CTI in
regressions (3) and (6)), and four monetary policy measures (EURIBOR-1M and Spread:10Y-3M in regressions
(1) to (3), and EURIBOR-6M and Spread:10Y-6M in regressions (4) to (6)). In both the credit risk and the
profitability equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing
literature are instrumented by their one-year lagged value. Time fixed effects are included in all regressions.
P -values are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks, and z -statistics are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4.8: Relationship-based cooperative banks’ credit risk & profitability in a low
interest rate environment (2010-2019)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Credit risk equation
LLP lagged 0.543*** 0.579*** 0.546*** 0.545*** 0.581*** 0.548***







Size 0.016*** 0.038*** 0.004 0.016*** 0.039*** 0.003
(3.863) (9.267) (0.866) (3.749) (9.418) (0.722)
Net loans -0.001* -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(-1.744) (-1.234) (-1.077) (-1.610) (-1.137) (-0.928)
EURIBOR-1M 0.008 -0.014 -0.019*
(0.820) (-1.179) (-1.837)
EURIBOR-6M -0.012 -0.035*** -0.034***
(-1.564) (-3.937) (-4.302)
Real GDP -0.136*** -0.136*** -0.128*** -0.136*** -0.137*** -0.129***
(-32.423) (-31.744) (-30.451) (-32.076) (-31.432) (-30.281)
Profitability equation
ROAA lagged 0.571*** 0.571***
(33.591) (33.645)
NIM lagged 0.873*** 0.877***
(179.529) (184.538)
-CTI lagged 0.695*** 0.693***
(58.170) (57.930)
LLP -0.086*** -0.010*** 1.590*** -0.093*** -0.013*** 1.650***
(-18.732) (-2.929) (10.154) (-19.219) (-3.553) (10.012)
Equity 0.009*** 0.002** 0.050* 0.009*** 0.002** 0.053**
(7.935) (2.338) (1.887) (7.608) (2.021) (2.011)
Liquid assets 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.073*** 0.001*** -0.001*** -0.073***
(6.096) (-6.254) (-10.178) (6.003) (-6.012) (-10.186)
Spread:10Y-3M 0.020*** 0.042*** 0.592***
(7.855) (15.611) (6.500)
Spread:10Y-6M 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.388***
(9.909) (13.148) (3.459)
Real GDP 0.001 0.017*** -0.012 0.003* 0.013*** -0.144**
(0.282) (8.923) (-0.213) (1.832) (7.336) (-2.549)
Observations 12,630 12,630 12,630 12,630 12,630 12,630
Banks 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985 1,985
Notes. This table reports the results of estimating dynamic simultaneous equations System 4.1 using two-
step GMM for an unbalanced panel of European Retail & Consumer, Universal Commercial and Wholesale
Commercial banks displaying a cooperative ownership structure with a number of clients per branch below the
full sample median in 2019 (see Table A2 and EACB (2020a)). Our base sample includes 1 985 banks from
7 countries over the period 2010-2019. Unconsolidated bank-level balance sheets and income statements are
reported by Fitch Connect and winsorized at the 5% level. Country-level data are gathered from Eurostat
and Thompson Reuters Eikon. See Table 4.1 for the definition of all explanatory variables, and Table 2 for
descriptive statistics and correlations. Estimations include one credit risk index (LLP in regressions (1) to (6)),
three profitability indicators (ROAA in regressions (1) and (4), NIM in regressions (2) and (5), and -CTI in
regressions (3) and (6)), and four monetary policy measures (EURIBOR-1M and Spread:10Y-3M in regressions
(1) to (3), and EURIBOR-6M and Spread:10Y-6M in regressions (4) to (6)). In both the credit risk and the
profitability equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are presumably endogenous in the existing
literature are instrumented by their one-year lagged value. Time fixed effects are included in all regressions.
P -values are computed using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks, and z -statistics are
reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Third, unlike previous results, the credit risk of consolidated cooperative banks
is positively correlated with the business cycle variable, Real GDP (see Table 4.7)
in stark contrast to relationship-based cooperative banks that show countercyclical
credit risk (see the significantly negative Real GDP coefficients in Table 4.8). How-
ever, such a finding is in line with Beck et al. (2018) emphasizing that a greater
presence of relationship banks is associated with fewer credit constraints during
cyclical downturns, which is particularly beneficial for smaller, younger, and more
opaque firms when recession hits. Conversely, this easing effect mainly benefits safe
firms in times of economic booms and is positively associated with firm investment
and growth. As a result, relationship banks can smooth the negative impact of
cyclical downturns after having acquired sufficient information on borrowers during
good times.
Fourth, the Spread:10Y-3M and Spread:10Y-6M variables in the profitability
equation display higher significance levels in the relationship-based cooperative
banks subsample. Accordingly, cooperative banks committed to relationship lend-
ing are concerned by higher profitability dependence on monetary policy in a low
interest rate environment. This result confirms, for relationship-based cooperative
banks, Borio et al. (2017)’s evidence of the link between short-term rates and the
slope of the yield curve; this effect is even stronger when the slope is steeper and
bank size smaller (Genay, 2014). Therefore, we provide empirical support to Hy-
pothesis 2, which proposed that the profitability of cooperative banks preserving
their relationship lending model is more severely hit by a low interest rate environ-
ment than that of cooperative banks opting for consolidation.
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Finally, consolidated cooperative banks display a great capacity to buffer the
impact of exogenous monetary policy shocks on credit risk. This interpretation
is led by the highly significant and positive EURIBOR-1M and EURIBOR-6M
coefficients in Table 4.716. However, the ability of relationship-based cooperative
banks to reduce their exposure to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy when
interest rates are low differs in reality. When significant, the EURIBOR-1M and
EURIBOR-6M coefficients turn negative, as shown in regressions (3), (5), and (6)
in Table 4.8. Unlike consolidated cooperative banks, cooperative banks committed
to relationship lending actually increase their willingness to raise credit risk in a
low interest rate environment. Hence, we confirm Hypothesis 3 that proposed that
cooperative banks preserving their relationship lending model in a low interest rate
environment are prone to assume greater credit risk than cooperative banks opting
for consolidation.
Although this result is similar to the estimations for non-cooperative banks (see
Table 4.6), we posit that such a similarity is not explained by the same reasons,
mainly because non-cooperative banks and relationship-based cooperative banks
organize their business models and engage with customers in a different way. This
important difference is consistent with the contribution of Jiménez and Saurina
(2004) on the role of the bank–customer relationship in credit risk as well as supports
Peltoniemi (2007)’s view on (long-term) bank–firm relationships being beneficial
to high-risk firms. The present study, however, is the first—to the best of our
16Such an ability is even stronger for consolidated cooperative banks than cooperative banks
more broadly (compare with the coefficients in Table 4.5).
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knowledge—to find such results for the cooperative banking industry in the euro
area by singling out consolidated cooperatives and relationship-based cooperatives.
4.5.4 Robustness checks
To further address the assumption that interest rate changes are exogenous to credit
risk (i.e., that monetary policy does not respond to the riskiness of newly issued
loans), we undertake additional robustness checks. Table 4.9 presents the results.
First, endogeneity is likely to be more of a concern for nationwide banks whose
loan portfolios reflect economic activity across the country than it is for small, local
banks primarily affected by local shocks (Dell’Ariccia et al., 2017). Therefore, we re-
estimate System 4.1 excluding large banks from the sample17 for which endogeneity
is more of a concern. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 4.9 report the results. We find
similarly significant coefficients to our preliminary results in Table 4.4. In particular,
the negative coefficients of the EURIBOR-1M and EURIBOR-6M variables and
positive coefficients of Spread:10Y-3M and Spread:10Y-6M are similar to those
obtained in the full sample. This suggests that our results are not contaminated by
the inclusion of large banks.
Moreover, our results might also be driven by the business cycle, as credit risk
might adjust endogenously with the state of the economy. We thus control for direct
changes in the economic activity in regressions (3) and (4) by including a Recession
dummy18 and its interaction with the monetary policy proxies (in both the credit
17That is, banks with assets in the top quartile of the full sample.
18The dummy variable equals 1 when the Real GDP variable is negative and 0 otherwise.
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Table 4.9: Credit risk & profitability in a low interest rate environment (2010-2019):
robustness checks
Without large banks Impact of business cycles -Zscore as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Credit risk and overall risk equations
LLP lagged 0.546*** 0.547*** 0.559*** 0.552***
(47.057) (48.713) (51.609) (54.821)
-Zscore lagged 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001*** 1.001***
(1678.206) (1678.664) (1654.162) (1653.980)
ROAA -0.171***
(-8.076)




-CTI 0.007*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(-14.945) (9.055) (9.016)
Size -0.008 0.004 -0.005* -0.013*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(-1.471) (0.810) (-1.957) (-4.825) (-8.146) (-8.059) (-2.708) (-2.733)
Net loans -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(-4.976) (-5.347) (-2.989) (-4.155) (5.572) (5.500) (4.390) (4.382)
EURIBOR-1M -0.068*** -0.018*** -0.020***
(-7.737) (-8.082) (-9.556)
EURIBOR-6M -0.024*** -0.028*** -0.073*** -0.016*** -0.017***
(-3.151) (-3.268) (-10.765) (-9.137) (-10.780)
RealGDP -0.134*** -0.135*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(-31.683) (-31.428) (-10.346) (-10.762) (-10.865) (-11.304)
Recession 0.695*** 0.660***
(26.604) (18.458)
EURIBOR-1M * Recession -0.247***
(-4.334)









-CTI lagged 0.771*** 0.774*** 0.773***
(100.102) (102.889) (102.357)
LLP -0.058*** 0.004 -0.078*** 0.887***
(-11.710) (0.989) (-14.712) (-8.865)
-Zscore -0.001 -0.001 -0.039 -0.039
(-0.993) (-0.915) (1.630) (1.602)
Equity 0.008*** -0.001 0.009*** -0.015
(9.111) (-1.010) (10.163) (1.068)
Liquid assets 0.000 -0.001*** -0.000 -0.041*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.046*** -0.046***
(0.774) (-4.553) (-1.286) (7.496) (-4.854) (-4.659) (8.555) (8.435)
Spread:10Y-3M 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.910***
(7.046) (14.763) (-13.770)
Spread:10Y-6M 0.019*** 0.034*** 0.337*** 0.028*** 0.891***
(4.472) (9.965) (-4.010) (12.209) (-11.497)
Real GDP 0.003 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.018 -0.045
(1.357) (6.942) (9.234) (7.623) (-0.373) (0.942)
Recession 0.131*** 4.351***
(2.605) (-4.217)
Spread:10Y-3M * Recession -0.054***
(-4.408)
Spread:10Y-6M * Recession -0.647**
(2.179)
Observations 19,432 19,432 26,146 26,146 25,983 25,983 25,983 25,983
Banks 3,196 3,196 3,998 3,998 3,941 3,941 3,941 3,941
Notes. This table reports the results of estimating dynamic simultaneous equations System 4.1 using two-step GMM for an unbalanced panel of European
Retail & Consumer, Universal Commercial and Wholesale Commercial banks. Our base sample includes 3 998 banks from 10 countries over the period
2010-2019. Unconsolidated bank-level balance sheets and income statements are reported by Fitch Connect and winsorized at the 5% level. Country-level
data are gathered from Eurostat and Thompson Reuters Eikon. See Table 1 for the definition of all explanatory variables, and Table 2 for descriptive
statistics and correlations. Estimations include one credit risk index (LLP in regressions (1) to (4)), one measure of banks’ overall risk (Zscore in regressions
(5) to (8)), four profitability indicators (ROAA in regression (1), NIM in regressions (2), (5) and (6), PTP in regression (3), and -CTI in regressions (4), (7)
and (8)), and four monetary policy measures (EURIBOR-1M and Spread:10Y-3M in regressions (3), (5) and (7), and EURIBOR-6M and Spread:10Y-6M
in regressions (1), (2), (4), (6) and (8)). In the credit risk, the overall risk and the profitability equations, all bank-level explanatory variables which are
presumably endogenous in the existing literature are instrumented by their one-year lagged value. Without large banks subsample in regressions (1) and
(2) refers to banks for which Size variable is below the full sample top quartile. Time fixed effects are included in all regressions. P -values are computed
using heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered for banks, and z -statistics are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** indicate significance at the
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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risk and the profitability equations). Again, we continue to obtain the same sig-
nificant signs on the link between monetary policy and both bank credit risk and
profitability.
We rerun our estimations using another indicator of bank risk commonly used
in the literature (Ramayandi et al., 2014), namely, the Z-score (see Table 4.1 and
Equation 2 for the methodological approach to build the index). As stressed by
Khan et al. (2017), model specifications using the Z-score as the dependent variable
should not include ROAA or Equity as controls because the Z-score index is a
function of these two indicators. As such, there is a significant risk of obtaining
misleading results. Therefore, regressions (5) to (8) do not use the ROAA variable
in the overall risk equation or the Equity variable in the profitability equation. In
addition, as noted earlier, because reductions in the Z-score imply higher bank risk,
whereas increases in LLP convert to higher credit risk, we multiply the values of
banks’ Z-scores by -1 to facilitate a more consistent interpretation. Once again, our
results on the influence of interest rate variations on credit risk and profitability
remain unchanged.
Together with the fixed effects and GMM estimation techniques, those robust-
ness checks confirm that our main results hold, alleviating any concerns that the
empirical analysis is contaminated by an endogenous response of monetary policy
to bank credit risk.
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4.6 Conclusion
This study analyzes the effects of monetary easing on bank credit risk and profitabil-
ity in 10 euro area countries between 2010 and 2019. Specifically, we investigate
how such effects depend on bank ownership structures and, for cooperative banks,
how they interact with relationship lending practices. Building on previous studies
indicating that credit risk and profitability are jointly determined, we consider a si-
multaneous equations system to examine how relationship lending implemented by
cooperative banks influences their performance in a low interest rate environment.
The main results are threefold. First, we find no evidence of the presence of a
risk-taking channel of monetary policy for consolidated cooperative banks, whereas
such a channel is extensively shown in the euro area for non-cooperative banks.
Therefore, consolidated cooperative banks do not seem to raise their credit risk sig-
nificantly when monetary policy is eased, distinguishing them from non-cooperative
banking institutions. Second, we highlight that the profitability of cooperative
banks preserving their relationship lending model is more severely hit by a low
interest rate environment than that of cooperative banks opting for consolidation.
This raises issues about the middle-term durability of relationship lending given the
longstanding low interest rates in the European banking industry. Third, we find
that non-cooperative banks and relationship-based cooperative banks are both con-
cerned by the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission, which increases
their credit risk under accommodating monetary policy conditions. Nevertheless,
we suggest that such similarities do not occur for the same reasons because rela-
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tionship lending is associated with a fundamentally different lending process than
transactions-based lending technologies that devote significantly lower proportions
of their assets to lending to small businesses (Berger and Udell, 2002).
Under “low-for-long” interest rates, non-cooperative banks prioritize maintaining
their profitability at the expense of higher credit risk (Kuc and Teply, 2019), whereas
relationship-based cooperative banks increase their capital buffers (on average, the
capitalization of relationship-based cooperative banks is significantly higher than
that of consolidated cooperative banks) to ensure access to credit, including for risky
local businesses. As a close bank–customer relationship produces informational
rents for the cooperative banks involved, such banks exercise some degree of market
power and are better prepared to finance riskier borrowers and projects. While one
might be concerned about the durability of relationship lending when interest rates
are close to the zero lower bound, this insight points to the crucial impact of the
bank–customer relationship on the development of regional and local economies.
Accordingly, the greater the relationship lending strategy of a cooperative bank,
the greater is its willingness to undertake credit risk, which is particularly valuable
to high-risk firms and small businesses, as they are often informationally opaque
and have far fewer external finance alternatives than large companies.
The conclusions presented in this paper suggest that further research on the
impact of the risk-taking channel of monetary policy on relationship-based coop-
erative banks may yield new insights into alternative transmission mechanisms to
the traditional channels already identified in the literature on commercial (i.e.,
non-cooperative) banking. Specifically, comparing customer risk profiles with the
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duration of relationship lending in a low interest rate environment is a promising
path toward better understanding the “local virtues” driven by cooperative banks
committed to relationship lending.
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Appendix A. European cooperative banking: trends
in the total number of clients per branch (2010-2019)
Table A1: European cooperative banking: trends in the total number of clients per
branch (2010-2019)




Österreichische Raiffeisenbanken 2,071 2,142 2,050 2,187 2,268 2,281 2,400 2,486 2,497 2,246 + 8.45%
Österreichischer Volksbanken 1,468 n.a. 1,714 1,758 2,345 2,284 2,935 3,307 3,649 4,017 + 173.64%
Finland
OP Financial Group 7,460 7,781 8,112 9,304 9,395 9,562 9,857 10,811 11,732 11,063 + 48.30%
France
Crédit Agricole n.a. 4,655 3,000 5,385 5,514 4,505 4,727 5,977 6,000 6,190 + 32.98%a
Crédit Mutuel 5,000 n.a. 3,280 5,135 5,681 5,837 5,851 6,124 6,354 6,840 + 36.80%
BPCE n.a. n.a. n.a. 4,781 4,500 4,375 3,900 4,000 4,032 4,032 - 15.67%c
Germany
Cooperative Financial Network - Bundesverband
der Deutschen Volksbanken und Raiffeisenbanken
(Volksbanks, Raiffeisenbanks, Sparda-banks, PSD
banks, and DZ banks)
2,227 2,247 2,270 2,298 2,349 2,529 2,545 2,701 2,852 3,211 + 44.19%
Italy
Cooperative Financial Network (Raiffeisen,
Banco Popolare, and Credito Cooperativo)
1,302 1,360 n.a. 1,347 1,351 1,359 1,392 1,410 1,417 1,417 + 8.83%
Luxembourg
Banque Raiffeissen 2,594 2,297 2,649 2,174 2,330 2,732 2,732 3,126 3,179 3,225 + 24.33%
The Netherlands
Rabobank 8,306 11,467 8,959 13,850 16,088 16,996 20,471 19,144 20,293 25,606 + 208.28%
Portugal
Credito Agricola 1,710 1,685 1,659 1,786 1,611 1,778 2,080 2,242 2,501 2,580 + 50.88%
Slovenia
Dezelna Banka Slovenije d.d. n.a. 992 992 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,428 1,084 1,111 1,114 + 12.30%a
Spain
Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de Crédito n.a. n.a. 2,267 2,303 2,037 2,097 2,165 2,218 2,165 2,185 - 3.62%b
Banco de Crédito Cooperativo n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 3,037 2,668 2,953 3,117 3,335 3,600 + 18.54%d
Notes. This table reports the total number of clients per branch of consolidated and relationship-based cooperative banks included in our sample,
for each year between 2010 and 2019. When available, hand-collected data stem from 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020
annual reports published by the European Association of Co-operative Banks. For further information, see http://www.eacb.coop/en/about/annual-
reports.html. a2011-2019 % change. b2012-2019 % change. c2013-2019 % change. d2014-2019 % change.
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Appendix B. Consolidated & relationship-based co-
operative banks in the euro area (2019)
Table B1: Consolidated & relationship-based cooperative banks in the euro area
(2019)
Home country Number of clients
Number of legally
independent local Number of branches Number of clients
or regional cooperative (in home country) per branch
banks
Panel A: Consolidated cooperative banks
Österreichischer Volksbanken Austria 1,072,639 9 267 4,017
OP Financial Group Finland 3,894,000 147 352 11,063
Crédit Agricole France 52,000,000 39 8,400 6,190
Crédit Mutuel France 34,200,000 18 5,000 6,840
BPCE France 30,000,000 29 7,440a 4,032
Rabobank Netherlands 9,500,000 89 371 25,606
Banco de Crédito Cooperativo Spain 3,441,666 18 956 3,600
Panel B: Relationship-based cooperative banks
Österreichische Raiffeisenbanken Austria 4,000,000 368 1,781 2,246
Cooperative Financial Network -




banks, PSD banks, and DZ banks)
Cooperative Financial Network
Italy 6,000,000b 259 4,234 1,417(Raiffeisen, Banco Popolare, and
Credito Cooperativo)
Banque Raiffeissen Luxembourg 122,547 1 38 3,225
Credito Agricola Portugal 1,684,462 79 653 2,580
Dezelna Banka Slovenije d.d. Slovenia 87,977 1 79 1,114
Unión Nacional de Cooperativas de
Spain 7,064,825 42 3,233 2,185
Crédito
Median value 5,000,000 41 1,369 3,413
Notes. This table reports for the year 2019 the home country, the total numbers of clients, legally independent local or regional cooperative
banks, branches (in home country) and clients per branch of consolidated and relationship-based cooperative banks included in our sample.
Prime source is EACB (2020b), which was elaborated in collaboration with Tilburg University and based on European Association of Co-
operative Banks Members input (financial indicators on 31.12.2019). aData from 2018. bValue calculated by Tilburg University which bears
the full and sole responsibility, as it is neither reported nor formally approved by the respective cooperative banks.






Since the single currency was implemented, monetary policy has been the backbone
of the European banking industry. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis
(GFC), the European Central Bank (ECB) had no choice but to resort to uncon-
ventional measures to push inflation up to target. Since then, this posture changed
very little, and even intensified with the advent of the global COVID-19 pandemic.
As interest rates remained stuck at historically low levels, the method of prob-
lematizing the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission gradually changed.
While early work demonstrated the existence of this channel, its amplitude, and
its interactions with bank-specific characteristics, a new line of research recently
focused on the financial stability implications of the extension of the risk-taking
channel over time. The goal of this thesis was to contribute new insights on both
sides of the fence.
Chapter 2 explored the existence of the bank risk-taking channel in the post-GFC
euro area, as well as its interaction with banking industry competition and leverage
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(through a search for yield effect). I also identify nonlinearities in the risk-taking
channel depending on the level of bank capitalization. In contrast with previous
evidence for the U.S. banking industry, these results point to the importance for
theoretical studies to consider alternative channels–in addition to the traditional
portfolio rebalancing channels–and confirm that time, geographical circumstances,
and local banking market conditions are key in understanding the impact of mon-
etary policy on credit risk.
Despite an extensive literature on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, the
joint influence of bank capital and funding liquidity on the latter remains poorly doc-
umented. However, this prospect is crucial when monetary policy is implemented
under the concomitant capital and liquidity standards stipulated by the Basel III
accords. Using data on the euro area from 1999 to 2018 and triple interactions
among monetary policy, equity capital, and deposits (as a proxy for funding liq-
uidity), Chapter 3 suggested that banks concerned with a crowding-out of deposits
effect before the GFC are more sensitive to the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy. These results support the need to implement capital and funding liquidity
ratios simultaneously to mitigate the monetary policy transmission to credit risk.
The findings also highlight the absence of this effect among less efficient banks in
the aftermath of the GFC. Accordingly, for inefficient banks operating in a low in-
terest rate environment, a trade-off arises between financial stability and funding
liquidity. These results have implications for euro area bank regulators advocating
uniform funding liquidity requirements across a variety of banking systems under
low-for-long interest rates.
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Lastly, I used a simultaneous equations framework in Chapter 4 to investigate
the effects of monetary easing on cooperative banks’ performance depending on their
commitment to relationship lending. While I do not find evidence of a risk-taking
channel of monetary policy for consolidated (i.e., less committed to relationship
lending) cooperative banks, I show that the profitability of relationship-based co-
operative banks is more severely hit in a low interest rate environment compared to
consolidated cooperative banks. This finding raises issues on the mid-term durabil-
ity of relationship lending under low-for-long rates. Moreover, both non-cooperative
banks and relationship-based cooperative banks tend to increase credit risk under
monetary accommodation. However, these similarities do not occur for the same
reasons: while the former prioritize profitability through higher credit risk when
interest rates fall, the latter rather increase their capital buffers to ensure credit
access to customers, which consist mainly of small businesses and high-risk firms.
This last part of the thesis argues for greater consideration for bank business model
diversity, and how it influences the mechanism of monetary transmission within the
European banking industry.
The present doctoral thesis has several implications regarding the monetary
policy and potential adjustments in the near future of the euro area. Specifically, I
propose three lines of thought to gain a more precise understanding of the risk-taking
channel of monetary policy transmission, namely bank leverage, bank efficiency, and
bank ownership structures.
Chapter 2 suggested that euro area banking industry is concerned with a “skin-
in-the-game” effect (De Nicolò et al., 2010) involving that the more a bank has to
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lose in case of failure (i.e., having high levels of capitalization), the less severe the
moral hazard problem. This means that banks with a high franchise value have
a lot to lose and little incentive to take excessive risk, whereas zombie banks are
willing to take great risks to gamble for resurrection (as it seems to be the case in
the U.S. banking industry). Accordingly, policymakers should tackle the issue of
bank leverage when reviewing solutions to tame the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy in the euro area (and, especially, when interest rates prolong at extremely
low levels).
In turn, Chapter 3 highlighted that inefficient banks facing low interest rates are
unable to comply at the same time with capital and funding liquidity requirements
without increasing their level of credit risk. This requires a closer look at changes
in the share of European banks which have not succeeded in regaining satisfactory
levels of efficiency since the GFC. In terms of potential adjustments for the monetary
policy, this contribution provides insights on why concomitant capital requirements,
funding liquidity requirements and low interest rates may ultimately be an explosive
combination in terms of financial stability.
As an essential part of the euro area banking industry, cooperative banks and
the way they preserve their business model and relationship lending practices also
interact with monetary policy. Chapter 4 evidenced that consolidated cooperative
banks are not significantly exposed to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy.
This result may be due to the adoption of hybrid forms of organizational structures
(i.e., halfway between decentralized cooperatives’ and non-cooperatives’) leading
to new credit risk strategies when interest rates remain low. Thus, this would be
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worth exploring this avenue in future research dedicated to risk-taking channel of
monetary policy.
By way of complement, relationship-based cooperative banks increase their cap-
ital buffers to ensure access to credit when interest rates are low, including for
risky local businesses. As a close bank–customer relationship produces informa-
tional rents for the cooperative banks involved, they exercise some degree of market
power and are better prepared to finance riskier borrowers and projects. This insight
points to the crucial impact of the bank–customer relationship on the development
of regional and local economies when evaluating how small and territorial-based
banks are impacted by the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Implementing
policies without taking into account the specificities of these banks would eventually
lead them to exit the banking industry with, potentially, a considerable impact on
the access to credit for a large number of individuals and local businesses in the
euro area.
Undoubtedly, the future of monetary policy is called on to play an active role in
addressing financial stability risks. While low and stable inflation promotes financial
stability, it also increases the likelihood that excess demand pressures show up first
in credit aggregates and asset prices, rather than in goods and services prices.
Accordingly, in some situations, a monetary response to credit and asset markets
may be appropriate to preserve both financial and monetary stability (Pfister and
Sahuc, 2020). As a result, credit risk and financial stability must be a concern for
the ECB when the financial sector ends up being unable to absorb all of its losses
with possible cascading defaults if it is not bailed out.
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Still, uncertainties remain on the linkages between easy money and low rates,
on one hand, and risks to financial stability, on the other. Monetary easing does
work in part by increasing the propensity of investors and lenders to take risks but
in periods of recession or financial stress, encouraging investors and lenders to take
reasonable risks is an appropriate goal of policy. Though, problems arise when, be-
cause of less-than-perfectly rational behavior or distorted institutional incentives,
risk-taking goes too far. Vigilance and appropriate policies, including macropru-
dential and regulatory policies, are therefore essential. In addition, evidence is still
sorely lacking on whether new monetary tools pose greater stability risks than the
generally low rate environment expected to persist even when monetary policy is
at a neutral setting (Bernanke, 2020).
In a speech delivered at The ECB and Its Watchers XXI web conference on 30
September 2020, Claudio Borio, Head of the Monetary and Economic Department of
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), voiced the idea that the tools central
banks use in a crisis are actually becoming increasingly indistinguishable from those
employed in normal times (Borio, 2020). Somehow surprisingly, such tools proved
more effective than expected in influencing financial conditions and bank behavior
over time, but also appear to exhibit diminishing effectiveness and long-term side
effects.
So there are grounds to believe that monetary tools have diminishing effective-
ness, as there are limits to how far interest rates can be lowered and credit spreads
compressed. The compression of bank interest margins can also weaken their lend-
ing capacity in the longer term, and it becomes increasingly obvious that the lower
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interest rates are, the smaller the impact on economic activity (the impact of the
duration of low rates also being a key issue) is.
Partly as a result, the wide-ranging emergency measures taken to address the
COVID-19 pandemic further reduced the policy room for maneuver, reminding us
that an economy with small safety margins is exposed and vulnerable. Therefore,
the priority in the future of the euro area and research to undertake will be to
rebuild policy buffers, not just in monetary policy, but also in prudential and fiscal
policies.
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Essays on the Risk-Taking Channel of Monetary Policy Transmission in
the Euro Area
Abstract: The thesis contributes to the recurrent debates in the macroeconomics of banking regarding
the risk-taking channel of monetary policy transmission. As the unifying theme of the present essays,
I tackle this issue from three different angles with a special focus on the euro area banking industry. I
rely on available data–at both the bank-level and the country-level–and different identification strategies
to deliver up-to-date empirical evidence contributing to a deeper understanding of the monetary policy
impacts on credit risk.
In the first chapter of the thesis, I investigate how the risk-taking channel of monetary policy interacts
with the degree of leverage in banks’ balance sheets after the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 (GFC). Using
dynamic panel techniques, I first find significant statistical evidence that credit risk is negatively associ-
ated with variations in interest rates, while competition in national banking industries tends to enhance
this effect. I also suggest that this negative relationship is most pronounced for banks with relatively
high levels of leverage, which is consistent with a “search for yield” effect. These results for the euro area
are strikingly different from the U.S. banking industry, confirming that time, geographical circumstances,
and local banking market conditions are key in understanding the impact of monetary policy on credit
risk. Moreover, the results point to the importance of considering alternative channels of risk taking in
addition to traditional portfolio rebalancing channels in theoretical studies.
The second chapter investigates the joint impact of bank capital and funding liquidity on the monetary
policy’s risk-taking channel. Using data on the euro area from 1999 to 2018 and triple interactions between
monetary policy, bank equity, and funding liquidity, I shed light on a “crowding-out of deposits” effect
prior to the GFC, which supports the need for simultaneous capital and funding liquidity ratios to mit-
igate the monetary transmission to bank credit risk. Interestingly, the analysis also highlights a missing
crowding-out of deposits effect among low-efficiency banks in the aftermath of the GFC. Consequently, a
trade-off arises between financial stability and increased funding liquidity, requiring a special treatment for
inefficient banks operating in a low interest rate environment. These results challenge the implementation
of uniform funding liquidity requirements across the euro area as by the Basel III framework suggests.
The third and last chapter extends the analysis to the special case of cooperative banks and relation-
ship lending in the euro area. These financial intermediaries tell a different story between countries and
therefore imply different responses to a common monetary policy. Accordingly, I find no evidence of the
presence of a risk-taking channel of monetary policy for consolidated (i.e., less committed to relationship
lending) cooperative banks, whereas the results indicate extensive evidence of a risk-taking channel in the
euro area for non-cooperative banks (see also the previous chapters of the thesis). Therefore, consolidated
cooperative banks seem not to raise their credit risk significantly when monetary policy is eased. Further,
I highlight that the profitability of cooperative banks preserving their relationship lending model is more
severely hit by a low interest rate environment compared to cooperative banks opting for consolidation.
This finding raises issues on the mid-term durability of relationship lending as interest rates have been
low for an extended period in the European banking industry. I ultimately find that both non-cooperative
banks and relationship-based cooperative banks are concerned about the risk-taking channel of monetary
policy transmission, which results in an increase in their credit risk under accommodating monetary con-
ditions. Nevertheless, I suggest that such similarities do not exist for the same reasons, as relationship
lending is associated with a fundamentally different lending process than transactions-based lending tech-
nologies, which devote significantly lower proportions of their assets to lending to small businesses.
Keywords: Monetary policy; Risk-taking channel; Credit risk; Euro area banks.
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